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Abstract
This study undertakes a cultural critique of dominant, modern relationships to
“nature” through a cross-cultural philosophical engagement with certain Indigenous
American traditions of thought. This is done through a focus on questions of ontology:
what kind of ontological presuppositions inform our own dominant, modern
philosophical heritage? What kinds of relations do these at once enable and foreclose?
And what alternate possibilities for thinking and living might be opened through different
ontologies? I argue that grappling with modernity’s legacy of anthropocentrism and
ecologically disastrous relationships forces us to rethink an existential terrain set by an
atomistic ontology that reflects a Christian interpretation of the world. In contrast to this
dominant ontology and as a way of defamiliarizing ourselves from it, this study
endeavours to think with and alongside what I argue are profoundly relational ontologies
and styles of thinking expressed by different Indigenous philosophies and lifeways. It
also poses the question: how might relational ontologies open up different ways of
understanding and experiencing ourselves, of disclosing and relating to the nonhuman, of
construing the nature of our ethical horizons?
As part of my exploration of this question, I bring Indigenous thought into
conversation with two thinkers from the Western tradition who arrive, from their own
directions, at somewhat analogously relational perspectives – namely, Friedrich
Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. I argue that the critical arsenal these thinkers offer
Western theory gives valuable insights concerning the potential that relational thinking
might have as a counterdiscourse vis à vis our dominant culture – but that Indigenous
thought pushes us much farther still in this direction. Accordingly, I try to explore how
lessons from Indigenous thought might lead us to rethink or recuperate on different terms
certain elements of Nietzsche and Heidegger’s critiques. Rethinking counterdiscursive
possibilities in this way, this study seeks to contribute towards a critical theorizing that is
more consciously responsive to the intertwined legacies of colonialism, modern thought,
and our present ecological crises; to connected political contours, tensions, and
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possibilities within our present; and also better attuned to possible points of productive
consonance, conversation, and allegiance therein.
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Introduction
“The ecological crisis is a symptom of a deeper, metaphysical crisis in human
consciousness and an accompanying crisis of culture.”
-Freya Mathews1

0.1 Ecological Relations as an Ontological Problem
That we live today in an age of ecological crisis is a truth we can evade only at the
price of our own intellectual integrity. From a Western, ecologically-informed standpoint,
we might invoke the widespread extinction and depletion of species, pollution caused by
extractive industrial projects and our associated capitalist economy and lifeways, the
acidification of the oceans that are themselves increasingly crowded with plastic and
other noxious garbage, global warming, deforestation, and so on, as only a few indices of
the kind of situation we now face. Accompanying such signs as these, however, is the
fact that the processes generative of this crisis continue altogether unabated, and have
done so despite warnings and opposition that have come from numerous quarters for
many years.
This ecological situation we face today did not suddenly occur overnight; nor did
it arrive out of nowhere. The generally disastrous impact human beings are now having
on the earth and its creatures has accrued as a direct consequence of transformations in
social, political, economic, and other relations, that can be broadly associated with the
phenomenon of “modernity” and processes of “modernization”. The phenomena
involved here are complex and multifaceted.
If we wish to name some of the especially relevant phenomena here, we might
begin with shifts in patterns of subsistence and land use associated with the development
of modern market capitalism, beginning in Europe and spreading elsewhere through
widespread processes of privatizing enclosure, often under directly colonial terms. This
1

Freya Mathews, Reinhabiting Reality: Towards a Recovery of Culture (New York: SUNY Press, 2005), 8.

2
restructuring of relations to the land has actualized, in a generalized way, modern ideas of
ownership as well as land improvement or “development” through the human reworking
of a natural world conceived as passive material for human labour. Connected here has
been the commodification of all manner of our worldly relations and activity and the
general development of marketized, mass societies.2 There is an intimate connection, in
turn, between these phenomena and the growth of the modern state, and kinds of
conceptions of human freedom (e.g., freedom of the market, and an associated body of
liberal-democratic political doctrine) and the good life that this modern form of polity has
both expressed and sought to enable. These processes, it is worth stressing again, are in
turn tied to generalized processes of colonialism that have sought to erase diverse and
pre-existing Indigenous lifeways, to draw a line in time that leaves behind such practices
in order to establish and foster these new realities, new human-nonhuman and humanland relations, new collective and individual accounts of the meaningful way to live.
Intersecting here are forms of technological rationality that have allowed us to think of
ourselves, in ways often taken to be self-evident, as masters of the earth. This prevailing
technological rationality also sets to work in processes of rationalization that have
significantly reordered the terms of social life and worldly relations. The story of our
ecological crisis is, as countless authors have pointed out, the story of the externalities
and consequences and often unforeseen limits of these intersecting logics.
But all of these logics arise, make sense, and become meaningful, on the basis of
a particular background of understanding, a philosophical framework of possibility; and
because we continue to think on these bases, the usual conclusions also seem difficult to
avoid. All the most important social dynamics we might link to our present ecological
situation reflect and manifest, in other words, a particular, dominant, Western
philosophical heritage as their immanent logic. Most particularly, they reflect distinctive
shifts and developments within that heritage generally traceable to the last five hundred
years. Dominant convictions and legitimating notions about the kinds of social projects
that are meaningful or worthwhile, and what the central terms and problems of

2

For a helpful overview of the many of the processes involved here, see Karl Polanyi, The Great
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 35-80.
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(individual and collective) life are, grow in crucial and distinctive ways from the soil of
this thought.
When I refer to “modernity” in this way, I thus mean to signify a particular
cultural, philosophical, and relational complex whose more immediate origins can
generally be traced to relatively recent developments in Western European society,
though this complex has since come to be, if not necessarily hegemonic, at least
dominant, much more broadly. An essential part of the phenomenon of modernity is a
particular mode of relating to what is identifiable as “tradition”: it is a logic at some level
of clearing away what came before in order to build from new and purportedly more
rational foundations, and of reordering social relations accordingly. But the specific way
this possibility is set up, undertaken, and understood to be meaningful, reflects a
particular philosophical heritage and tradition whose consequences we continue to draw
today. Quite despite all narratives to the contrary, modernity is at no time free of
tradition: it is a story that casts itself in universal and culturally neutral tones, but in this it
is expressing in fundamental respects a particular cultural and philosophical tradition, and
certain longstanding assumptions made within it.
The initial point I wish to make is simply that the problem of responding to the
mounting troubles of our ecological crises – which has become one of the most crucial
demands of our age – requires that we revisit the assumptions and philosophies that have
landed us here. Attempting to live differently, to bring forth futures that do not match our
direst current expectations, requires not only that we understand the kinds of logics,
assumptions, and legitimating arguments that have landed us where we are, and that
continue to empower those processes we may wish to curb. But more than this, we need
to ask how we might learn to think differently, to broaden the philosophical imaginaries
on which we draw – and not just rehearse the same tired scripts to ourselves as
comforting companions to a solipsistic grave.
A necessary task in the philosophical reckoning that is required of us today, I
suggest, involves problematizing or putting to question many of our most fundamental
and accustomed assumptions about ourselves and the world, about the basic nature and
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structure of existence. It involves troubling our assumptions about what “nature” is and
how we can/should relate to “it”, about what it means to be a human being, and so on.
That is to say, it is necessary to problematize our dominant ontology. The basic dicta of
ontology inform how we live, the decisions we make, what alternatives we see, and what
possibilities we imagine, in a way that is often invisible in everyday contexts. It is
invisible because these dicta tend to be experienced even in the form of background
notions we largely take for granted as common sense, and concerning which we often
barely conceive that alternatives are possible. But make no mistake: many of the most
consequential philosophical commitments we make transpire at this level; and these
commitments are both fundamentally interpretive and contestable.
The major point here, in other words, is this: that without a rethinking of
ontology, we are likely to only continue reproducing the generative conditions of our
ecological troubles even as we try to address discrete issues as they arise. We will
continue to conceive and experience our freedom, our technoscientific vocation, what
civilization and nature are and mean, and so on, in ways that set us to collide ruinously
with ecological limits.
At the broadest level, this is the task that my dissertation takes up: to defamiliarize
these most basic elements of our thinking, to try to disrupt a certain tendency to
monotony in our philosophical imaginaries and to develop a kind of broadened critical
vantage-point on the dominant practices and understandings of our day. Most especially,
I try to ask how beginning to think more relationally, and from out of more relational
ontologies, might open up different ways of thinking and living, of conceiving the scope
of our possibilities of being in the world, in relating to the nonhuman and what we tend to
see as “nature”. For reasons that I hope to make clear, I think that an especially good way
to do this kind of work, to ask this kind of question, is to broaden the scope of our
conversation beyond the confines of the Western tradition. Most especially, it seems to
me that Western theory might learn a great deal on this point from Indigenous American
philosophical traditions. In the following dissertation, I will endeavour to show some
respects in which this is so.

5

0.2 Relationalities
This question of relationality can be said on many fronts to be “in the air” today,
in ways that provide a general backdrop that informs my work here, and relative to which
this dissertation might be of especial interest and relevance.
The idea that reforming our relations to “nature” must involve learning to think of
ourselves not as disembedded from it, but as relationally constituted within it, has been
one voiced in various iterations and for some time on the Western side of things. Such an
influential thinker in the deep ecology movement as Arne Naess, for example, has made
this claim.3 Many authors have responded to this idea in one way or another from the
“ecological philosophy” side of things – including for example Freya Mathews, who I
draw upon a fair amount in this work. At the broadest level, this idea that relational
thinking can supply philosophical resources better conducive to a more sustainable and
less anthropocentric way of being is I think an immensely valuable suggestion.
At the same time, various thinkers in the contemporary Western theoretical
tradition have offered versions of a more relational counterdiscourse oriented towards
rethinking our ways of being in the world and the dominant terms of our existence. What
we might broadly call “Nietzschean thought” – including not only Friedrich Nietzsche
and Martin Heidegger, but also Max Weber, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and others
– can be seen to have offered a great deal in this direction, in ways that have been
tremendously influential in the circles of Western theory. In this dissertation, what I am
above all interested in is relationships: the kind of relationships we currently enact as
human beings relative to nonhuman ones, to the land, to what we think of as “nature”,
and so on. What kinds of relationships currently produce and structure our present-day
ecological crises, and what might different relationships look like? One of the great
values of these thinkers is that they can help us think about relationships – and, most
particularly, help us think about the ways in which our dominant relationships can be
seen to be impoverished. But as Nietzsche saw so clearly, an impoverishment in
3

See, for example, Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A
Summary,” in Inquiry 16:1 (1973), 95.
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relationships also means an impoverishment in ourselves, in the kind of selfhood we
experience, and in our accounts of what it means to live a good life. The ecological crisis,
read in this light, must precisely be taken to be also a crisis in culture (as Freya Mathews
claims above), a crisis that challenges us to rethink just who it is we think we are, and
how we think we ought to live.
Hence, one can locate a broad trajectory of thought in contemporary Western
theory that surfaces now and again (often drawing especially on thinkers like Nietzsche,
Heidegger, and Deleuze – including in his partnership with Félix Guattari): attempts to
rethink ethics and politics and what it means to live a good life – often the basis of more
relational ways of thinking. Change your ontology, change your thinking, change your
mode of being and doing. Evidently this present work takes up this orientation in its own
way.
But it is not only from the quarters of Western theory and Western academics that
one hears something like this. Indeed, the cultural, legal, and philosophical traditions of
many Indigenous peoples throughout the Americas express, so far as I understand them, a
profoundly relational way of thinking predicated upon profoundly relational ontologies.
In the contemporary context, relational philosophies, ethical concepts, and so on, are also
often articulated by Indigenous peoples as sources of critique in direct opposition to the
colonial and resource-extractive projects of dominant, capitalist, modern/Western
lifeways. This kind of thing is not new, but it is ongoing. Quite recently in Canada (as
only one example), the question of relations and relationality has been vocalized by
Indigenous thinkers and groups connected with the “Idle No More” movement, as part of
ongoing processes of resistance to colonialism in general and land and resource
expropriation efforts in particular on the part of the Canadian government and settler
society.4 In Ecuador, to take another example, a similar kind of relational
counterdiscourse has been put forward in the Quichua notion of the kausaj sacha or

4

See, for example, Naomi Klein, “Dancing the World Into Being: A Conversation with Idle No More’s
Leanne Simpson,” in Yes! Magazine (March 5, 2013), available at: http://www.yesmagazine.org/peacejustice/dancing-the-world-into-being-a-conversation-with-idle-no-more-leanne-simpson.
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“living forest”, that has been voiced especially in opposition to plans for the further
“development” of the Amazonian region through oil extraction.5
All this raises questions about the possible linkages or conversations that might be
made across Indigenous and Western philosophical traditions on the subject of what it
means to think relationally, how doing so might invite us to reflect upon our dominant
modern lifeways, and so on. It raises the question, relative to my own vantage point, of
how I might begin to more thoughtfully absorb something, as a non-Indigenous settler
and Western person invested at some level in the problems of philosophy and critical
cultural theory, from the kinds of things Indigenous peoples tend to say, not least when
responding to the action of modern settler societies.
And indeed, scholars and activists and elders and others will often suggest that
there is a great deal that Western thinking might stand to learn from Indigenous
traditions, especially on the question of what it might mean to live and relate more
sustainably on the land and with the nonhuman, and with a closer sense of connection to
these. This dissertation is in many respects my own attempt to think this kind of
suggestion through as seriously as I can and in my own way. And indeed, scholars will
often make this claim in a broad way by implying points of intersection between the
kinds of things I broadly gloss as “Nietzschean” relational concepts and Indigenous ones
– for example, in the notion that Indigenous thinking is “place-based”, that it bears some
affinity to the Heideggarian concept of “dwelling” in places, and so on.6 The precise
nature of these intersections, however, and what differences may still be involved
between Western and Indigenous conceptions in this regard, is rarely explored in much
detail or as a potential source of philosophical insight or lessons for theorists invested in
Nietzschean critique.
5

See Gualinga, José, “Declaration of ‘Kawsak Sacha, Living Rainforest.” Available at:
http://www.frontieredevie.fr/documents/Kawsak-Sacha-2.pdf.
6
See, for example, Edward S. Casey, “How to Get From Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time:
Phenomenological Prolegomena,” in Senses of Place, ed. by Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso (Santa Fe:
School of American Research Press, 1996), 15; Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in
livelihood, dwelling, and skill (New York: Routledge, 2000), generally; Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits in
Places: Landscape and Language Among the Western Apache (Albuquerque: Univesity of New Mexico,
1996), 106-107; and many more. The invocation of Heideggarian notions of place for thinking about and
signifying what is going on in Indigenous traditions of thought is quite widespread – which, as we will see,
is not altogether surprising, since the concept is indeed useful in this regard.
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Moreover, the political and cross-cultural sense in which questions of relationality
are “in the air” today entreats us to ask about relational ontology not as merely an abstract
theoretical question. It is rather one richly rooted in a lived and contested political and
colonial terrain, which those of us who might wish to critique the dominant dynamics of
“modernity” from within the Americas both inhabit and must engage. In trying to think
through questions of relationality and relational ontology in an explicitly cross-cultural
way and in light of this political context, it is my hope to also do theory in a more
politically engaged way.
That is: with a view at once to illuminating actual faultlines, points of tension and
resistance, and so on, within the present political conjuncture, and in a way that is also
useful for thinking about the more hopeful possibilities that might be found and nursed
there. What possible philosophical, cultural, and counter-cultural allegiances and
intersections might be made, and might be productively explored and engaged in the
fashioning of alternative collective futures? How can we best understand what the
philosophical and cultural import of some of these struggles might be, including from a
non-Indigenous but critical perspective? What kind of critical vantage-point and theory
might better serve such a political moment as ours, might help us learn and make the
most from it, finding productive points of overlap, of common or at least consonant
concern and so on? What connections might be drawn between Indigenous thinking and
the kind of critical arsenal more usually drawn upon in the discourses of Western critical
theory – and how might the latter be usefully provoked and changed through this
engagement?
Problematization of ontology as such is a difficult enough move to make
depending on the context; but it is rarer still to find this done, with sufficient rigour, in an
explicitly cross-cultural way.7 Such a project is an important one to engage in, not least in
light of the kinds of questions I have just raised. In this dissertation, I argue that to
undertake cross-cultural philosophizing with rigour requires precisely that we understand
that the differences between the traditions in question extend to and include differences in
7

Although there are certainly people who should be named here, such as Tim Ingold, Eduardo Viveiros de
Castro, and Mario Blaser – whose styles of questioning here are probably closest to my own.
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ontology. In other words, I wish to accept and generally argue for what Mario Blaser has
characterized as a framework of “political ontology”, which takes for granted that
ontologies do exist in the plural; that the dominant modern/Western ontology should not
be interpreted as supplying a kind of neutral and superior meta-discourse or most true
ontology; and that the co-presence of disagreeing ontologies describes something
essential in the contemporary political conjuncture.8 But if Blaser is right in making this
argument (and I think he is), there are nevertheless few who have tried to explore what
cross-cultural philosophizing and critical re-thinking could then mean within this space,
much less through an engagement with Indigenous relational ontologies in particular.
The foregoing, I hope, will help to give a sense not only of some of the ways
relational themes are like to be encountered today, but also relative gaps in the
conversations on this point that I wish to try to fill. But it may also fairly be asked, at this
juncture, why I focus on Indigenous relational ontologies in particular. Are there more
possibilities than atomistic and relational ontologies, amongst the non-modern? I am
inclined to answer the latter question in the affirmative. Blaser, for example, has drawn
on Philippe Descola to suggest that there are also “analogical” ontologies (as in Taoism,
where an “originating dynamic . . . repeats itself from the micro to the macro and
permeates the entire cosmos”), and “totemistic ones” (which allocate “a mix of humans
and non-humans within ontologically distinct groups that originate from a common
ancestor”), as presumably exist amongst Australian Aborigine peoples.9 I should expect
that there are more than these; and that such ideal types are only helpful to a point before
we have to acknowledge a great deal of diversity that resists them.
I engage relational ontologies here for reasons that are to a certain extent
circumstantial: these are traditions and inclinations that are both “around” in the places I
live and amongst people I have met, and that I have had the good fortune to find myself
thinking about in the course of my life and research. But then, relational thinking is also a
direction gestured to as a counterdiscourse on a number of counts, as I have already
indicated; and it happens to be one that I am convinced holds meaningful potential for
8

Mario Blaser, “Political Ontology: Cultural Studies without ‘cultures’?” In Cultural Studies 23:5-6 (Sept.Nov. 2009), generally.
9
Ibid, 886.
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thinking-otherwise in the present moment. But by no means do I wish to suggest that it is
the only viable course one might take, most especially in cross-culturally exploring
alternate and less anthropocentric ways of being in the world.

0.3 Some Clarification of Terms: “Modernity”, “Nature”,
“Philosophy”
There is an obvious corollary to my claim that “modernity” can be understood, at
least in its dominant guise, as entrenching and expressing a particular ontology, and my
claim that Indigenous philosophical traditions generally presume a different kind of
ontology (i.e., a relational one). Thus, there is a distinct sense in which I claim that
Indigenous philosophical traditions – as these also continue to be lived today, including
by people I have met – should be understood as “non-modern”. There has been a good
deal of writing in recent years that would dispute the validity of this gesture: not
infrequently, we are told that the non-modern does not exist, or that we must abstain from
using the term on moral grounds.
This is usually because it is assumed that referring to Indigenous traditions as
non-modern must amount to relegating Indigenous and other non-Western peoples (who
continue to practice and think within such alternate traditions and ontologies) to the
undesirable end of a single binary. One can be either non-modern and hence inhabit
statically traditional “islands” outside the reach of History’s changes (in which History
presumably is an unproblematically universal ontological structure); or one can be
modern, reinventing oneself with the times, partaking in some way or another in the
general project of Freedom. To my mind the issue is that the alternatives here are poorly
devised, and tend to say more about the either/or categories of modern Westerners (which
we avoid sufficiently problematizing) than anything else. Why assume that History is
singular and more ontologically real than anything else? Why assume that the
“traditional” – whatever that is supposed to mean in the singular – is static, never mind
homogeneous?

11
The “modernity” I know, and which seems to me to be dominant but not universal
today, is predicated upon and enforces a particular ontology and way of thinking that
stems from European origins. But I have met many people who do not think and live in
these ways – who continue to live, interpret changes, and dynamically cultivate
themselves, on the basis of other ontologies and philosophical traditions. They all wear
bluejeans, yes; but that is hardly the most important or interesting thing that could be said
about them. And to assume from this that they must be “moderns” in any clearcut sense
both effaces the specificity and fullness of the latter term and the actual differences
involved in the way these people understand existence and the kinds of things that exist.
To my mind – and here I follow in particular the suggestion of Mario Blaser – to construe
the present only in terms of possible differences between alternate modernities effaces
the very real sense in which the present also involves a struggle over the non-modern and
indeed over the latter’s very existence. It also effaces from our philosophical and political
imaginaries valuable and real possibilities opened by the persistence of the non-modern.10
A second term I would like to elaborate on a little further here, and which I use
pervasively in this text, is “nature”. As it is used in everyday contexts, “nature” itself is a
rather nebulous and somewhat fuzzy concept that accrues a wide range of meanings. And
indeed, this fuzziness – or rather this accrued wealth of implicit meaning and associations
– is itself an important characteristic of the way the nature concept functions in our
dominant discourse and imagination. And it does function. The point here is that this
conceptual nebulousness, this ever-present range of “background noise”, itself informs
the essential way the “nature” concept circulates in the dominant modern worldview, the
kind of work it does in us and how it leads us to understand the world around us, the
meaning of mundane practices, and so on. In this sense the power of broad concepts like
nature is at some level their very indeterminacy.
My concern in this dissertation is not with some thing called “nature” itself, or
any single definition of this, but with (problematizing) the work that concept does
broadly in structuring our relations to a range of things we signify as nature – which I
also point to, for example, through alternate terms like “the non-human”, “land”, and so
10
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on. I have not abandoned the term “nature”, however, because ultimately I think it is
useful for signifying in a broadly intelligible way (at least to a Western readership) the
kinds of “things”-in-relation I mean but whose identity I ultimately wish to question.
What concerns me, in other words, are the relations we have inasmuch as the nonhuman,
land, and so on, are sighted in this way and hence understood and encountered on the
basis of this background of meaning.
Accordingly, I take it to be necessary – indeed as a matter of precision in my
analysis – to approach the concept of nature with a view to its functioning in this way, to
letting it be what it is in its cultural layeredness. Hence I endeavour to draw out some of
the most important tones, as it were, within this kind of nebulous totality of resonance –
which is not to say that these tones cannot be heard clearly sounded by particular thinkers
and find their origins in particular philosophical analyses and associated ontological
assumptions. But what is more important than any one articulation by any one thinker is a
general set of dominant resonances that come to be felt between them, which is given
voice in a variety of interlocking ways that take their thematic bearing from a variety of
issues. To develop an analysis and understanding of “nature” along these lines, however,
is not short work – is not the sort of thing you can do in two sentences devoted to
“clarifying your terms” – which is why I devote much of Chapter One, and the bulk of
Chapter Two, to the question.
A third term whose use in this dissertation I would like to clarify is “philosophy”.
This work attempts to establish a cross-culturally broadened vantage-point from which to
undertake a critique of modern thought and culture with regard to our relations to
“nature”. Accordingly, my aim is also to explore a distinctively cross-cultural way of
thinking about philosophical and ethical questions.
This mode of doing philosophy is I think relatively rare; it has perhaps its most
obvious intellectual forebear in Paul Radin’s Primitive Man as Philosopher. Radin
argues there that philosophizing and philosophers, taken in an adequately broadened
sense, should be taken as universals across cultures, and that every human society
contains thinkers who grapple with certain shared, universal problems or questions (for
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example, the nature of reality, the nature of freedom, right and wrong, the nature of the
self, what it means to live a good life, the meaning of death, and so on). Answers to these
questions, however, certainly are not universal.11
We should be careful, of course, in making assertions about “universals”; and we
may even, with Nietzsche, have learned to take a certain disinterest in them. But however
we may wish to put it, the point I wish to take here (and which the language of
“universals” grounds in one way) is that it is fully possible to see something like the same
questions being posed across different cultural contexts, though the precise way these
questions will be posed and approached will itself undoubtedly reflect cultural
particularities/interpretations. In other words, there is the minimum assumption or
discovery of points of rough analogousness across cultures, of shared problems – which
is at some level the condition of possibility of cross-cultural thinking at all.
As John Dewey himself recognized in his introduction to Radin’s work, if we
understand and approach philosophy and philosophical problems in this way, then our
sense of what it can mean to do philosophy undergoes a change. We need no longer
assume that this must or even necessarily should be a conversation that the Western
tradition undertakes with itself. And if we wish to understand, say, what the self is – then
we need not assume that the only or even the best answers to be had will come from the
Western tradition.
We often seem to imagine that philosophy (and scholarship generally) is a
singular, cumulative process. In the past this kind of idea has certainly given support to a
reading of Western thought as the spearhead of universal history, before whose next step
we now understand ourselves to be labouring. But the pluralization of philosophical
traditions, and of ontologies operative within them, cuts into this narrative; it invites a
pluralization of what serious thought and culture/cultivation can mean. It also opens up a
different kind of possibility for our own philosophical work. Rather than interpret
philosophy as a cumulative exercise (which might even make more sense if we were
restricted more narrowly to engagements within the Western tradition), the point can now
11
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become not so much to add to a singular body of what has been said, but to do the work
of putting one tradition into conversation with another. This is a different kind of
conversation, a different mode of “doing philosophy”, that must be evaluated on terms
proper to it and what it sets out to accomplish.
Where we are attempting to engage philosophical problems cross-culturally, we
inevitably find ourselves preoccupied with concerns that more conventional and
culturally insular theoretical texts do not have to the same degree. The relationship of
Quichua to modern Western thought is not the same as the relationship, for example, of
ancient Greek to modern Western thought. In this difference, problems of translation
become paramount to an even greater extent, in response to which it becomes necessary
to learn ways of thinking more familiar to the ethnographer than the philosopher. Perhaps
most especially, one must learn to be relatively comfortable with the idea that there is a
special kind of rigor that pertains to the unavoidable imprecision that accompanies crosscultural engagements – which has to do with thinking about and thinking through
conceptual “bridges” across traditions. In my text, the phrase “something like” will
appear often and function as an important technical term: it expresses precisely this
method of finding analogical bridges, and it is employed to signal the problematic or
tenuous nature of such analogies. These bridges are necessarily points of approximate
analogy rather than one-to-one correspondence or equation. One cannot even make the
claim that X is to Y as seed is to tree or as ancestor is to descendent, which are
connections that might be more plausibly posited between earlier and later thinkers in the
Western tradition (though I would find the latter more compelling than the former). It
becomes in turn a question of trying to do philosophy and reflect on philosophical
questions from within a space that is opened through this different kind of imprecise but
nonetheless illuminating play.
One of the ways this cross-cultural play is illuminating is that it helps to make
conspicuous the kind of background meaning, basic assumptions, implicit ontological
interpretations, and so on, that continue to separate the “bridges” we might invoke from
their non-Western “analogues”. To my mind an advantage gained is this: that it becomes
possible to simultaneously open up a different view onto possibilities that would not
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otherwise have occurred to us with regard to particular philosophical questions,
defamiliarizing ourselves from our usual thinking. From a vantage-point broadened by
cross-cultural reflection, it becomes possible to see how we might begin to think about
particular philosophical questions/problems on the basis of radically different terms – the
differences involved here, to my mind, exceeding those liable to be found only internally
to the Western tradition.
Invoking Western thinkers as bridges, and bringing them into the fold of such
cross-cultural terms of engagement, calls for a different kind of treatment of them than
might be expected in the context of other sorts of academic conversations. Though my
principle bridges in this work will be Nietzsche and Heidegger, my preoccupations are
less those of clarifying precisely what, say, Nietzsche or Heidegger said in terms of the
explicit and internal coherence of their thought – or what they would understand
themselves to have said, or what a mainstream interpretation of their work would be. I am
not intending to make a contribution to Nietzsche Studies or Heidegger Studies. I
consider the philosophical space in which I move to have been opened in crucial respects
by these thinkers. But beyond this, my concerns here are limited, first, to the extent to
which they are helpful as bridges; secondly, to the kind of implicit background
resonances that may be drawn out of them through this process; thirdly, to the extent to
which, having employed them in this way, we can see more clearly some of the limits and
limitedness of the help we can expect from them where the problem of nature is
concerned; and fourthly, to the ways in which lessons from Indigenous thought might
lead us to rethink or recuperate on different terms certain elements of the cultural
critiques they offer us.
This kind of explicitly cross-cultural approach sets my work apart, for example,
from recent works in ecological philosophy like Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter12 or Freya
Mathews’ Reinhabiting Reality. Both of these do extremely valuable work on topics very
similar to my own, in seeking to undermine key assumptions that inform our present
mode of anthropocentric modern thinking. Most especially, they both focus on the ways
our tradition has tended to conceive animacy and materiality and the ways this limits the
12
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scope of our possible and meaningful engagements with the material and natural world.
But neither of them tackles this problem in an explicitly or (accordingly) rigorously
cross-cultural way. Mathews mentions Australian Aboriginal thought in passing, but
more as an aside than as a focus of sustained reflection. In this sense the proximity she
gestures to between these and her own counterdiscursive response to the Western
tradition is not thought through in detail, nor are the differences involved engaged
deliberately as potential sources of philosophical insight. It is interesting to speculate here
that the very traits and delimitations that make Mathews’ book more definitely
recognizable as philosophy also make her book less thorough as anthropology.13
Thus, to my mind, neither Mathews nor Bennett fathoms the question of
relationality – especially as it could pertain to a rethinking of animacy, or what relational
ontology could enable as a counterdiscourse on the matters that concern them – to the
depth to which Indigenous thinking could lead them. Alternate theoretical resources from
within the Western tradition, including Nietzsche in Bennett’s book and Heideggerian
concepts of “dwelling” and “place” and “letting-be” and so on in Mathews’, are engaged
in a much more usual way – i.e., precisely as the kinds of alternate resources one might
expect to draw on especially where the conversation is largely limited to the Western
tradition. The work of this dissertation stands apart from this more standard usage in that
it opens a cross-culturally-broadened vantage point from which precisely these kinds of
contrapuntal Western voices are themselves also able to be questioned, reconsidered,
provoked and stretched in less usual ways.
We “theory” scholars are more used to engaging contemporary problems,
ecological and otherwise, I think, in much this way: we take a problem, identify our usual
way of thinking about it, use one or several thinkers from the Western tradition to show
how one might possibly illuminate/reframe the problem in different/more desirable ways,
and draw the resulting conclusions. This kind of work, as for example Bennett or
Mathews show, can be unquestionably valuable; and the Western tradition certainly
contains room for a good deal of play on most points of interest. But then, if this is all we
ever do, we are also likely to repeat basic presuppositions and assumptions (not least,
13
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those emergent from our usual Christian and atomistic ontology) about how one must
think in order to think at all – simply because such assumptions become invisible when
they are all we ever hear.
A final point might be included with the previous three insofar as these offer
commentary on some of the methodological idiosyncracies of this dissertation and the
limits of its focus. This point concerns the essential interdisciplinarity of this present
work, and hence the kind of work it does and on which it should most centrally be
judged. Mine is an argument that draws upon conversations in political theory,
environmental studies, philosophy, and anthropology. But it also, for this reason, is
situated in a space at some remove from each of these, and the kinds of foci and
disciplinary conversations proper to them. At some level, my argument necessarily begins
with a number of disparate interdisciplinary pieces, and attempts to show that these
pieces can and should be engaged in proximity to one another, and then asks: “Given
these pieces and in light of them, how then might we think?” One of the distinct
contributions of this work, I think, is the way in which it attempts to bring often-separate
conversations together into dialogue – conversations that, moreover, are not confined to
the Western academy.
At the same time, the interdisciplinarity involved here also precludes me from, for
example, undertaking a full review of all the literatures relevant to all the various
elements I bring together here. It would be an impossibly large and also not terribly
interesting project to flesh out how all the themes and topics I touch on in this dissertation
have been engaged by literatures across the several disciplines that I draw on, or to
contextualize all of the elements I employ here within the diverse and often multiple
disciplinary academic debates that might at some level be relevant to them. Further, it
would be somewhat beside the point since my aim here is not specifically to weigh in on
any of these discrete debates.
Thus, for example, although I draw on critical analyses of sovereignty, modern
politics, the history of modern thought and culture, the history of colonialism, or the
theological underpinnings of our thought, I do not raise these matters because my aim is
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to add something new and unthought-of to each of these discrete topics of analysis and
scholarship. My point is not to suggest that we do not yet adequately understand
something about – for example – modern sovereignty and its stakes; and I do not purport
to lay out what that is and propose how to do better. I of course offer an account of
modern sovereignty that I try to present as a defensible one, grounded largely in classical
theorists of the subject – though a certain amount of detail and care in this must
inevitably be sacrificed inasmuch as it is not the major focus of my work. Rather, it forms
part of what I take to be necessary context and conceptual building-blocks – in order to
understand the stakes, the consequences, and the nature of the problem I am trying to
raise – and the situatedness from which I raise it. I endeavour to present such buildingblocks in as much detail as is pertinent to my use of them.
At the same time, this dissertation, though it has involved ethnographic fieldwork
on my part and has a good deal to say about different Indigenous traditions of thought, is
not itself intended to be presented or read as ethnography, as making some new
ethnographic contribution, which accordingly must take care to situate itself in a novel
way amidst other such contributions. The “so what” that frames this work is not, finally,
the generation of knowledge about one or several Indigenous traditions of thought.
Rather, I am concerned precisely with the kinds of conversations we might have where
we permit ourselves to engage ethnography seriously as a way of doing something
distinct from it: that is to say, philosophy and cultural critique. This has to do with the
interdisciplinarity of the work. But it also has to do with the kind of interdisciplinary
work it is: an interdisciplinary philosophizing that is moreover a cross-cultural
philosophizing. But I bring together all the various pieces I do here because I think that
these provide the kind of grounding context necessary in order to have this
interdisciplinary conversation in an adequately conscientious and informed way.

0.4 Chapter Overview
Let us hope the foregoing will suffice as preamble and introductory context. The
rest of this work is divided into four chapters and a conclusion. These could in turn be
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grouped together into two broad movements: the first two chapters opening up my
problem and delivering relevant context and bases for comparison from the
Western/modern side of things; and the last two chapters moving more directly into the
domain of cross-cultural thinking with Indigenous traditions of thought.
The first chapter, in particular, attempts to introduce my project in a way that
foregrounds its situatedness within a particular philosophical tradition but also within the
(inter-)cultural and political terrain of (North) American settler-colonialism. Thus, on the
one hand, I lay out my basic project of defamiliarizing ontology and of thinking alongside
more relational ontologies as a way of grappling with the problem of how we can
defamiliarize dominant modern ways of relating to “nature”. On the other hand, I clarify
my sense of the meaning and relevance I understand this project to have. I do this in part
by being explicit about the kind of lived, intercultural, ecological, and political context
that has provoked this project and that I am concerned to think “in light of”. For it is
relative to this context that the “so what” of this project must ultimately be gauged.
The second chapter turns more directly to the question of “nature” and the kind of
meaning this has arguably come to assume within the dominant culture of modern life
and thought. I work to draw out this meaning as it plays across a number of interlocking
domains and philosophical projects: the philosophical problem of the modern Cartesian
subject and a connected theorization of the problem of reality; understandings about the
natural world that developed in association with the rise of modern science and particular
connected construals of the meaning of technology and the technoscientific vocation; a
consonant view of nature that in turn comes to underlie distinctly modern and influential
notions of politics and political life, as expressed most especially in the modern sovereign
state as polity; the view of nature that underlies distinctly modern notions of
property/ownership, which becomes tremendously consequential in the structuring of
dominant human-nonhuman relations. Throughout this process, I also work to show how
a particular, Christianized, atomistic ontology can be seen to be operative across the
contexts examined. In order to prepare the ground for the cross-cultural work of the next
chapters, I lay out what I take to be a more acceptable alternative to the way that our
dominant ontology invites us to think about problems of reality, ontology, and cultural
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difference – or, to put much the same problem slightly differently, about the relationship
between nature and culture.
In Chapter Three, “Ethnographic Meditations”, I turn to focus on a selection of
Indigenous philosophical and cultural traditions – most especially the Ojibwa,
Amazonian Quichua-speaking peoples, and the Tlingit. On the one hand, I draw together
the examples I do in order to provide a kind of introduction to the tenor of Indigenous
relational thinking in different contexts, so far as I understand these and in ways that bear
on the philosophical issues especially significant to my general problem. I try to show
how selfhood, animacy, personhood, the non/human, and a good deal else, can be
experienced, understood, and explored very differently when conceived on relational
ontological terms. I furthermore try to show, through ethnographic examples, how
relational ontology enables different possibilities in the experience and codification of
different facets of everyday existence and social relations, on points whose usual
delineation has become central to the modern experience of things. Many of the points
covered in this regard stand in direct contrast to much of what was seen in Chapter Two:
we then try to see what relationally-conceived understandings might look like concerning
technology and skill, property relations, what it means to live a thoughtful life or make art
or experience beauty.
In Chapter Four, I try to bring Indigenous relational thinking more closely into
conversation with what I think are some of the better analogical “bridges” from the
Western tradition: namely, Nietzsche and Heidegger. I draw out certain points of
similarity between these Western thinkers and Indigenous thought. But I also and at the
same time try to bring to clarity points of variance between them. And in these
differences, I try to show how Indigenous thought tends to push the question of
relationality much farther, and in ways that are especially worth thinking about in terms
of what possibilities this opens where the problem of our relations to the nonhuman are
concerned. Accordingly, I try to show that – to a certain extent and in the ways that
Nietzsche and Heidegger bear traces of their origins within the Western, Christianized,
and largely atomistic tradition – we can also begin to see some of the limitations of their
cultural critiques for helping us grapple with the (modern) problem of “nature” and for
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beginning to think sufficiently “otherwise”. But we can also, and at the same time, begin
to ask whether something like the critiques they offer might not be recuperated along
different lines in light of alternate ontological and conceptual possibilities we might learn
to “think with”, in light of our engagement with Indigenous thought.
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Chapter 1
1

Breaking Open the Face of the World: Rethinking Self and
Nature in Light of (Onto-)Politics
“You think it’s a stump, but that’s my grandfather.”
-Harry Robinson1

1.1 Sketching the Terrain: A View from the Heights
This dissertation undertakes a cultural critique of Western modernity and its
dominant relationships to “nature” via an engagement with certain Indigenous American
philosophies and traditions of thought. I employ what might be termed a cross-cultural
philosophical procedure that engages and draws from Western philosophical literatures,
Indigenous thinkers, ethnographies, and stories. I undertake this task with the
understanding that what is at stake in the differences between those cultures I am
engaging extends to and includes differences in ontology – what I will refer to as the
atomistic ontology that characterizes Western thought, and the relational ontologies that
characterize those Indigenous traditions with which I am engaging.
Thus, this dissertation is an experiment in problematizing, or more precisely in
defamiliarizing, ontology – and in exploring what critical, political, ethical, and
philosophical reflection might be, within a kind of between-space where ontology itself is
up for grabs. My aim is to open up to question one particular ontology – that of Western
modernity – and hence our accustomed and dominant ways of being in the world, of
understanding the nature of reality, our nature as selves, the ethical horizons we inhabit
and our position relative to others, most especially the nonhuman. But more than this,
my aim is to explore alternate possible ways of seeing and thinking and relating, alternate
1
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and intervening “games of truth”, that might be enabled through an engagement with
alternative ontologies.
Why embark on such a task, and why focus on the problem of “nature”? As I
suggested in my Introduction, a crucial motivating reason here is that we live at a time of
pervasive, interconnected, and deepening ecological crises that we are nowhere near
adequately addressing. These are moreover indissociable from profoundly unsustainable
and anthropocentric processes of modernizing “development”, an ethos of world-mastery
predicated on the domination and reworking of the “natural” world, and from associated
aspirations, logics, and legitimating stories fundamental to modern life. The crises we
now experience, in other words, are in a crucial sense expressions of where our dominant
ways of thinking and being can be seen to land us – expressions of the limits,
externalities, and consequences of these. This dominant worldview is structured in
fundamental ways by particular ontological assumptions; and these assumptions have no
small bearing on shaping what we experience as the problem of “nature” and our
relations to it – as well as the range of alternatives we consider possible to these.
Fundamentally, our present ecological crises present us with challenges we must better
learn how to address; and it is in the nature of crises to call for thought and for
revaluation of how we are used to doing things. If we are to ask what it might mean to
live and think differently, it makes a good deal of sense to address and put to question
these fundamental, accustomed assumptions of modern culture – that are often so familiar
as to be invisible to us.
Let us linger for a moment with this term “defamiliarization”: it is used quite
deliberately here. It is a question of making the familiar strange by means of having
sojourned somewhere else – of having learned to see the world, and reflect back on the
familiar, with different eyes. The term is associable with methods of cultural critique
though anthropological comparisons across cultures. And there are aesthetic overtones
that are important. Indeed, the term also invokes distinctive perceptual and experimental
effects produced for example in certain forms of literature or art, but also intoxication –
effects of aesthetic estrangement or rupture, of seeing familiar things in a newly
mysterious or unfamiliar way. Defamiliarization in this sense can signify experiences that
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grow and stretch the self and thought, that send us back to questioning the sensible and
perceptible in a renewed way, that de-realize the real and open the face of the world up
differently – and all of this is pertinent to the efforts undertaken here.2
“Defamiliarization” is necessarily a practice that takes place from out of, and
relative to, an initial vantage point or orientation, a particular localization of thought and
understanding, a given sense of the “familiar”. Philosophically, this initial location is
delineated here by what I refer to as the dominant ontological contours of modern
thought, and by the existential and comportmental modes that these entail. And our
dominant modern ontology, I argue, can be characterized as assuming a particular
resolution and distinction of nature as separate from culture. As one might expect,
precisely what we understand “nature” and ourselves as human (cultural) beings to be as
such and in distinction from one another, has no small bearing on the question of how we
conceive it to be possible or meaningful to relate to the nonhuman world that we view as
“natural”.
The problem I raise here is a fundamental one, with far-ranging ramifications. The
problem of how our dominant modern thinking leads us to understand ourselves in the
world, to apprehend and relate to the nonhuman, is structured in crucial respects in terms
of this problem of our relationship to nature. But at the same time, the way modern
thought typically understands nature relative to culture is also itself constitutive of the
way it understands what it means to be modern at all. That is to say, the nature/culture
settlement precisely grounds many of our most foundational and familiar stories and
aspirations concerning what it is to be mature, free, and reasonable – how we are and
what our vocation properly is as beings in the world. The way we think about and relate
to “nature” in this sense – as I will show more fully in the next chapter – informs and
2
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structures complex and interlocking technoscientific, political, ethical, legal, etc.,
problematics that are constitutive of our dominant, modern lifeways, our rationalizations
and codifications of social processes, and so on. For in its dominant guise, this
nature/culture relation is not separable from the general problem of the modern subject,
and the way the latter comes to delineate problems of knowledge and freedom, to
experience the world.
The difficulty to be confronted, at some level, is the stubbornness, universalism,
and exclusivity with which this all-too familiar and basic constellation comes to frame
our sense of the possible and viable, the ways it makes sense to speak about the world
and imagine ourselves in it. A particular enframing of reality delineates, purportedly for
always and everywhere, the terms for grappling with the serious affairs of life: the one
true game worth playing. But then, if the manner of our sighting and relating to nature
resonates throughout the terms of life in Western modernity, it also tends to underlie and
indeed delineate many of our most familiar ways of critiquing and resisting/responding
to that dominant culture – our ways of attempting to think otherwise, to articulate and
imagine the possibility of doing anything else. In diverse ways, we tend so often (and
even unwittingly) to reproduce the basic dicta that land us back in the very problems we
might want to evade. Thus whereas the problem of “nature” represents today, on
numerous fronts, a rather obvious limit and set of concerns for our globalizing modernity,
it also represents – to the modern Western vantage point – a peculiarly intractable
problem. The question of ontology is a crucial one to raise here because this invites us to
begin by problematizing precisely those fundamental and aprioristically presumed dicta
that – often neutralized, naturalized, and variously disguised – continually entrap us
within such familiar conclusions and consequences.
The crucial point to assert, however, is that the modern Western account of things,
and its presumed ontological dicta, are contestable, necessarily interpretive, and
culturally and philosophically particular, and do not indeed constitute the only story to
be heard today. There remain today very different ways of thinking and being, predicated
upon very different ontologies. As I have said, the sub-set of ontologies I will engage
here, which clash visibly with modern Western ones in the part of the world I inhabit –
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not least around the question of nature and our relations to it – are those expressed in the
philosophical traditions of Indigenous American peoples.
My endeavor here, as I have said, is to learn, from a selection of Indigenous
American traditions, something about what it might mean to think and live “otherwise” –
to show how the relational ontologies expressed there can unveil the world, ourselves in
it, the problem of what it means to live a good life, etc., very differently. In other words,
Indigenous relational ontologies (and connected ways of thinking) levy meaningful and
fundamental challenges and disagreements precisely on the question of nature and related
problems. This is a point that indeed seems continually reaffirmed within the political
landscape and struggles of the present – if we consider, for example, widespread
Indigenous resistances to ecologically destructive resource extraction projects within
Canada and elsewhere (for example, the well-publicized Indigenous resistances to mining
in northern Ontario, to the Enbridge pipeline in British Columbia, to hydraulic fracturing
in New Brunswick, to oil extraction in the Amazon basin, and so on).
Engaging in this kind of cross-cultural philosophical work employed here, in
order to begin to begin to think between ontologies in a defamiliarizing way is also
nothing less than to undertake a philosophical practice that aims to unsettle the face of the
world as we typically see it: our dominant partitioning of what is visible, sayable, and
sensible. It is to begin to see how it is possible to allow ourselves and others, and our
existential possibilities, to be unveiled in different ways, to gain coherence along
alternate lines. Defamiliarization must accordingly be differentiated from a process of
simply tabulating differences in a removed fashion.
At stake in this opposition is something similar to what Friedrich Nietzsche
identified in On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. Namely: at stake is
the difference between an engagement with otherness that seeks to remain within a sphere
of spectatorial, “objective” knowledge, and so can change us in no way other than to give
us further data to contain as “walking encyclopedias” – and an engagement that is lived
philosophically in a transformative sense, that is absorbed relative to the domain of
something like our own freedom, our own active questioning of existence and what it
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means to live a good life – and our efforts to live such a life.3 In this, it is not that we
must give up altogether on asking the old and fundamental philosophical questions we
have long recognized, but only to acquiesce to the possibility that something like these
questions may be posed (and answered) quite differently, or approached from different
directions.4
The kind of defamiliarization pursued here, therefore, can perhaps best be
approached as a distinctive kind of transformative philosophical practice or truthprocedure – what Michel Foucault called an askesis.5 The aim is above all to see how this
kind of pathway can lead us somewhere different from where we started. Such a practice
as this one can be a medicine in its own way – and one that today would seem to be
called for in no small measure. For on many fronts, it can be said that our dominant ways
of construing and relating to nature are bad ones that are in need of being disrupted, that
these are constitutive of some of the most pressing worries and failings of our age.
For the rest of this chapter, I will endeavor to elaborate a little further on the
nature and basic contours of the problem I have introduced above, and how I understand
my theorizing to be structured and situated here. In this, I will further introduce some of
the basic terms and concerns relative to which the defamiliarizing work of this
dissertation is undertaken – and elaborate some of my basic motivations for doing so.
But first, a word or two might be given in clarification of terminology.

1.2 Ontologies?

3

Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life trans. by Peter Preuss
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), esp. 15, 24-25, 28-32.
4
A similar claim and basic orientation is defended in Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher.
5
That is, a form of philosophical practice that implies a different kind of truth-procedure and relationship to
truth, from that typical of e.g., Cartesian framings of the problem, which understand truth as something that
the self must constitutively have access to as what she is. In the (much older) philosophical notion of
askesis, rather, one finds postulated that “for the subject to have right of access of the truth he must be
changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself. . .
This is a work of the self upon the self, an elaboration of the self by the self, a progressive transformation
of the self by the self for which one takes responsibility in a long labor of ascesis (askesis).” Michel
Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982) trans. by Graham
Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 14-16.
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Ontology, Martin Heidegger reminds us, is fundamental to the activity and
vocation of philosophy itself; it poses the question of the being of beings – i.e., of what is
and the manner of its existence.6 And in a certain way, Heidegger’s own work on
ontology, or rather fundamental ontology, will provide a basis, carved out relative to the
terms of the Western tradition, for my own approach to ontology as a problem. It will
therefore be necessary to briefly review Heidegger’s thinking in this regard in order to
clarify my own use of the term “ontology” within this dissertation.
For Heidegger, the question of being stands to be accessed through the way we
are as beings, and hence through the way we find ourselves existentially and at all times
within a world, or relational totality of meaning. It is only on the basis of our being-inthe-world that we are able to encounter entities as something, as understood and
interpreted. The phenomenon of worldhood or being-in-the-world, in other words,
constitutes the transcendental ontological structure on the basis of which phenomena
come to pass and to self-showing, i.e., come to disclosure through language.7
As we see further in the next chapter, Heidegger’s analytic of worldhood
displaces the manner in which our prevailing metaphysical constellation has, most
notably since Descartes, tended to conflate questions of ontology with those of
epistemology. Our subjectivistic modern metaphysics, for Heidegger, covers over
precisely the phenomenon of worldhood as the condition of understanding matters of
reality as we do, i.e., by placing the problem of securing certainty for the knowing subject
at the beginning of all that may be said.8 But to displace the ground of modernity’s
epistemological foundationalism also undermines our tradition of understanding
ourselves as finally ascending to the viable way of thinking to the exclusion of all others.
Hence it undermines our habitual story of progress culminating in modern science as the
supreme and exclusively valid speaker on behalf of what is, interpreted as universal
nature; the ways this in turn supports a particular delineation of the human qua subject;
and so on.

6

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), 34.
Ibid, 32-35, 50-71.
8
Ibid, 21-22, 31-32, 186-190.
7
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Especially important to note here is this: that instead of confirming our usual
modern story where history amounts to a unitary and universal progression of
understanding and reason, an ascendence of humankind from infancy to maturity,
Heidegger offers something quite different in his concept of the “epoch”. For Heidegger,
an epoch is an age, characterized by particular ways of thinking, of seeing and knowing
and understanding, that are grounded in a given metaphysics. In any given epoch,
metaphysics frames the world and lets entities come to disclosure in the ways they do.
What is especially valuable for my purposes here is that, following Heidegger’s analysis,
we experience a certain pluralization and equalization of these epochs, because it is
simply accepted that being and beings are able to grant themselves differently to thought
in each context. No one epoch can reign supreme over all others, however, because of the
nature of world-disclosure as such: being only ever grants itself to metaphysical thought
while also withdrawing.9
In this sense, each epoch can be understood at once to involve a viable
questioning and investigation of existence in its own way, and yet also never constitute a
final or absolutely true account of reality. Relative to these epochal pulsations of being, it
makes no sense (because it would be an error in logical priority) to suggest that the
positive understanding of the world characteristic of one is somehow more correct than
any other, since the possibility of correctness can only be secured within specific
constellations of metaphysical terms.10 Heidegger’ position here should be distinguished
from that kind of crude relativism often projected in positivistic circles today, however,
which would merely assert that the alternative to positivism is to assume that any
9

Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2002), 8-9: “The history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sendings and the It
which sends forth hold back their self-manifestation. To hold back is, in Greek, epoche. Hence we speak of
the epochs of the destiny of Being.” (9)
10
This basic way of thinking permeates Heidegger’s later writings. For example: “Greek science was never
exact, precisely because, in keeping with its essence, it could not be exact and did not need to be exact.
Hence it makes no sense whatever to suppose that modern science is more exact than that of antiquity.
Neither can we say that the Galilean doctrine of freely falling bodies is true and that Aristotle’s teaching,
that light bodies strive upward, is false; for the Greek understanding of the essence of body and place and
of the relation between the two rests upon a different interpretation of beings and hence a correspondingly
different kind of seeing and questioning of natural events.” Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Writings trans. by William Lovitt, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977), at 117;
but see also 115-154 generally; and Heidegger, Identity and Difference,trans. by Joan Stambaugh,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), especially 32-3, 66-7.
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arbitrary thing is true quite regardless of what any attentive observation of anything might
tell us. It is rather that one is only ever able to pay heed to beings on the basis of the light
and the forms of coherence granted through language and modulated epochally (and
which we do not merely “invent” by ourselves), and that in any such case it is a question
of being attentive to the world within and through different constellations of possibility.
If we retain Heidegger’s thinking here as a philosophical backdrop, it will perhaps
now be possible to clarify my own use of the term “ontology”. In this dissertation, I mean
by “ontology” those fundamental and most basic dicta that, within a given tradition of
thought and everyday experience of existence, lay out an interpretation of the basic
contours of reality or “what is” as such. That is, the basic and most general dicta and first
principles we assume concerning the fundamental nature, constitution, and structure of
what is, the coherences assumed by being and beings. These delineate what it is to be an
entity, what kinds of “entities” exist, as well as offer interpretations concerning our own
nature as beings, the correlate contours of our basic ethical horizons.
Thus “ontology” is used here in a sense that is perhaps broadly enabled by
Heidegger’s reconfiguration of the problem as that of a transcendental analytic vis à vis
problems of knowledge; but my concerns here are much more localized.11 Unlike
Heidegger, my interest here is not in simply stepping back from the terms of our own
dominant constellation, or – like many modern and postmodern thinkers – in overcoming
metaphysics as such.12 Indeed, to my mind, something like metaphysics and ontology
remains always an indispensible condition of thinking. But then, I am especially
interested here in the way we might speak of ontologies in the plural, as fundamental
delineations performed into worlds in the plural – and in the possibility of thinking across

11

Indeed, in the final analysis, whereas I take Heidegger’s analysis as a helpful way of opening space
relative to the Western tradition and limiting some of the latter’s worst consequences, I also am inclined to
locate Heidegger’s work, and the kinds of questions it makes sense for him to pose, within and relative to a
specific cultural-ontological tradition.
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Indeed, ontology and metaphysics are often associated retrospectively with the speculative philosophies
of the Scholastic era; and one can identify a pervasive anti-metaphysical current running throughout much
of the modern tradition, and finding expression not only for example in positivism, which presumes that
modern knowledge and science now effectively grasp reality to such a degree that metaphysical inquiries
have become essentially superfluous and discredited. However, this anti-metaphysical tendency is also
visible in different ways in Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and so on.

31
and between the modes and specific localizations of thinking these enable.13 For if the
presumption of particular metaphysical dicta gives us a kind of basic grammar according
to which being and beings are able to assume coherences, are able to be let be, it is also
the case that alternate ontologies enable alternate ways of attentively studying the world,
of discovering coherences within it – alternate ways of thinking, engaging, investigating,
dwelling in the world. Of course the very effort to pluralize ontologies in this way is itself
a contentious manoeuvre that will no doubt encounter its share of opposition (it is much
easier, perhaps because it is also far less consequential, to restrict oneself to speaking of
plural epistemologies). Others have undertaken to defend a pluralization of ontologies
more directly.14 While building upon the efforts of such thinkers, it will be hoped that this
dissertation will itself contribute to building a case for such a manoeuvre, not least by
showing how it might be more satisfyingly employed in a critical reading of our own
tradition and in an engagement with others’.
So “ontology” here is taken in a sense that asks about something like the terms of
coherence operative within discrete constellations. As a plurality, ontologies or worlds
might be analogized to Heidegger’s “epochs”, but with the provision that it is necessary
to see that there are rather a plurality of actual “worlds” that are contemporaneous with
one another rather than following in a singular historical succession.
At a basic level, in the conjunction of ontos and logos we hear the question of the
manner in which being and beings become sayable, are able to be disclosed by speech
and discovered.15 (We might be inclined to invoke Heidegger’s metaphor of truth as an
“unveiling” in this connection. But then, perhaps it is more a question of allowing the
world to show itself in alternate raiment, another guise of becoming-articulable – with the
acknowledgement that all there ever is is more clothing, and never a final ‘X’ behind a
veil.) If we take our cue from this, ontology must be seen to be itself inseparable from the
13

In this sense, I am indebted to the critique and modification of the concepts of world and ontology
offered by thinkers like Mario Blaser, Jacques Rancière, and Alain Badiou, among others.
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See for example Mario Blaser, “Political Ontology.”
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See Martin Heidegger’s discussion of logos in the introduction to Being and Time, 28-9; Whereas logos
has accrued a range of meanings through the course of the Western tradition, Heidegger asserts that “logos
as speech really means . . . to make manifest ‘what is talked about’ in speech. . . The ‘being true’ of logos
as aletheuein means: to take beings out of their concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed
(alethes); to discover them.”
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problem of truth and the possibility of advancing an interpretation of truth, and of what it
means to seek the truth with regard to being and beings. Indeed, it has become customary,
within the terms of the Western philosophical tradition, to consider “ontology” as a
branch, and occasionally as a synonym, for metaphysics; and it is worth noting that
metaphysics is itself often defined in much the same terms I have used to describe
ontology.16
A further point must be made here concerning ontology, and the kinds of issues
and basic problems this tends to involve. In ways that will be more thoroughly explained
in the chapters that follow, I understand questions of ontology to be closely intertwined
with what we might roughly call questions of theology and cosmology.17 Such words of
course bring us to understand whatever ontological constellation is being discussed by
way of analogy to the Western one, and the kinds of specific meanings words like theos
or cosmos assume therein; and they root us within an analysis of the Western tradition
and its conceptual language in the first instance. But this kind of analogical bridging can
be acceptable, I suggest, as long as we remain sufficiently critical and mindful about the
kinds of inferences these lead us to draw, and leave sufficiently open the question as to
the greater or lesser suitability of these inferences for any given comparative case.
By these terms theology and cosmology, I mean to suggest that the questions of
ontology tend to be bound up with, respectively, i) the kinds of interpretations,
16

See, e.g., the entry for “metaphysics” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy ed. by Robert Audi
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 489-491. We see the overlap here relative to Heidegger
himself, in that for him, “metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is
and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is formed.” (The
Question Concerning Technology, 115). It can also be worth noting here that Heidegger identifies four
central and interrelated questions that together comprise what is essential in a “fundamental metaphysical
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and mode in which man is man”; ii) “the interpretation of the coming to presence . . . of the Being of
whatever is”; iii) “the delineation of the coming of presence . . . of truth”; iv) “the sense in which, in any
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indebted to Seth Asch, Relational Ontology: An Exploration Through the Work of M. Foucault. University
of Victoria, MA Thesis. (2004) Available at:
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commitments, doctrines, and philosophical decisions rendered on the basis of particular
ways of conceiving and orienting thought relative to discrete construals of something like
the divine and its relation to the world and to human beings (and hence different
interpretations of all three of these as such). As contrasting “Western” examples we
might name God or the Godhead in the Christian tradition, or the struggling eternal gods
of Greek polytheism. Taken in this sense, these are of course very different “theologies”
which, as Friedrich Nietzsche for example attests, offer (at least generally speaking)
markedly different interpretations of the world and existence and what is worthy of
reverence and what it means to live a good life, as well as different orientations towards
the sensible and mortal life, and so on. It can be difficult, though potentially provocative,
to explore points of possible analogy in this regard between Indigenous and different
Western traditions – though once again it is clear that we must take care as we do so.
Relatedly, I understand ontological questions to be bound up with ii) the kinds of
accounts that a given construal of the world offers concerning the world’s coming-intobeing or origin – or lack thereof, if for example the world is taken to be eternal and
uncreated (as in Aristotle).18 Needless to say, I wish to take this question sufficiently
broadly, such that it can serve as a fruitful point of comparison between the Creationist
story of Christian metaphysics and, for instance, origin stories concerning speciation or
the withdrawal of non-human persons into differentiated bodily forms at the end of the
“beginning times”, found in Indigenous Amazonia and elsewhere.19 But then, I will also
invoke the term cosmology in a somewhat broader sense as referring to articulations of
the overall structure of the world or “cosmos”, the positioning of human beings and
others within that general structure, and so on – in the sense, for example, in which
Christianity or Platonism can be understood to advance a vertical cosmology of ascent
(from the Cave of shadows up to True Being) by contrast with more “horizontal”
possibilities.

18

This question of the origin of the world tends to be understood as an essential question belonging to
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Furthermore, it will be argued here that if a fundamental relationship can be seen
to exist between theological, cosmological, and ontological questions and understandings,
then these can in turn be seen to delineate and enable specific forms of knowing and
understanding what the essential questions and problems for knowledge are. To say this
relative to the Western tradition is of course to take issue with the ways that modern
science and its vocation are often philosophically understood. Most particularly it is to
take issue with the positivistic notion that metaphysics and ontology are forms of inquiry
characteristic above all of the pre-modern era and Scholasticism, and have largely been
bypassed or made redundant, as inquiries into the fundamental nature of reality, by the
work of modern science and its supposedly superior methods for accessing that reality.
The work of modern science as a form of knowing is only possible on the basis of
a prior and philosophically delineated “ground plan” (to use Heidegger’s term) that
determines the manner of knowablity of things, the kinds of questions it makes sense to
ask of phenomena, the kind of “things” that are, the basic characteristics these have, and
so on.20 It is of the nature of such ground plans, that amount in effect to a philosophy of
nature, that although they supply the presuppositions on which a given science will
ultimately depend, they can never themselves be established by the methods of that
science.21 Yet it is at this prior and broader level that the consequentiality of given forms
of knowing is secured (or made capable of being opened to contestation), including the
manner in which and the reasons for which a given form of knowledge should be
assumed to be communicable, transferable, exclusive or non-exclusive – due for example
to the presumed uniformity of nature or lack thereof. It is also at this level that we see
established dicta that prepare the kinds of ethical and comportmental conclusions it
makes sense to draw relative to particular knowledges, what knowing can be taken to
mean for us as a practice, and so on.
In this dissertation, I offer an interpretation of modernity’s dominant ontology as
fundamentally atomistic. By this I mean that we tend to begin our account of the world by
assuming the existence of individual, bounded, atomistic “things” or substances
20
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possessed of properties – a tendency that attains its precise character for us within
modern modulations of a fundamentally Christian interpretation of the world. I have said
that what interests me here are the reflexive and imaginative possibilities that might be
opened if we begin to think and interpret the world relationally – a point on which it
strikes me that we moderns have a great deal to learn from Indigenous American
traditions in particular. Perhaps most simply and at the level of ontology, “relationality”
here means beginning with an assumption that relations are prior, that any atomistic
“thing” is rather only a kind of (at least temporary) fixity or concrescence, a gathering
constituted in and through these prior, dynamic, and contextual relations. It means
learning to focus in a sense on what happens between (including between levels of
structure) rather than focusing on supposedly individual things, and indeed to do so as a
way of understanding what any particular thing is at any given time. Relational thinking
can also and accordingly invite us to be mindful of small variations in context or
assemblage that may affect nuance not registered through a more atomistic line of
questioning – in this sense displaying a certain affinity with a philosophy of difference.
And relational ontology also implies, as we will see, a different relationship to truth.
This dissertation accepts the diagnosis by a number of political theorists and
anthropologists, that part of what is at stake in contemporary political relations between
Indigenous and settler peoples in colonial contexts throughout the Americas is precisely
what we might call disagreement at the level of ontology.22 As such, one characteristic of
these disagreements and what is at stake in them, is that they manifest precisely as
disagreements over the different “things” that are at stake.23 (For example, if a stump is a
grandfather, as Harry Robinson suggested at the beginning of this chapter, then it is
something quite different from a stump as understood by the logging industry, by
environmental science, and so on, and it will be related to differently.) This kind of
disagreement becomes evident in moments of conflict over resource development, in
related differences between Indigenous and Euro-American normative and legal
traditions in this regard, in everyday practices, and so on. This is so in part because the
22
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validity of reducing the land to “nature” qua fungible “resources” – and all the
philosophical and ethical baggage this implies – is not a settled dispute here.
Thinking between or across ontologies in light of these kinds of disagreements –
precisely my aim here – poses special kinds of challenges, which may have already begun
to be apparent in one way or another. For where worlds are multiple, as I have already
suggested, we must acknowledge that our thinking is always necessarily and
irredeemably local and localized.24 That is to say, that one never has full access to any
absolute totality, just as there is never any neutral ground to which one can retreat, no
possibility of thinking that is not already framed in some sense and at any given moment
by some specific set of ontological contours. One always begins from somewhere,
relative to a particular set of coherences. And any articulation of why we might pursue a
given philosophical venture necessarily finds itself having to appeal in the beginning to
terms already intelligible given where we are. Similarly, cross-cultural engagement of
the kind pursued here requires that we seek out and employ possible interpretive
conceptual “bridges” or points of analogy between ontologies (and the lived
philosophical traditions these inform), even as we remain mindful of all the risks such
acts of translation carry.
Though my aim here is a defamiliarization of ontology and of a particular terrain
of thinking, therefore, it is nevertheless rooted in the first instance within Western theory,
as a version of an immanent critique, an askesis relative to a specific kind of viewpoint.
This is a viewpoint rooted in those special and distinctive experiences of malaise and ruin
that draw out the latent consequences of modernity itself. In other words, it is rooted in
those experiences with which Western modernity, perhaps rather like de Goya’s Saturn,
eats at her own children; and the provocations sought here are levied relative to those
terms. What is at stake here is in the end a recognition that the terms of our nature/culture
settlement are internal to the ontological matrix of modernity, and the possibility of
exploring how one might begin thinking otherwise than through our nature/culture
24
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constellation and relationship. But it is nevertheless necessary to emphasize that this
dissertation takes the Western “problem of nature” as its starting-point and speaks in the
first instance to motivating concerns that arise from that context.
This would seem to be the necessary condition of making any strong and initially
intelligible claim, relative to our initial starting-point, as to why any given instance of
thinking across and between worlds is important or valuable. Jacques Rancière’s
definition of politics as a relation that challenges the exclusion of one world by another
by means of a form of litigating seems an apt metaphor for what I am trying to do here as
a philosophical practice. That is to say, it is necessary to begin in a manner that is at once
understandable within the terms of particular localization or partitioning of things – in
this case, that of our dominant order of modern thought and ontology – and yet to
simultaneously introduce into those terms what previously had not been (deemed)
thinkable or sayable, leading thus beyond the initial terms of intelligibility. One begins by
making a kind of formal claim to equality, by challenging the validity of an instance of
exclusion (in this case, of Indigenous relational ontologies by and relative to our
dominant, modern, atomistic one), even if it will be precisely the aim of that litigating
discourse to produce a rupture of the previously dominant order, a reconfiguration of
terms and of the sensible itself. 25
Let us therefore turn briefly to describe some basic characteristics of what we
might initially sight as the “problem of nature” and the kinds of worries, accordingly,
which this work responds to.

1.3 Characterizing Our Dominant Relations to Nature
How then might we characterize the modern relationship to nature? One of the
central words that is employed and becomes consequential in the history of modern
thought on the subject is domination. Considering our present, and the basic contours of

25
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contemporary modern life, such a term seems an apt description. Everywhere nature is
ordered and reordered, mobilized, and reworked to suit the ends dictated by human
beings and most especially in relation to rationalized notions of our “self-interest”; it is
continually reduced to exchange-value within a modern market society; the earth is torn
asunder at great ecological cost for the sake of extracting the “resources” buried within.
Phenomena are carefully and continually studied so that we may know them; but always
at work in this is the fundamental drive to increase the extent of our control over the
physical world.
This domination, I argue (and as others have argued26), is rooted in an ontology
that sets the human self apart from nature, occupying a privileged position relative to the
rest of Creation, and understood accordingly to be the autonomous and atomistic ground
of its own action, the being uniquely endowed with language or reason or whatever else.
In other words, we dominate nature by virtue of the way we understand it as such.
Informing this understanding are a host of categories and what we take to be dualisms
that oppose each other under the signs of nature and culture. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro
provides a helpful list here: “universal and particular, objective and subjective, physical
and social, fact and value, the given and the instituted, necessity and spontaneity,
immanence and transcendence, body and mind, animality and humanity, among many
more.”27
Broadly speaking, it appears to be endemic to our dominant modern constellation
that the freedom of the human being is always set up over and against material nature,
which forms a more or less mute backdrop for human activities upon the world stage.
And where it is only human beings who are moral persons in the fullest sense – having
reason and free will, being made in the image of God and in this sense being “highest”
among creatures – it is clear that our relations to the rest of the world are not subject to
the same kind of ethical injunctions as our relations with each other.

26
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The meditations of Heidegger, who construes the modern relationship to nature
under the sign of “technology”, are a helpful point of departure here. For Heidegger, what
is characteristic of this relationship is the way we come to experience all extant beings, as
objects, as so many resources before the human will – awaiting our planning and
ordering, our valuations (understood as coming from us through acts of will), standing
“on reserve” and available for our use and abuse, our mastery. On the one hand, this
relation is structured and enabled by the way modern thought lays out the terms for
modern physics to take shape as an exact science of a universal nature, and hence as a
particular way of apprehending and “enframing” what is, in its reality, as calculable in
principle. But on the other hand (though relatedly), it is a question of the way modern
man comes to understand himself as freed to himself, newly self-responsible –
determining for himself the criteria of valid knowledge, but moreover determining his
own ends and giving direction to the world, seizing for himself the wheel of history. In
other words, it is a question of the philosophical and cultural event of modern
subjectivity, on the basis of which modern man comes to exalt himself “to the posture of
lord of the earth.”28
Another helpful and generally consonant point of departure here can be found in
the diagnoses of the ecological philosopher Freya Mathews, that modern relationships to
nature are essentially “monological” rather than “dialogical”. The definitive phenomenon
at one level concerns our endemic and solipsistic anthropocentrism: inasmuch as our
goals, our ends, our interests, etc. come to form the beginning, and generally the ending,
of any story worth telling. But this state of affairs is enabled, Mathews suggests, by a
particular dualistic premise that entrenches a particular ontological, ethical, and
epistemological line between ourselves and nature: that “there is nothing akin to mind in
basic matter.”29 As such, within the monological relationship to nature, there can be no
meaningful possibility of communication with the world qua physicality, nor any source
of meaning within it. Nor can one experience, in one’s relation to the nonhuman world,
much in the way of ethical concern or obligation such as one has with other agents.
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As I explain further in the next chapter, another way of expressing this
development within the Western tradition is that nature comes to be seen as lacking
intrinsic ends. As a result, it is understood to fall to human beings to posit these – since in
the tradition of modernity’s Christian metaphysics, we are alone amongst creatures in
possessing free will and reason. The problem of ends is itself integral to how Christian
thought understands problems of meaning – for example, relative to the overall historical
direction of the world, its linearity and chronology, directed through God’s Providence.
Left now to ourselves and restricted within the terms of our subjectivism and its finitude,
however (and hence at a further remove from God by comparison with the experience of
Medieval thought), we come to experience that meaning flows one way, from us out into
the world. Nature in this sense forms the passive complement to our own activity. As we
will see, the whole modern technoscientific vocation of intervening in nature so as to
manipulate “its” processes, to improve nature so as to suit our ends and bring about a life
finally worth living, assumes its sense and takes its rooting in this basic context.
Inasmuch as the problem of our relation to the nonhuman is modulated through
the problem of nature, it is notable that discourse on this problem tends to occupy a space
of fluidity between the kind of baggage nature assumes as a pivotal ontological resolution
for modern thought, and the sighting of particular ontic beings (i.e., entities) as “nature” –
what we typically see as “wilderness”. We tend to think of the latter unproblematically:
wilderness or nature is simply what is out there when you don’t do anything to it – it is
the physical, biological, and material world when simply left “untouched”. But as such,
the very meaning the “wilderness” assumes here cannot itself be separated from the
broader ontological meaning of nature and its separation from culture within the terms of
modern thought (which difference often tends to be spatialized in terms of the difference
between wilderness and civilization). Far from being simply “out there”, wilderness as
such is inextricable from the frame of meaning we already carry with us wherever we go.
And so we cannot be surprised to find, as one writer has for example suggested,
that even in the ways we will tend to defend spaces of wilderness and articulate their
importance, the same basic ethos of anthropocentrism tends to remain untroubled. Thus,
in our publicly intelligible defenses of the wilderness, the latter tends to appear for us

41
variously i) as a kind of farm, studied and managed by an elite of expert specialists, and
productive in multiple, defined, scientifically validated and calculable ways – ranging
from raw material for resource extraction to oxygen factory; ii) as a playground, on
reserve as “wilderness experience” for the outdoor tourist industry, but once again a more
or less mute backdrop to human recreational and economic activity; iii) as a kind of
prison, the Other to the domestic, civilized realms of Rational Man – from which the nonhuman inmates occasionally escape, and to which these need to be returned.30

1.4 Visions of Worry
Now, the form of relationship sketched briefly above can be said on several fronts
to be a bad and a worrying one. Let us take a moment to review some of the central
aspects of how this might be.
Not least among the challenges faced today is what we might call the ontic fallout
of modernity and processes of modernization – i.e., its impact upon beings. Articulated
within the terms of modern environmental science, for example, we encounter this impact
under the sign of the ecological consequences and limits of our dominant, modern ways
of thinking and living – and the seeming ineptitude of our habitual theoretical, political,
legal, and ethical tools to adequately respond to the dangers we face in this regard. It is
more or less common knowledge today, all sham “debate” within mass-democratic
politics and the media aside, that the logics of our dominant civilization are outpacing
what we can (even within Western terms) describe as the capacity of our planet’s webs of
life to sustain themselves – and us. With the melting of the icecaps, the acidification of
the oceans, deforestation, widespread pollution of the earth and waters, the accelerated
extinction of species – and in general the demonstrably cumulative impact that
modernity, its capitalist economy, and its vision of “development” is having – we occupy
an ethical and “material” position today whose precedent can perhaps only be found in
the development of the atomic bomb. That is to say, that it is becoming increasingly
30
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difficult to meaningfully imagine how our dominant lifeways could lead to a future of
any kind.31
It would be a mistake to raise this point as merely a managerial one – i.e., as
presenting a set of discrete problems that call only for a more refined set of technical
fixes within the established system that expresses precisely our technological rationality.
To do so supposes that there is nothing inherently wrong or dangerous in the basic
modern technological world-project as such, in our ethic of dramatically changing and reordering the earth and human societies as a process of “rationalization” on the one hand
and as a project of freedom on the other. Leaving deeper assumptions untroubled, we
tend to assume that we can and should keep up our basic anthropocentric and
technological project while somehow fixing all the unintended consequences. We lay our
bets that our level of mastery is or will be such that present and future unintended
consequences (ecological devastation, climate change, growing extinction rates, or rather
the sum of threats these events pose to us) will be solvable. The normative ideal of
“responsible development”, while at one level an indispensable one for ensuring that the
problem of consequences remains on the table at all, nevertheless fails us insofar as it
leads us to assume that we are or can be cognizant of all the repercussions of the
interventions we make in our ecologies (and that all of the impacts to be assessed are
cognizable within the framework of possible technical fixes within the domain of
objects). There is something spurious about these kinds of assumptions, especially
considering that many of our present ecological troubles have been produced precisely by
past technical interventions aimed at “fixing” discrete problems.32
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There is a profound sense in which our present-day ecological crises do but draw
the long-prepared consequences and show us the limits of modern ways of life, which are
themselves generalized expressions of modern thinking. That is, these are expressions of
where you end up given our subjectivism, our nature/culture split, and an associated body
of legitimating stories and universalistic socio-political doctrine – and the lacunae,
constitutive violences, and the “externalities” of these. In this sense, it would seem that
we fundamentally eschew the kind of ethical, philosophical, and socio-political selfreflection invited by our present moment insofar as we leave such deeper matters
untroubled, or simply take the fallout of modernizing processes as rationales for further
entrenching those same logics.
One encounters a similar issue in the ways we might try to resist the
anthropocentric logics of modernity through efforts of communing with “nature” qua the
wilderness, or through efforts to preserve more of “it” from the ravages of industry in
wilderness parks. It is not that, within a certain way of understanding the context of our
present, such manoeuvres never do anything valuable. But the point is that the basic
relationship characteristic of modern humanity vis à vis nature remains intact; that the
preservation of wilderness remains only a domestic possibility within the terms of
modern thought, politics, and society as such, another monological act where a human
public decides what to do with “its” land. The legitimating stories, limits, and structuring
dynamics of the modern state as a polity, and as an enabling structure for the freedom of
modern subjects, continue to play out unchallenged in their essence. We remain
altogether cut off from nature, just as we do not begin to imagine whether one might have
“culture” or “civilization” predicated upon alternative, more dialogical relations. The
deeper problems remain unposed.
A deeper cut, and a more valuable theoretical move, is to question this entire
modern relationship – its necessity, inevitability, adequacy, and so on – and indeed the
ontological terms that give the modern constellation the shape it has. In consonance with
Heidegger, I am most concerned with exploring those possibilities for being and thinking
that are occluded by the terms of our subjectivism – and, accordingly, the modern
nature/culture settlement it is bound up with. But I raise the question of ontic devastation
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– which may be sighted in the terms of ecological science, but also may be sighted in
other ways – because this forms an element of concern that any conscientious reflection
on dominant relations to “nature” must attempt to be responsive to in some way. But as
the cross-cultural reflections of this dissertation will show, moreover, it would also be a
mistake to assume that we must somehow cling exclusively to a rigidly technoscientific
worldview and interpretation of human-nonhuman relations because this supposedly
furnishes the only language through which to think about ways of caring for the land or
exercising stewardship over it. As it happens, we moderns are not so special as that.
There are ways of arriving at similar concerns through relational terms that are not
predicated on an ethos of anthropocentric world-mastery – a truth we would do well to
ponder.
Connected to the ontic devastations of modernity, but also not reducible to them,
is moreover a broader question concerning a kind of impoverishment that can be seen to
haunt our dominant modern lifeways, and to make its home in us where our relations to
the world are reduced to the terms of a monological and technological framework. The
problem here concerns the kind of people, the kind of selves we become, the experiential
and comportmental horizons we come to inhabit under modern conditions. That this kind
of impoverishment should be relevant as part of the “problem of nature” follows from the
way what we are questioning here is a relationship: it is something that happens between,
that in turn implicates what we usually think of as what goes on “in” ourselves as much
as what is “out there”.
On the Western side of things, thinkers in what we might call the Nietzschean
tradition have been some of the most perceptive on this point. Martin Heidegger and Max
Weber belong in this group – as do Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and others. All of
these will haunt this text, though Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Weber will appear most
conspicuously. Though these thinkers begin from the terms of the Western tradition and
various contrapuntal strands of possibility within it, they also contain elements of a
movement towards more relational thinking – though I will argue that Indigenous
traditions push us much farther in this direction. What is important for my purposes here,
however, is simply to suggest that from the vantage-point of a concern with relations and
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the ways these are constitutive of us as selves, these thinkers invite us to see how a
certain poverty is cultivated under modern conditions in our relations with the (nonhuman) world around us.
For Heidegger, for example, there is something profoundly annihilating in our
technological seeing that eviscerates and nullifies things in the richness of their
presencing. In Nietzsche’s story of our tradition as nihilistic and predominantly
soteriological, as in Heidegger’s renewal of the story of the “flight of the gods” or in Max
Weber’s famous diagnosis of modernization as the “disenchantment of the world”, we
encounter stories of a loss of reverence for the world and worldly existence, and indeed a
festering resentment against it. What is resented is thought here, variously but relatedly,
in terms of the body and sense, the poetic folds of our being in places, a richness of
worldly engagement attuned with a lively plasticity to the rhythms of life, in ways that
moreover “take on much”, that open onto all the multitudinous registers of experience. In
Weber for instance this is signified, in sociological language, by the gradual rejection of
practices like dreaming and ecstasy from the serious affairs of the world by dominant
elements in the modern tradition.33 But then, what is thought under the sign of
disavowed “enchantment” here may I think be interpreted more adequately as elements of
alternate possible ways of attentively listening and interacting in the world, of letting
things be disclosed and cohere, and be related with.
In a consonant vein Freya Mathews has described a kind of paucity or loss within
contemporary Westernized life in this way:
When the entire world is treated as raw resource, inert and unspeaking, then
the fundamental modus operandi of society must . . . be one of callous
insensitivity. To represent the world as brute and blind requires that we
ourselves assume an attitude of bruteness and blindness. We must march
through the world unseeing and unfeeling, turning away from the poetic
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order that unfurls about us, trampling underfoot the exuberant infinity of
tendrils reaching out to us.34
In the kinds of people and comportmental modes that we excel in cultivating
today as a consequence of our philosophical trajectory, Mathews locates a kind of learned
aesthetic and relational deadness, a stunting of horizons achieved by first turning away
from profound and constitutive relations within the world.
This deadness would seem intimately tied to the hardness – the exclusivity and
finality – with which we experience the real itself, along with the basic ontological
contours with which our vision of the real is tied. Consonantly, the danger that most
profoundly assails us in modern relations to nature, for Heidegger, is that we should come
to imagine that the (ontologically secured) framework of “technology” constitutes the
only valid manner of thinking, seeing, and being in the world.35 To think in this way
ensures that no other language is possible, no alternate modes of exploration or ethical
reflection – and no ability to see that there are relations that it is not given to the modern
willful subject to experience.
The Weberian notion that disenchantment is a process is worth touching on here
because it points to a particular effect of our metaphysical heritage and its understanding
of truth as demystifying. Because we understand matters of truth in an exclusive and
universal manner, we tend to understand nature in principle as something singular and
universal.36 Accordingly, we are apt to experience the rendering-calculable of nature
undertaken by modern technoscience in a way that eviscerates competing and divergent
ways of understanding the world. This occurs by submitting these to the test of factuality
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. . . and seeing that they fail. Whatever is really going on at any moment, we are assured,
can best be explained through our terms.
This occurs, moreover, in a way that invites us to assume that the kinds of
questions modern natural science asks of the world are the same kinds of question asked
by anyone else – though poorly. Thus even Weber, speaking of the general occlusion of
“magic”, practices of dream, vision, etc., from the terms of serious life in the modern
West, understood the finality and the irrefutability of this occlusion in this way: that we
now undeniably recognize that
there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather
that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that
the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical
means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom
such mysterious powers existed.37
In other words, the assumption is that alternate ways of understanding and relating to the
world can effectively be reduced to the problem of technical mastery as it takes shape for
modern science and is explicitly posed by it. It can hardly be surprising, of course, that
the latter should be seen to emerge the indisputable victor: to do modern science better.
As a number of scholars have noted, if nature is singular, and Western reason and
the science it grounds occupies a position of special access to it, it is the basic
compromise with difference enacted by modern ontology (and the expression of that
ontology and its consequences in political liberalism) to allow for many “cultures”: in
other words, a settlement between what Bruno Latour calls “mononaturalism” and
“multiculturalism”.38 The peace this provides with different ways of being and alternate
philosophical traditions is a false one in that this already contains a domesticating and
colonizing ruse that hierarchically demotes the non-modern and non-Western.
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One the one hand (so the story goes) there is Western Culture, which properly
grasps the nature/culture split – and hence our true vocation as human beings within the
world and relative to nature – as what it is. On the other hand, there is that cacophonous
multiplicity of cultures that confuse and muddle nature and culture, that have not yet
learned to draw the distinctions we do (the necessity of which is precisely prepared by
way of our own ontological presuppositions). These cultures may no doubt be
entertaining and fascinating in their “beliefs”, exotic customs, cultural “values”,
“worldviews”, and so on, but they are hardly edifying about the serious affairs of life.
The essential phenomenon here is that these cultures undergo domestication (and hence
forms of exclusion) as the condition of their inclusion into the terms of modern, Western
ontology – i.e., into the nature/culture divide. (And it is my wager, drawn from writers
like Mario Blaser and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro in particular, that speaking of cultures
in terms of multiple ontologies, thought through, can provide an effective counter to this
domesticating logic of mononaturalism and multiculturalism.)
But if this process, and this nature/culture constellation, comes to assail and
domesticate all non-Western cultures and ontologies, all other possible worlds, it also can
be understood to impoverish the culture of the West itself. In this connection, the whole
set of cultural critiques concerning the “Death of God” in the birth of Man, and the
cultural fallout of our subjectivism, becomes pertinent to my present problem and what is
at stake in it. For this story of modern culture locates our own impoverishment within a
set of manoeuvres from which any serious attempt to rethink ourselves and the horizons
of our existence in the world must strive to be extricated. On the one hand, the domain of
nature – the factual, real world “out there” – simultaneously gives shape to “cultural”
side-structures where everything else that has no place there must be made to fit. As a
result, we can experience the rather harmless survival of any alternate accounts of
ourselves in the world within the sphere of fiction or literature, children’s fantasies, and
so on.39
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On the other hand, our delineation of the real/factual unveils what and where
value must be – even as we come to understand that all the serious existential questions
are unavoidably about us and our values. In a manner that is consistently Cartesian,
“meaning” and belief come to be rationalized to assume a certain form, viz. as
propositional assertions to which we assent. We might ask, of course: what if the
devaluation of “meaning” has already begun in setting the matter up in these terms in the
first place – not only in presuming this kind of rationalized propositional structure for it,
but making it from the beginning something created and “believed in” by us, and where
the terrain has already been set by the “facts”? Nietzsche observed that a meaningless
nature requires redemption from a god; that we who have killed God and lost the meaning
He once provided must attempt to assume the position of gods ourselves – though we
must always already find that we are not up to the task.40
But apart from the specific problem of meaning as this becomes inflected by our
Christianized tradition (and I understand our culture of modernity, and the very way it
conceives the possibility of its secularism, to be precisely an outgrowth of Christian
thought), there is a further question we might ask here. What if the possibilities of
cultivating and being mindful of enriching relations with the land are something like this,
inasmuch as they can only awkwardly be transposed into questions about “beliefs”, or as
something that involves us in a one-sided way? What if the “exuberant infinity of
tendrils” that enfolds us richly in place can only be poorly thought under such terms, so
that they can only shrivel beneath the lens of subjectivism? Must such relations not then
suffer a similar fate of devaluation where rationalized under dominant construals of what
constitutes questions of meaning, and what such meaning can and must be?
Certainly this would seem to be the case where connections of peoples to land
become categorized (and atomized) as “cultural”, “private”, “spiritual” values, matters of
“belief”, etc. – and precisely dismissed from public life as properly private or
idiosyncratic affairs. (It is worth noting, furthermore, that this entire practice of division
between public and private becomes all the more problematic relative to Indigenous
40
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contexts – where one precisely cannot separate the individual from the community in
these atomizing terms, and not least with regard to relations to the land.)
There is an additional structural and institutional point to raise here concerning the
problem of devaluation in the context of Western societies. Where a broader public
commitment to secular maturity in step with science holds sway, modern liberalism as a
political philosophy understands it is our right to espouse our beliefs privately and takes
steps to preserve a space for this under those terms.41 But then, as Max Weber saw, the
forcefulness of disenchantment, and much of its painfulness, comes to the fore especially
as one enters into the engagements of public life and finds that one cannot possibly do
justice there to the hard questions42 and the things that most matter. Because important
questions about meaning are relegated to the private sphere and, what is more, are made
formally intelligible within a presumed, overarching legal and administrative framework,
we come to understand the serious conversations of the day to occur at a level which
procedurally enables, includes, and stands outside such substantive relations.43 Speaking
in the subjectivistic language of political liberalism, Weber expressed the correlate
tension this way: “precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from
public life.”44
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It has been argued (and I would suggest rightly) that at its worst, but not its rarest,
our individualized search for meaning instead tends to degrade into the ersatz of
consumerism, of a transactional existence removed from broader significance or any kind
of deeper or less monological relationship to the nonhuman world around us.45 And this
process seems in turn only to reproduce the same basic, dominant mode of relating to the
land, the nonhuman, and so on. Thus, for example, this process is tied to a particular cult
of the new, of creation and invention qua the product of human activity liberated from the
“territorialized” constraints of traditional limits, as well as the mobilization of nature as
resource, an understanding of economic relations as primarily extractive relative to the
land, and so on. The aesthetic deadness that Mathews describes seems only deepened by
the speed of activity enabled and demanded by contemporary life. And so we witness the
gradual disappearance of modes of being, “inefficiencies” or “irrationalities” in which
different and more dialogical relations with the world might have had the space to
develop, in which might have breathed more substantive ties to the non-human world
which become so difficult to justify or articulate under the dominant frames of
intelligibility.
Where the world assumes the intellectualized character of resource, it becomes
difficult to even imagine how other ways of being could be conceivable as anything other
than childishness or other impossible caricatures, or why one would even care to wonder
about them. Experienced from the inside, that same deadness would seem to assume the
character of a happy obliviousness, a life geared to the kind of banal modes of solipsistic
enjoyment our consumerism requires of us. Herbert Marcuse’s recounting of our
technological society as at once cultivating an erotic disengagement from the broader
landscape, and an intensification, localization, and valorization of the directly sexual, and
other socially acceptable forms of (now subjectivized) “libidinal” fixation, might be taken
as broadly consistent with this point.46 The ersatz of consumerism, the thrill of speed, of
racing the motor, etc., form loci of enjoyment that at once can entrench a self-focused,
45

I am indebted in this paragaph especially to Mathews, Reinhabiting Reality, 8-11, 17, 19, 35; and Martin
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Perennial, 2001), 122-127.
46
Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 73-75. Freya Mathews, interestingly, offers a similar point in Reinhabiting
Reality, 123-124.

52
mobilized, and unlistening comportment relative to the world – and, in the latter case,
readily translate into and confirm feelings of monological and technological power over
“nature”, and enjoyment in that feeling. “’We have invented happiness,’ say the last
men, and they blink . . .”47
But in all this, I suggest that what becomes pressing is not only the need to
counter or dismantle the demystifying, exclusive, and disenchanting logic of our
universalism, but moreover to positively broaden and shift our own possibilities for
thinking and experiencing. That is, what becomes crucial is the possibility of exploring
or opening our thought through alternate languages, to redefine the parameters of possible
thought, with and through which to understand, to aesthetically and affectively
experience, to articulate and act in the world – for where our dominant language alone is
left to hold sway, one also seems bound to come to no alternate conclusions.

1.5

On Seeking Alternate Languages

To experience modern relationships with nature as impoverished, and hence to
experience something like the “disenchantment of the world” as painful and as a crisis of
relationships, sets up a problem of re-enchantment relative to the disenchanted vantagepoint. This problem, for reasons that will now be clear, is necessarily tied to a strategy of
de-realizing the real, of breaking the singular hold of our dominant logics and hence our
dominant ways of construing and relating to “nature”. But, I have suggested that this
might also be a question of exploring alternate languages for thinking the basic contours
of existence, such as resist the very framing that allows for disenchantment as an
experience, and indeed produces it as something inevitable, a mark of our maturity, and
so on. It is a question of opening alternate possible horizons, contesting and casting the
terrain of coherences differently.
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From our starting-point here, such alternate positivities of seeing, saying, and
interacting can be experienced as modes of disclosing and giving heed to the world as
something much richer, in a sense more “enchanted”, than our dominant modern
ontology can countenance.48 But then, in saying this, we must recognize that the entire
dis/enchantment dualism, employed in the present manner, only makes sense within and
relative to the terms constitutive of the modern West. To pursue “enchantment” seriously
and in cross-cultural and cross-ontological context brings us to the point where we must
necessarily see the whole terrain reconfigured. Such reconfiguration occurs in that the
total referential frame of meaning undergoes expansion and change, relative to which
particular contrasts and impressions, conclusions drawn, etc., must now appear
differently. It is perhaps not unlike the experience of viewing a Gestalt picture: once one
has seen the duck, for example, one can never quite go back to seeing only the rabbit.
Here we return to the question of defamiliarization, which in the present context
must be understood as a de-realizing practice that is simultaneously argumentative and
“poetic”. That is, it is at once a discourse about the viability and validity of alternate
coherences enabled by (in this case) relational ontologies, and a practice that opens up the
sensible in alternate ways, and through altered modes of perception and interaction.49 In
this regard, I argue that learning to think relationally, and specifically from out of
Indigenous relational ontologies, can be one way to disrupt the terrain whose layout
secures our own disenchanted impoverishment and separation from the nonhuman world,
to levy provocations relative to the fundaments of the modern constellation, and to put to
question many of our accustomed and aprioristically presumed dicta in a uniquely
powerful way.
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vantage-point. I mean to invoke the problem of dis/enchantment here in this sort of way. See, for example,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil trans. By R.J. Hollingdale (New York; Penguin, 1990), at 32.
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This is also precisely how Jacques Rancière, who theorizes “politics” precisely as a matter of relation
between multiple worlds, understands the effects opened by litigating against specific instances of
exclusion by the dominant (but always irredeemably local) “distribution of the sensible”. See Jacques
Rancière, Disagreement, 56-58.
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I take relationality and relational ontology, then, as a counterdiscourse; it is my
sense that relational thinking can be enriching – can be a kind of medicine – relative to
where we moderns now find ourselves. That is, it has the capacity to open ways to think
that are contrastingly “richer” and also more dialogic relative to the nonhuman. But as we
will see, it also does so without assuming a concept of “nature” that matches its sense in
modern English – and so avoids many of the endemic pitfalls of that concept in its
familiar guise.
On this point, I shall return briefly to a suggestion made earlier. That is, that many
of the ways we might typically critique, resist, or open up possibilities relative to our
dominant constellation nevertheless so often end up repeating precisely the constitutive
gestures of that constellation. Not least, we so often end up repeating all the essential
moves to land us back in our usual relationship to “nature”. For this reason, our
multifaceted “problem of nature” becomes especially intractable in that we find that we
lack the tools for thinking-otherwise in an adequately comprehensive and fundamental
way, i.e., in a way that redefines the field of coherences itself.
We see this for example in the way we might be inclined to interpret and separate
out several elements within the worries detailed above and to see these as necessarily
distinct, or even as calling for responses that must come into tension with one another,
insofar as we retain our familiar, presumed and ontologically determined categories of
intelligibility. Interpreted within the terms of our dominant ontology, I have already
noted, the problem of the ontic devastation invites treatment as a managerial problem, a
problem precisely concerning nature and what we who stand outside of nature as its
willful masters are to do with/to “it”. The problem of the richness or paucity of modern
life, on the other hand, and the experiences of ossification or cultivated deadness or
stultifying rationalization that can be connected here, might be traditionally posed in
terms of the problem of human freedom – which belongs to us as atomistic, willful, selfinventing, creative beings.50
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Weber himself is exemplary in this connection: in his Vocational lectures, for example, our disenchanted
present stands to be redeemed in some sense by way of a renewed commitment to decision, to the valuepositing of the willful human subject. (From Max Weber, 126-128, 152-156.) But examples abound on this
point, which ultimately only the classical story of modern freedom itself, and can generally be found
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The same kind of parsing can be seen at work in the ways we often approach
problems of colonialism. At some level, it is precisely the business of our dominant order
to ensure that the issues involved here are (only) countable within its terms of
intelligibility. Thus, for example, the marginalization of Indigenous peoples and culture
might be made to “count” ultimately as a problem that only concerns the freedom or
equality of other human beings. One potential implication here is that an adequate
solution to everything at stake could be supposed to involve only the inclusion of
excluded Indigenous peoples into the domestic order of the state and its economy, a more
equitable modernization, or even through a greater “accommodation” of Indigenous
concerns. Such concerns, however, nevertheless figure in this as only another set of
formally identical (monological) “claims” over and against the backdrop of a mute
nature. (In this way, “nature” is also preserved as a distinct and separate field of concern,
which in turn sets up an aporetic tension between what it must mean, in the last analysis,
to care about the nonhuman qua nature, and what it must mean to be supportive of
Indigenous struggles.51)

wherever “politics” or “art” stands to be reclaimed as a revitalizing force under modern conditions without
grappling first with the problem of ontology itself, most especially of nature and its relation to the willful
human. Critiques of technological ideology by Frankfurt School thinkers tend to do much the same thing:
the problem always comes down to the ossification of our own thought and hence the smothering of our
own freedom – which is also why someone like Marcuse can recuperate a kind of Marxian technological
vision where the automated satisfaction of vital needs enables an alternate and genuinely liberating
modernity (One-Dimensional Man, 16). Even Foucault would seem caught by this problem of willful
freedom: insofar as critique is understood precisely as part of an ongoing modern practice of autonomy, of
the self-invention of ourselves as subjects, whereby we must understand ourselves to be the ground of our
own action, the creators of contingent etc. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” in Ethics:
Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Vol. 1 ed. by Paul Rabinow, (New York:
The New Press, 1997), 312-313.
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An aporia experienced in various convoluted ways, for example within the discourses of contemporary
environmental politics in places like British Columbia, where the fight to preserve spaces of “wilderness”
(i.e., natural spaces devoid of culture) unavoidably enters into tension with e.g., the fact of prior and
longstanding Indigenous presence on the land. Bruce Willems-Braun, for example, has argued that one
solution within environmental discourse has been to lump Indigenous peoples in with “nature”, as people
who live(d) close to it. But then, Willems-Braun himself articulates what is wrong here only by further
resorting to modern/Western ontological categories and related timelines: to conflate Indigeneity and nature
mandates that Indigenous peoples be “traditional” to be authentic; and thus they are trapped by the colonial
discourse of environmentalism in the past, not permitted to be Indigenous and modern, to be free agents
continually reinventing themselves and so on. This may be so, but then why should this singular axis of
history, of tradition-modernity, and the correlate modern/Western problem of self-creative freedom, be
taken unproblematically as the ground for articulating everything at stake here? Might a better (and, in the
end, less colonizing) move not be to disrupt the neutrality of that very ground? C.f., Bruce Willems-Braun,
“Buried Epistemologies: The Politics of Nature in (Post)colonial British Columbia,” in Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 87:1 (1997).
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To come to the concerns I am raising here in this way, I have suggested, precisely
ensures that we reproduce their generative terms, that we remain internal to a game
already rigged so far as the problem of nature is concerned. For where we continue to
think either the problem of nature or the problem of freedom in our accustomed,
anthropocentric way, the problem of developing alternate and less dominating or
anthropocentric relations with the nonhuman, remains stubbornly difficult to adequately
raise. In the same way, the question of richness in contrast to the kind of cultural paucity
or crises named above remains unposed as one concerning constitutive and dialogic
relationships to the nonhuman; rather, we insist on construing the matter as a problem
that can be addressed relative to the domain of the free human in atomistic isolation, the
problem of positing new values, etc. And so our monological dance can but continue.
I should stress that it is not that all that is named with reference to the problem of
freedom, or anything like the kinds of critical possibilities orbiting that problem for the
Western tradition, should simply be abandoned or rejected altogether, that these articulate
nothing of importance. For freedom as a problem grounds valuable possibilities for
articulating counterprinciples, and hence making objections to a number of threatening
tendencies within the modern scene (which are also not irrelevant to the problems raised
here). We know these tendencies from any number of social and cultural theorists from
the last hundred years: the oppressive closure of thought and imagination under the terms
of late modernity, the reduction of ourselves to the kinds of people we must be to be
functional job-holders and consumers in an increasingly marketized society, and so on.
The problem of “freedom” enables a certain capacity to play a game of difference against
that of identity, of dynamism of the self against forces of ossifying stultification, etc. It is
rather that in the ways we habitually articulate these matters, everything remains tangled
up and interpreted through a very particular set of ontological assumptions, which in turn
shape the kinds of conclusions and inferences it becomes possible to draw at any point. It
is my suggestion that something not unlike many of those concerns can be articulated
along different and relational lines.
Part of what is at issue in problematizing modern ontology and thinking between
ontologies, then, is the extent to which our usual ways of compartmentalizing these
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problems into different ontological and “value-” spheres, into separate issues, and so on,
is necessary or indeed desirable at all. While such elements may appear discrete by virtue
of the (nature/culture) categories through which to think them, it will become evident
through the course of this dissertation that an ethics and philosophy grounded in
relationality must challenge the inevitability of any such separations. (Accordingly it will
also challenge the implication that these worries can only properly be addressed through
the terms of that separation, or that one must somehow pick sides in a tradeoff between
caring about what can only be thought as “nature”, and caring about freedom or
Indigenous peoples or anyone else).
An engagement with relational ontology, in other words, allows us to see how by
stubbornly insisting that our accustomed way of seeing, interpreting, and partitioning is
the only viable way of doing so, we are apt to remain in the grip of what are effectively
false problems, or rather the false assumption that anything like these matters can only
ever be posed and responded to in such-and-such a (familiar) way. Thinking across
ontologies has the capacity to sharpen, by way of contrast, our own abilities to recognize
and defamiliarize many of our most basic assumptions that otherwise go unnoticed, and
the precise interpretive manoeuvres that underlie these. And in this, it opens a capacity
to reflect in renewed ways about the possibility of a medicine, about the kind of
philosophy, the alternate truth-games and ethical practices, of which we who are moderns
stand today in need.
One final point might be made here. That is, it should perhaps be emphasized that
my aim here is not simply to present my readers with some sort of stark choice: are you
to believe in ontology A and reject ontology B, or in ontology B and reject ontology A?
This is already too Cartesian, too Hobbesian a setup insofar as it relies in the end on an
act of will, and on the presumption that the logic through which the world might be
engaged must be singular. We are presented with a set of alternatives in a manner not
unlike a blackmail: either A or B; and there is no alternative but the alternative. Let us
rather try to give up on thinking in blackmails, to learn to distrust the very inclination to
do so, and avoid moving always so fast and along such well-worn tracks of association.
Let us rather limit ourselves, for the moment, to seeing how it is possible to learn to think
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and be shown something different, to discover the world from a different vantage point,
through processes only awkwardly reducible to something like acts of will. The essence
of defamiliarization concerns the sense in which to have sojourned through two ways of
thinking (or more) leaves you in a different place than having only over encountered one;
and what is important here is the askesis, the transformation this brings, as a phenomenon
that shines forth in its own positivity.
It is a strange impulse, I think, to assume that such new and previously unthought
positivities as one encounters in this way, such new coherences as one has learned to
think through, must in the end be put to the singular test of one ontology’s truth-games –
and so that it is a mark of “higher” thinking to see these nullified, reduced to a
nothingness, to illusion, etc.52 It is a question of seeing the terrain – and the face of the
world – change, and then seeing how our ethical questions accordingly appear in a
different light. And even just to begin opening such a horizon, relative to the beginningpoints sketched here, achieves I think a great deal.

1.6 A Note on Political Context and Situatedness
In coming to my questions in the way that I do, I am also attempting to “do
theory”, to ask for example the philosophical questions of ontology and ethics, in a way
that strives to be responsive to the present, to think in light of the kind of context where I
find myself situated. Thus, my reflections here arise in light of the dangers, but also the
possibilities, that arise within what we might call our contemporary “conjuncture” – i.e.,
the present as configured by the coincidence of “cultural”/ontological structures in the
ongoing encounters of colonialism.53 In returning to many of the cultural critiques of
modernity levied by thinkers like Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Weber, I am trying to
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A problem that points us again in the direction of our metaphysics, and the ways in which, e.g., the
Cartesian story of reality and of belief qua acts of will requires that we think in terms of a truth-logic of
correspondence, where the alternative is presupposed to be between a singular, universal reality/being and
illusion/nothingness. The challenge is accordingly to assure ourselves that we have placed our anchors, as it
were, on something solid, where so much is unreliable and deceptive. But to my mind there are alternatives
to this kind of setup, as I will hope to show in the following.
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In my use of “conjuncture” here I am drawing directly on its inflection by Mario Blaser in “Political
Ontologies,” though the term most directly recalls the work of Marshall Sahlins. See Marshall Sahlins,
Islands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), introduction.
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(re)think many of their provocations in light of openings, but also contextual
circumstances that they did not experience in the same way. Our current and deepening
ecological crisis is one example of these circumstances, but another is the social and
political dynamics of settler colonialism and Euro-Indigenous relations within the
Americas. These matters are not as separate as we might think even under conventional
terms, since the dynamics of colonialism are indissociable from the universalizing spread
of modern relationships to nature (as expressed in capitalism and associated legal, social
and political structures, for example). Such contexts colour my reflections on the
Western tradition in obvious ways, but they are also at some level what makes it possible
for me to engage Indigenous American philosophical traditions at all and in the way I do.
In that settler-colonialism (as experienced for example in Canada, where I live) forms an
implicit psycho-social and political backdrop to this dissertation, it will perhaps be worth
a few words here to elaborate on the way I understand my present inquiry to be situated
relative to that backdrop and its dominant logics, and hence to offer response to it.
On the one hand, my aim here is precisely to explore possibilities for renewed
self-reflection and philosophical thought in ways that occur within and through a
particular political scenario – which is to say, one marked by the co-presence of multiple
and disagreeing ontologies – and the kinds of possible interrelations this gives rise to. But
to do this, and to attempt to think in a more open, non-colonizing, non-hierarchical, and
cross-cultural way within such a context is on the other hand to resist and counter specific
and dominant logics that do continually insist upon such colonizing, hierarchical
relations. This problem lies especially close to my subject matter here; for the problem of
nature, its singular universality, and our monological nature/culture relations is precisely
a central pillar of the legitimating stories and logics of the modern (colonial) state, and
the kinds of codifcations and self-understandings it entrenches. Or rather: the latter are
precisely political expressions of where one ends up when the ground is prepared by our
modern ontological settlement and related philosophical developments. The logic of the
blackmail proposed by Descartes or Hobbes is also none other than that continually
operative within the logics of the modern, sovereign state itself.
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For indeed: one could say that the logic of modern sovereignty is nothing other
than the dominant and politically authoritative articulation of the appropriate relation
between Western/modern and all other possible modes of thinking and being – and those
of the Indigenous peoples it has worked to supplant, not least. Though I can elaborate
only briefly on the matter here, modern state sovereignty is enacted in and through
practices of demarcation between the inside and the outside, between the modern and the
primitive in such a way as to produce both spatial and temporal delimitations expressive
of the philosophical problems constitutive of the modern itself.54 On the one hand, what
is enabled on the inside is nothing other than our classical story of modern freedom, and
the authoring of laws that make it possible to balance our freedom with equality within
the domestic space of the state, to cultivate the kind of rational maturity proper to us as
human beings, and so on. But what is moreover authorized here, and enforced within
lived situations internal to the spatiotemporal self-framing of the state, is precisely the
singular terms of our modern ontology itself, and its nature/culture relation. In this sense,
sovereignty politically grounds the sighting of the nonhuman and the land within the
frame of nature: as mute territory claimed for (willful) dominion, as natural resources or
wealth belonging to the nation, as a physical expanse chartable in the mathematized
universal space of the map, and so on – a point that has been of no small significance for
the specific dynamics of modern settler-colonialism.55 In the next chapter, I will show
more fully the ways in which our political and social codifications express a monological
relationship and ontology, and the ways our stories of freedom and so on are inseparable
from our concept of nature.
On the other hand, what are excluded here are not only all other possible worlds,
but moreover the kinds of pre-existing jurisdictional relationships that other peoples had
and continue to have with the land, which express such alternate ontologies within the
space of everyday social life and interaction. This exclusion precisely takes the form,
within the dominant logic of sovereignty itself, of a blackmail. We find the general stakes
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For a more thorough exploration of this point, see R.B.J. Walker, After the Globe, Before the World
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For a good study of the ways this has been the case in the history of colonialism in British Columbia,
where I live, see Bruce Willems-Braun, “Buried Epistemologies,” and also Daniel Wright Clayton, Islands
of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000).
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of the problem expressed in Thomas Hobbes: either one must draw the sharp lines of the
state, and have security, certainty, and so on, after the modern manner – or one must have
effectively nothing that is thinkable or habitable, a life of insecurity, uncertainty, hopeless
ephemerality, brutishness.56 And in this, Hobbes does but offer a political correlate of
Descartes: either one has certain knowledge built on new, solid foundations, and hence a
grip on reality, or one is lost to the abyss of error qua non-being. And where one does not
speak with certainty, one should keep silent.
Writing that blackmail into the space of lived situations, the Hobbesian story of
sovereignty is none other than that of leaving behind all the disqualified lifeways and
traditions, everything we will now dismiss as “fairy stories” – of leaving the insecurity
and the unruly multiplicity (and its alternate narratives and timelines and struggles) back
then. One draws the lines for a new beginning, and clears away what came before. It is
on the basis of this enabling condition that sovereignty is then able to authorize a new
domesticity, within which the singular law of the state can now reign exclusively, can
hold extensively and intensively within its bounds, can grant the terms which now
structure everyday life. Played out in the context of colonialism, we see that sovereignty
is asserted, and the State assumes the monopoly on violence, the authority to parcel out
the land, to give laws. In principle, what came before was terra nullius, or needs now in
any event to be regarded as such, forgotten.57
Hobbes (and so many others like him) of course caricaturizes his outsides,
rendering them into unthinkable and unlivable absurdities, projections constituted
through dualisms that always favor the modern West58 – but in the end, so the logic goes,
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See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
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Of course, this basic logic becomes more complicated once the principle of terra nullius is disavowed in
law; but it is not for this reason undone, insofar as the prior grounding of the State’s sovereign authority can
never itself come under question within the law itself. Thus even a relatively sympathetic Supreme Court of
Canada decision like the appeal in Delgamuukw maintains , (and in principle must maintain) that the central
problem for us today must be one of reconciling “the prior presence of aboriginal peoples with the assertion
of Crown sovereignty”. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at 9. For a history of
the terra nullius concept within Canadian jurisprudence, see Michael Asch, “From Terra Nullius to
Affirmation: Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with the Canadian Constitution,” in The Canadian Journal of
Law and Society 17:2 (2002).
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it hardly matters. What matters instead is that we get on with it, on with the singular
history that counts and has universal significance: i.e., that of the state, of modernization
as the route to maturity, to living the way that is properly ours as human beings.59
Disrupt that logic, and its unification of authority – and one has chaos.
Within the temporality of the state, Indigenous peoples in principle come to
appear as anachronistic hangovers, as holdouts on the magic moment of sovereignty and
hence as those who refuse to play the meaningful collective game. A particular framing
of temporality justifies a host of exceptional violences: the future must be modernity,
must be the temporality of the state and its society; ergo, one can draw all the obvious
(and grotesque) conclusions concerning what is to be done in the present.60 It is hardly
surprising in this context that Indigenous peoples come to be viewed as an “Indian
Problem” to be solved – through genocide, through “civilizing” missions of one sort or
another, through the eventual assimilation of Indigenous peoples into the modern body
politic. Kill the Indian, save the man. All this is of course eminently familiar; where I
live, these same self-legitimating stories are repeated now much as they were at the
beginnings of the colonial period, with apparently little variation. And then as now, such
stories would seem to serve above all as self-righteous apologetics for a culture of
tremendous violence and callous thoughtlessness, of seething resentment towards
difference, to a steadfast closure of the mind against anything Indigenous peoples might
have to say.
But then, here is the rub: as a statement of how things are, the stories of the state
are always engaged in doing actively political work within a much less settled terrain,
reaffirming altogether contestable divisions and distinctions, rigging all subsequent
conversation in their favor. For in different but widespread ways, alternate forms of law,
knowledge, agreed definitions, a life based on illusory fairy stories or one based on reality – in Hobbes
case, this means being grounded in a mechanistic natural philosophy that already sets up distinctly modern
existential problems. See, on this point and for the passages relevant to the rest of this paragraph, the first
ten chapters or so of Leviathan.
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alternate relations to the land, alternate philosophical traditions, and so on, continue to
persist not least within the colonial spaces of the Americas – to take but one example.
Witness the way Indigenous nations have continued to oppose unilateral claims to the
land on the part of the state (and, subsequently, capital): what is at issue is at one level the
very validity of the state’s initial claim, its unilateral sovereign moment.61 This
opposition concerns, moreover, the validity of presuming at bottom a singular,
modern/Western, ontological-political field. For what one encounters in many of the
sayings of Indigenous peoples to the settler state is rather a form of disagreement
presented by alternate and co-existing ontologies – and the kinds of overlapping
jurisdictional relationships these inform and give rise to.62
This dissertation attempts to think within the relational and interactive space
constituted by this contested terrain. At a basic level, it begins with a refusal of the above
forms of blackmail and its associated projections of temporality. It is an attempt rather to
acknowledge that there is a great deal more going on than Hobbes might like us to admit,
and indeed to show that there are a great many enriching possibilities for thinking that
might be explored when one does not begin by accepting his terms and alternatives.
Rather than repeat the assumption of a singular linear temporality, sweeping us all
through modernity and to futures meaningfully articulable only from out of modern
terms, and a related fixation with new futures we might invent for ourselves, I am
inclined more to listen to what else is already here. For “already here” is capable of
levying provocations more fundamental, and also more meaningfully “otherwise” than
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many more familiar ways of disputing the dominant terms of our present. An ethics of
listening and respect, then, as a counter to colonizing and blackmail logics; an attempt to
open oneself to learning where Hobbes would tell us nothing at all can be learned; and a
recognition that the differences we traverse in this way extend to the very fundamentals
of our thinking, and are capable of growing our thought beginning at that level.
Of course, there is a sense in which those of us who inhabit the colonial spaces of
the Americas are already claimed and interpellated by the structures of modern thought
and politics, and by Hobbes, in ways that are not easily shrugged off. At the same time,
however, we can see that the question as to whether a less banal and impoverished way of
being might be possible today is far from being only a question individual thinkers must
be called to tackle for themselves, but is instead one that is very much alive in the present
context of our colonial politics. This poses the problem of calibrating our
ethical/philosophical work with political action. In this respect, the kind of theoretical
work done here can in a sense only be preparatory for more direct political and interactive
engagements, to the work of disrupting colonial logics, decolonizing settler-Indigenous
relations, etc., more broadly and within the specific places we live.
My theoretical work here nevertheless aims to be meaningful as at least a partial
response to the political scenario and logics of subjugation described above, not least in
insisting upon redefining the onto-political space in which we move. For the ordinary
functioning of everyday life under the singular onto-political field of modernity hangs
upon and continually reinforces our particular, dominant accounting of reality, a
particular partitioning of what is sayable, visible, sensible, and so on. The game of
sovereignty, and the finality of its “magic moment” of self-authored new beginnings, in
this sense follows us wherever we go, calling for continual reproduction in concrete and
daily practices and interactions. To begin to resist the kinds of exclusionary logics that
render Indigenous thinking as pre-modern “noise” rather than viable discourse, to disrupt
the terrain of the real through a kind of defamiliarizing philosophical litigation that argues
the equal viability of Indigenous relational ontologies63: it is my hope that this kind of
work will contribute to the cultivation of ameliorated and transformed relationships of
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settlers with Indigenous peoples. Jacques Rancière has suggested that any politics
challenging a concrete exclusion of alternate worlds within the space of our dominant
world, must involve “first and foremost an intervention upon the visible and the
sayable.”64 The appropriate political concern and endeavour, in this sense, concerns
above all a modification of the political, ontological, and aesthetic field of possibility.
That is, one must begin by breaking open the face of the world, and the symbolic armor
by which our dominant order continually reaffirms itself and its false peace of mind. And
if the arguments of this dissertation hold, we will also see how engaging and working in
support of Indigenous political struggles can not only be a logical extension of caring
about/rethinking our nature-self relations, but also a means of actualizing this possibility
politically.
It is crucial to note that better relationships here are unlikely to develop without
those of us who are settlers doing serious reflexive, critical, and transformative work on
ourselves. Such work is also unlikely to happen where the pride and world-historical selfimportance of settler society is permitted to persist undisturbed: for this pride also
presumes to make the exclusionary violence done to Indigenous peoples into perhaps
regrettable but necessary violence if we are all to better our ways of life, to carry
ourselves up the historical climb of progress. And this dissertation will have a great deal
to say to such pride.
As a work of theory, this dissertation is concerned primarily with cross-cultural
thinking as an ethical and philosophical practice – that is, it is invested in the work of
thought and in the kinds of disruptions and transformations of the self, the world, and our
relations therein, that this can enable. It is written from, and speaks largely relative to, a
particular vantage-point and position within the settler-colonial relation. But I am
convinced that such an orientation can do important work. For responding to the demands
of our present in a decolonizing way, I think, cannot simply be a matter of withdrawing
into ourselves so that other – marginalized –voices may speak; for there is a sense in
which this can also be a way of learning nothing and changing nothing in ourselves. One
listens for a moment, perhaps, and then goes back to whatever one was doing; for one has
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not come to any serious alternative for oneself in the process. But we must always and
unavoidably be thinkers in our own right, must meet the fate of the times with the tools
and the stories that we have; and so we cannot give up on the value of our own thought,
and of thinking differently.
At some level, the endeavor here is to ask what alternate pathways might be
opened if, instead of regarding our being-together as settlers with Indigenous peoples in
the Americas as a problem to be “solved”, an inconvenience with regard to our unilateral
(and monological) aims, etc., we might instead begin to ask what might we instead learn
insofar as everything is not so sewn-up? How might we begin bettering, working on,
transforming ourselves within such a context? If the problem I have delineated brings us
to appreciate the value, even with regard to ourselves, of a strategy of de-realizing the
real, then we might ask: can we do this in a way that is rooted in, responsive to, and that
draws upon the faultlines and the more “actual” possibilities of our present conjuncture
and lived political terrain? And indeed, I argue that we stand to learn a great deal from
Indigenous relational ontologies – from the ways these invite us to apprehend and
struggle with many of the impoverishments that haunt us through our dominant lifeways,
and to explore alternate possibilities.

1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, then, I have introduced the general problem and task of this
dissertation: namely, an attempt to defamiliarize how we moderns tend to think about
ourselves in the world and most especially in relation to the non-human, and to explore
how listening seriously to Indigenous traditions of thought can open up alternate
possibilities in this regard.
Before we can pursue that task cross-culturally, however, it will be necessary to
clarify a little further our starting-point. That is: the precise nature of our dominant,
modern ontological constellation, the ways this brings us to understand and relate to
“nature” in the ways we do, and the kinds of ethical, socio-political, etc., problematics
this comes in turn to delineate. How precisely might we understand the kinds of relations
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described by terms like monological or willful mastery to be characteristic of our modern
scene? Let me turn now to elaborate on this point.
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Chapter 2
2

On the Nature of Western Modernity
This chapter has two broad aims. The first is to establish, with greater clarity and

detail, something of the accrued meaning of “nature” within the dominant strains of
Western thought, its role within the modern ontological constellation, and the
ethical/comportmental horizons that can be seen to consequently arise and predominate.
This provides a basis for comparison on the “Western”, modern side of things when we
turn to consider different Indigenous traditions of thought in the next chapter. It will also
allow me to more fully substantiate my characterizations of the modern modus operandi
as monological, anthropocentric, “technological” in Heidegger’s sense, rooted in a story
of the will and a consequent ethos of domination, and so on.
To this end, I will touch on four interrelated “events” of significance in the
provenance of our contemporary scene and our dominant ways of understanding
ourselves, “nature”, and what relations with the nonhuman we take to be viable. These
are: i) the philosophical emergence of the modern subject, as we see most notably in
Descartes; ii) the development of a distinctly modern mathematical view of nature, as
distinguished from the neo-Aristotelianism that preceded it, and the connected
development of what we might call the modern technoscientific ethos; iii) the emergence
of certain understandings of politics as exemplified/expressed by the modern sovereign
state, which bears an essential relationship both to the theory of the subject (and its
understanding of human selfhood and freedom), and the modern view of nature; and iv)
the emergence of distinctly modern understandings of ownership or property, which offer
expression (as enforceable codifications of social relations concerning extant beings) of
the modern monological and technological relationship to the nonhuman qua “nature”.
And they at once enable, underlie, and legitimate the emergence and spread of
contemporary capitalist forms of economy, and associated practices land use, processes
of commodification, and so on.
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My second aim here is to show that the above events transpire, on the one hand,
within a philosophical field of possibility that is established by particular ontological
resolutions and presuppositions. On the other hand, I try to show some of the ways in
which this ontology is informed by distinctive theological and cosmological
interpretations. In other words, I try to establish that modern thinking – and our
distinctive ways of construing ourselves and relating to nature – emerges from, carries
forward, and indeed retains its full persuasive force within a particular and decisively
Christian interpretation of the world.
I elaborate some of my reasons for making this claim, and the lessons I mean to
draw from it, in the last section of this chapter. Not least in significance here is that
tracing our ontology to its theological roots allows us to appreciate to a greater depth
many of the fundamental interpretive manoeuvres characteristic of our contemporary
tradition. This allows us to reflect more adequately on what is ultimately at stake in
many of the basic philosophical points on which we find that Indigenous traditions of
thought tend to differ from ours. But it also opens up another line of questioning, which
hearkens to Nietzsche: that is, we can begin to ask about what is at stake in these basic
interpretive manoeuvres, about the kinds of evaluative or “moral” orientations relative to
worldly existence that are operative here, and so often unproblematically pushed forward
in neutralized terms.
Focusing on the events I do, much of this chapter will find itself drawn back to
thinkers the early modern period (though indeed, within these are notions that send us
further back still in the history of Western thought). My aim here, however, cannot be to
give a comprehensive history of modern thought. Neither is it to suggest that nothing of
significance for our self-conception and relations to nature has occurred since early
modernity – which would be patently untrue. But an event, as I understand it, is
important in that it somehow crystallizes a shift, sets the terms and a field of possibility
for much that comes afterwards, to which that “afterwards” must find itself responding.
This is not least because such developments often come to be expressed/codified in law,
in structures of authority and socio-political order, and so on. But events are fruitful for
us to explore because they allow us to see more clearly what was at stake in first
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establishing elements of the terrain we later take for granted. It is not necessary to assume
that nothing of importance happens after Descartes or Bacon. But I have elected to
discuss these because I think we can recognize more clearly in them much that continues
to hold sway in our own thinking, that in one way or another remains preserved even in
the wake of more recent developments.
With this in mind, let us now turn to the first development under discussion: the
event of the modern subject.

2.1 Of Subjects and Objects
Much that is essential in distinctly modern modes of understanding and relating to
the world and the nonhuman is expressed in what we might call the philosophical event
of the modern subject. Of course, this suggestion is nothing new; it is the thrust of
Heidegger’s argument when he describes the modern age as unique in that the world
emerges therein as a kind of “world picture” for and before human beings. “Man
becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being
and its truth.”1 And this shift, we well know, is bound up with particular ways of coming
to apprehend and interact with what we think of as the world “out there”; and much that
is at stake here is laid out in the epistemological project that Descartes situates at the
beginning-point of all that can be said. My own intention in the first part of this section is
on the one hand to review a few of the central characteristics of this philosophical
development and indicate some of the ethical and relational consequences that can be
seen to arise from it. On the other hand, it is to show how this development, for all its
purporting to begin everything anew in self-consciously erecting new epistemological
foundations, nevertheless entrenches a very particular and presupposed ontology, crucial
features of which are hardly new at all.
Many aspects of this ontology, indeed, have longstanding roots in the Western
tradition, and can be traced back as far as the Greeks if we have a mind to do so (not
least, in a commitment to an atomistic ontology, to the investigation of beings in
1

Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 128.
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accordance with the principle that identity belongs to being, and so on – even though
changes in the precise nature of this atomism do occur from Greek to modern thought).
But much that is distinctive, and distinctively modern in the ontology presented by our
subjectivism can moreover be seen to derive from Christian theological sources – and in
the second part of this section, I will indicate briefly some of the ways this is so.
The classic philosophical point of reference here, it has already been noted, is
René Descartes. In Heidegger’s gloss, it is here that we see the pure thought of the human
“I think” come to stand as subjectum, as the aprioristic that-which-lies-before upon which
can be grounded our certainty concerning the reality of anything at all, and relative to
which we are then in a position to establish certainty concerning the external world.2 But
this whole movement begins with a process of withdrawing from that “external” world in
radical doubt, from which the self-certainty of the cogito ergo sum is to rescue us: I must
first pretend that everything I think I know or that has ever “entered my mind” is an
illusion, a deception of the senses, a falsity. This doubt enacts a methodological principle
(and the question of truth here becomes above all a question of method): “that I should
withhold my assent no less carefully from things which are not plainly certain and
indubitable than I would to what is patently false.”3
We already begin here, it will be noted, with a presumed atomism: that it is
possible for the self to withdraw itself from its engagements in the world of sense, and
then apprehend itself in its own self-shining indubitability. The being-ness of existing as
a thing here is grounded in the notion of substance, from which it is possible to speak of
particular substances in an atomistic sense – for example, I think therefore I am; and this
means, I am a thinking thing. Descartes moreover introduces, as a modulation of this
atomism, a particular distinction between body and mind in the differentiation between
the res cogitans (which the self-thinking mind is), and the res extensa (of bodily things
within the material world).4

2

Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 148-153.
René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. by Donald A. Cress
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1986), 17, 57.
4
Ibid, 63-64.
3
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This atomism is inflected through a metaphysical view of the self as a being that
has within it a will, an internal and autonomously spontaneous organ of efficient causality
– such that the human being can be understood to be the ground and author of his or her
own action. We see in Descartes that the whole meditation running through selfwithdrawn doubt to new foundations hangs on the possibility of acts of will, with the
understanding that my will’s action lies anterior to the thinking I do and possesses the
power of assent or denial. Knowledge concerns judgment, and the will grounds my
capacity, independently and for myself, to suspend my belief in things in the sense of
withholding my assent from propositions that make judgments whose truth I cannot be
certain about. To remain in error, to believe in things I am not certain about, is thus no
less than to eschew the proper use of my freedom – and, knowing that we are free in this,
we also know precisely who is to blame.5 In this way, the foundationalist and selfreflexive manoeuvre of the dubito comes to place problems of knowledge close to the
heart of modern construals of maturity and self-responsibility6, and indeed sets up a
certain opposition between a modern self-liberating attitude as against (a particular
construal of) a “traditional” one.
This ontological separation of the self from the world, which ensures that the
essence of the self is most properly located in the soul qua thinking thing, makes possible
the drawing of an epistemological line between the self and nature. (This self-location in
the soul occurs even though it is clear that we are, in this life, a mixture of body and
mind. The latter forms a privileged locus for the self in a way that the body does not:
which is why if we can ground ourselves in the cogito, this process is able to rid of us our
fear of death insofar as the soul is shown to be immortal and independent of the body.7)
There can be no longer the real adequation of intellect and thing characteristic of
medieval realism.8 The important questions come to center around the relationship
5

See René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy trans. by Donald A. Cress
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1986), 82-84 (fourth Meditation).
6
For an excellent elaboration of this question of self-responsibility, see Charles Taylor, “Overcoming
Epistemology,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-19.
7
Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, 32.
8
Not least because the extended world is now reduced to matter. Aristotelian epistemology had understood
that things were themselves enmattered essences, i.e., a conjunction of matter and intelligible form, and that
in knowing something, the mind becomes identical with what is thinkable (i.e., the form) within its object
(Aristotle, De Anima, Bk III, Ch. 3, at 15). But it is notable that this epistemological closing-off of the
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between what we experience as representations that are in some sense ours “in here”, and
what is really “out there” – a relationship structured in term of truth as correspondence.9
These manoeuvres are of no small consequence for modern thought and the
worldly relations it delineates. Beginning with the problem of us and our self-certainty
enables an experience of ourselves as independently and autonomously freed to
ourselves, self-responsible for setting up the criteria of knowledge, thrust into the center
of our worldly stage. Though Descartes will still require God explicitly in his reasoning,
he nevertheless sets the terms by which we experience ourselves as left to ourselves in
our finitude, cut off from God as much as from nature. (We see this rift deepened with
Kant, for whom e.g., God’s providence, the idea of a universal law, etc., become
precisely regulative ideas of our reason: which Nietzsche will eventually call values.)
And in this independence, we also experience what Heidegger called our “secret goad”,
which prompts us to secure the full development of the “manifold modes of modern
[read, human] freedom.”10
Furthermore, we might note briefly that the Cartesian manoeuvre is also bound up
with grounding a certain way of coming to knowledge concerning the world it takes as
being “out there”, i.e., a world of material objects. That is, it is bound up with a specific
kind of mathematical project – in the broad philosophical sense of the Greek mathesis, as
determining what is knowable about beings. (“The mathematical” in the more common
sense of the numerical is in this sense only a particular and exemplary instance of
mathesis – though it is precisely one that, as it happens, comes to be privileged in modern
thought as a language especially appropriate for the scientific knowledge of nature).11 To
explore this point much further would anticipate too much the next section of this
chapter. But it is worth noting simply how Descartes’ privileged language for thinking

human being within his finitude and reflexive self-responsibility marks a change in the relationship
between thinker and world. Previously, Aristotelian thought had left the thinker open onto an intelligible
world in a way the Cartesian manoeuvre now precludes.
9
We can see again the atomism here, on both sides of the inner/outer divide, as well as enabling that divide
as such – since we are asking about the reality of something presumably subsisting out there by itself.
10
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Vol. IV: Nihilism trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: HarperCollins,
1991), 98-99.
11
C.f., Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993),
275.
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what is learnable about beings expresses a particular hierarchy of body and mind. For it
belongs to mind, and not the mind/body composite, to know; and, indeed, the presence of
the bodily within us is but another way of describing our finitude, our peculiar capacity
for being duped by the senses. Given that I experience things in a muddled way as a
composite, how am I to speak with confidence about the reality of material beings? The
solution favoured by Descartes, and many other Western thinkers since the seventeenth
century, has been to establish a distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Though at some level we can see here an iteration of the longstanding
philosophical theme of the relationship between the intelligible and the sensory, the
precise configuration involved is specific to the modern framework. Primary qualities can
be understood as determinable characteristics which can be recognized as belonging to all
matter, and which delineate the formal structure relative to which the operation of
universal causal laws can be apprehended.12 For Descartes, these supply a more solid
language for viable knowledge of physical reality because they correspond to the rational
intuitions of the mind13 and can be derived from the first principles that ground the selfcertainty of the cogito (i.e., they are simple, clear, and distinct). Primary qualities can
accordingly be separated out from those qualities we understand objects to have in
everyday consciousness which, in their simple form, arise from sensory experience.14
“The task of drawing up a list of primary qualities,” one author on the subject has written,
“is not dissociable from the project of specifying the single fundamental essence or
nature of materiality.”15 On this point I can offer no objection; but then it is also vital to
see that this particular project encodes and expresses a particular construal of body and
12

A.D. Smith, “Of Primary and Secondary Qualities,” in The Philosophical Review 99:2 (Apr. 1990), 232233. This article is also especially helpful in itself expressing the logics by which this distinction is able to
remain compelling today, as structuring the way to think about reality. “The majority of philosophers today,
at least in the ‘Analytical Tradition’,” the author writes, “would endorse a distinction between primary and
secondary qualities.” (221)
13
The primary qualities named by Descartes are: “magnitude, or extension in length, breadth, and depth;
shape, which arises from the limit of this extension; position, which the various shaped things possess in
relation to one another; and motion, or the alteration of this position; to these can be added substance,
duration, and number.” (Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, 72-73.)
14
The secondary qualities for Descartes are “light and colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat and cold and other
tactile qualities – [which] are thought . . . only in a very confused and obscure manner, with the result that I
do not know whether they are true or false.” Do these belong to things as they really are, or do they stem
from me in my bodily experience of them? Does something real cause these sensations to arise? (Ibid, 73.)
15
Smith, “Of Primary and Secondary Qualities,” 233.
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mind and their appropriate relation within the terms of how we think about problems of
knowledge.
In the foregoing, then, I have tried to explore some of the basic contours of the
complex and multifaceted event of the modern subject in our philosophical tradition.
Some of the factors that I have touched upon here, that become central in structuring our
subsequent sense of being in the world, and the horizon of our dominant modes of
apprehending/relating to “nature”, include: i) an ontological atomism; ii) a conception of
the self as willful; iii) a framing of problems of knowledge in terms of a correspondence
between “in here” and “out there”, i.e., in terms of an ontological terrain laid first by our
atomism.
To this we might add two further points. The first is simply that the problem of
the real is framed here in terms of an ontological alternative between being and nonbeing. For the problem with illusion and error is that it is precisely not real, i.e., it does
not anchor us in what is in being, but rather partakes in nothingness. The second point
here is simply that the problem of reality and certain knowledge here is posed from the
beginning in a universal way. On the one hand, this universalism is evinced in the way
the problem is posed relative to our possibilities and faculties as a universal class of
beings – in terms of the question of how it is that human beings may have (certain)
knowledge, as such. Here again we see a certain species of atomism: we start by
imagining ourselves as fixed and bounded, stable and subsisting entities, which can then
be understood to be necessarily endowed with certain capacities or faculties such as free
will, and presuming that all human beings as a class are created in this same way. (The
Christian notion that humans as beings are created in the image of God, and must be
understood universally in that way relative to the universal optics of God, is not difficult
to tease out here.) On the other hand, we can see how there is a universalism here in the
way we think about reality as such: namely, that there is one – a singular, universal
nature.
But if the way we thus think the subject, and reality, only makes sense in this way
given that we first presuppose a particular ontology, we might well ask: how does such an
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ontology arise? How did we come to think this way, to understand that these are the basic
contours and problems our thought must be shaped by?

1.1.1 Theological Contours (I)
The answer I think we must offer to the above question is that the ontology
presumed by Descartes, and that continues to live thereafter in modern subjectivism, is
not dissociable from a specific theological and cosmological heritage – namely, that of
Christianity. Tracing the provenance of this heritage brings us to sojourn in the domain of
Medieval thought, and the lengthy effort by Patristic and subsequent philosophers to
articulate and defend Christian doctrine within the language of Greek metaphysics, and
eventually to purge the latter of its identifiably pagan elements. Let us try to see briefly
some of the ways this is the case.
We might begin for example with the very set-up of the structuring problem of
being/reality and non-being as such. It is the Christian doctrine of Creation, for example,
that first leads us in a newly radical way to pose the question of the existence of the
world, which as existing must be rationally created, between the alternatives of being and
nothingness or non-being. For ancient Greeks like Plato or Aristotle, the world was not
created ex nihilo but as produced or fabricated through the mixing of principles that are
themselves eternal. Plato’s demiurge in the Timaeus, for example, creates neither matter
nor form, but only brings these together in the crafting of things; for Aristotle, similarly,
the world is eternal and uncreated. Accordingly, the problem of knowing tended to be
thought more in terms of ascertaining the principles according to which nature as physis
was self-showing, according to which beings emerged or shone forth as what they were,
and passed away.
The Christian doctrine of Creation shifts the matter so as to introduce precisely
such a radical contingency into the heart of beings, such as makes the existence of things
hang absolutely upon the creative and preserving power of God’s will.16 And it is
16

In other words, “Not only does it remain true to say that all that is, save God, might be other than it is,
but it now becomes true to say that all save God might possibly not exist.” By contrast, Plato’s Demiurge,
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precisely this cosmological alternative that would seem to frame the Cartesian imaginary:
how can I be sure that I remain anchored in what is in being, and which as existing must
be an expression of the omnipotent rational activity and coherence of God’s intellect,
which I must attempt to recapitulate within myself so far as my finitude will allow? If
error or illusion is a form of sin for Descartes, it is precisely because this is an
epistemological iteration of the way sin has been figured in the Christian metaphysical
tradition at least since Augustine: as prideful turning away from God towards the
material, as rebellion against God.17
Why and how does Descartes come to imagine the problem of reality, and hence
the whole construal of knowledge as a problem, as he does – i.e., as relative to a reality
that is universal, singular, bound up with a mind/body problem, and so on? Once again,
this is a problem experienced and delineated in the wake of Christian thought and its
interpretive requirements. It is not only that posing the problem of truth in terms of
certainty has its precedent in the Medieval search for certainty concerning individual
salvation, and in the way God as what is most real/in being is able to anchor the
possibility of certainty qua absolute truth held in God’s infinite intellect, the logos that
grounds and determines all things.18 Moreover, the problem of reality as structured by a
singular, universalistic logic, is something that Descartes is able to arrive at by virtue of
Christian onto-theo-cosmologically-determined dicta. His invocation of the old Christian
image of the “great book of the world,”19 for example, is no mere fanciful turn of
phrase.20
for example, “endows the universe with everything except, precisely, existence.” Etienne Gilson, The Spirit
of Medieval Philosophy trans. by A.H.C. Downes (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991),
68.
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See, e.g., Augustine of Hippo, Confessions trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998), 27.
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C.f., Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2003), 20-25.
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Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, at 5.
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It is not that there can be no alternative construal of things relative to distinctively Christian problems, or
that it is impossible to offer alternate logics that subvert the Cartesian logic on crucial points within the
possibilities of Christianized thought. Though proving this point here would take us too far afield, one
might for example mention Spinoza, or Heidegger, as delineating markedly different ways of approaching
the problem of the real – though both nevertheless continue to work in crucial ways within the domain and
the space opened by Christian thought. For there are of course numerous and often conflicting
philosophical strains that have come to in one way or another be Christianized, or to speak within Christian
terms; and not all of these lead us where Descartes would have us go. See my discussion below on the
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To understand what is involved here, it is necessary to see that what is
presupposed from the beginning is an ontological gap or difference between God and
Man: we are in our essence finite, imperfect, a composite mixture of body and mind, not
self-causing but dependant on God for our existence – as against the infinite and eternal
perfection, the infinite will and intellect of God the Creator who is Spirit and who is selfcausing. The old Anselmian proof that God is a being whose essence implies existence –
that He is a being who cannot not be since to exist is more perfect than to not exist – in
Descartes sets Him resolutely apart from us who could very well not be but for the will of
God.21 The beginning context here is one of equivocity, or difference in substance
between a transcendent God and the materialized and Creaturely. This equivocity,
however, frames a universal logic.22
Where everything hangs for its existence on a Creator who is omnipotent and
rational, we also know that nothing that exists can lie outside of God’s plan, that
everything is ordered by reason. Because that plan is anchored in the infinite knowing of
a transcendent God, the standard Christian problem here lies in navigating the inevitable
gap between God’s perfect understanding and our own. In this, the Cartesian logic
presumes a singular and unified being-true for what is in its intelligibility – precisely, a
uni-verse: if we take “versal” in the sense of a logical “turning” of the Word of God from

Heideggerian analytic of worlds as one alternative way of thinking that, while continuing to accept a basic
orientation towards “being” and to the God’s-eye question of the transcendental conditions of existence
(and hence to respond to questions that can be traced to a Christian heritage), nevertheless offers a profound
refutation of the Cartesian logic.
21
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nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to
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that is God. We perceive that all other things can exist only by help of the concourse of God. And,
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primal and inarticulable voice into a coherence of intelligible signification.23 Where there
is a singular divine logos, turning as a singular “book of the world” (and expressed within
whatever I might correctly represent as being “out there”),24 the problem becomes one of
ascending towards God so far as is possible. Because God is Spirit, our ascension toward
Him is possible for us through that which is highest and most Godlike in us: namely, the
rational mind and not the body. It is thus precisely a question of being oriented from the
beginning towards a godlike optics, a mathesis universalis, whereby we stand to ascend
to our utmost potential in thinking the thoughts of God after him through the rational
study of his Creation. In this, human beings reprise their traditional role within Christian
ontology, as mid-way between beast and God, highest of God’s creatures in possessing
reason and free will, and in this sense being made in the image of God.
In this sense, Descartes will begin ostensibly from the isolated position of the
human doubter and cogito; but the entire game has already been rigged in ways that are
inextricable from a prior and longstanding onto-theological discourse. Even the willful
self-responsibility of the modern knowing subject in this sense reprises the selfhood
reworked by Christian thought. Previously, it had been necessary to insist upon the
spontaneity of a free will internal to the atomistic Christian self, since this supplied the
ontological condition for individual salvation and good acts oriented to a point beyond
the world, as much as for individual guilt for one’s sins.25 It is only, as I have already
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On the one hand, our thought is oriented to the perfect and eternal peace, final rest, highest love and
beatitude which God as pure being is, and which cannot be experienced or sought in the goods of worldly
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suggested, that Descartes transmutes this problem into the domain of epistemology: error,
the belief in things that are false qua overextending my belief beyond the pale of the
intellect, the misuse in this way of my freedom – this constitutes precisely a form of sin
that it is our business to do away with.26
The above discussion suffices for the moment to identify some of the basic stakes
in what we might call the “event” of modern subjectivity and the framing of the world in
terms of objects over and against us who are subjects. Though the foundational discourse
of a thinker like Descartes purports to begin things anew through epistemology, I have
tried to show that this entire gesture attains its possibility and its meaning through a
particular confluence of (Christian) metaphysical and theological dicta. Having assumed
the basic contours of the subject attained here, of course, subsequent philosophical
discourse could broaden the distance of the modern self from God – as for example
through Kant’s refutation of the Anselmian proof, and his transmutation of God, His
universal law, etc., into regulative ideas of practical reason, and thus effectively as values
distinct from facts, and so on.27 But even in this, it would seem that the most essential
metaphysical decisions in the basic constitution of self and world have already been
presupposed.

life; nevertheless this highest good provides the model for our thinking of worldly justice, of peace on earth
in adherence to the universal moral law imposed by God Himself. On the other hand, moral evil (which is
to say, evil in the most proper sense of the term) in this story is precisely something we do, which enters
into creation through the defect or revolt of precisely those beings capable of such – i.e., free and finite
human beings. But it is precisely in this connection that the individual person is able to assume a distinctive
kind of importance and sense of worth, as the condition Christianity’s personalistic doctrine of salvation.
Just as it is only the atomistic, self-identical, willful human being who can properly be guilty of sin in the
Christian sense – that is, to stand behind sin as its author – so is it this same atomistic being who is able to
care for the future of his immortal soul beyond the confines of this world, and perchance be lifted from his
wretchedness by the grace of God. For the moral life now unfolds a rich drama within the internalities of
the soul, since the essence of the good or evil act must now be sought in the will and the movement of
intention which animates it. Connected to this understanding are the whole series of Christian ascetic and
confessional practices and the role these came to play in the development of a sense of self and conscientious self-scrutiny. Not only is there a question here of unifying the self in submitting one’s conduct to
a constant rational judgment; this judgment requires an always-unfinished exegesis which sorts through the
intentions and internalities of the soul which are obligated by the moral law which follows from its singular
source in God. Hence the familiar practices for sorting through and recognizing temptation, of denying the
flesh, of dispelling illusions, of scrutinizing the movements of the self, and so on. For a good discussion on
some of these points, see Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 304-308, 330-338.
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In ways I have already briefly indicated, the kinds of manoeuvres specific to the
emergence of the modern subject are moreover bound up with the emergence of a
particular view of nature. The manner in which this is so, and the precise view of the
world that emerges, is of central importance for the problem of the kind of relationships
with the nonhuman typical of modern thought and society and specifically entrenched by
these. Let us now turn to this matter more directly.

2.2 Shifting Natures and the Technoscientific Ethos
In the last chapter, I made reference to a collection of thinkers whose cultural
critiques of modernity emphasized the role of our conception of “nature” in defining our
present ways of relating to other (especially nonhuman) beings, and understanding our
ethical horizons in this regard. Freya Mathews, we recall, offers a gloss of the modern
ethical zeitgeist as “monological”, predicated upon a reduction of the physical world to
matter and the expulsion of mind from it. Classic theorists of the modern scene like Max
Weber and Martin Heidegger focus not least upon the related phenomenon of the
physical world’s becoming something calculable and hence susceptible to technical
mastery by us. These developments do, I think, express something of central significance
for the modern sense of ourselves in the world. But to understand better how this is so,
and how these phenomena are related, let us attempt a somewhat closer investigation.
Much of what is at stake here can be grasped in the shift in early modernity
towards a materialistic and mechanistic view of the physical world, in contradistinction to
the view presupposed by the rational science previously dominant in Western Europe –
namely, the neo-Aristotelianism that held sway there from the Scholastic era up until
roughly the sixteenth century.28 Nature’s reporting itself in either way is only possible on
the basis of a number of assumptions that it is the business of a philosophy of nature to
delineate. In the case of modern natural philosophy, this forms what Heidegger calls a
prior, axiomatically projected mathematical (in the sense of mathesis) “ground-plan”.29
Central in the emergence of this distinctly modern projection, and hence the basic way
28
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modern thought understands nature, are changes (relative to Aristotelianism) in the
doctrine of motion, in the kind of causality understood to be relevant to a scientific
investigation of nature, and in the nature of entities.
In Aristotle, motion – which completes itself in rest as in the fulfilment of an end
– is thought in terms of a distinction between the natural and the violent. Natural motion
is natural because it belongs to a thing, as a telos or final cause30, in virtue of being the
kind of thing it is. Hence it is to the essence of the thing itself and its attributes that we
must look in order to understand and explain what it does (and we can see how, in its
own way, even this science presupposes an atomistic ontology – beginning with preexisting, bounded, individual things qua substances and asking after their predicates).31
Fire has the property of being carried upwards just as stones, being heavy, will fall as
heavy things do unless something prevents them.32 Violent motion (e.g., throwing a rock
upwards) is essentially against the nature of the moved thing in question. As this can
occur from any number of extrinsic causes, it is of less interest for a science directed to
universals as they show up in the study of enmattered essences – which is what Aristotle
understood things to be. And because position is determined in natural motion by the
nature of the body in question (fire has its place above, earth below, etc.), the Aristotelian
cosmos is divided between celestial and sublunary realms; and the bodies that belong to
each, being of different natures, move differently.33
By contrast, we see in many of the foundational figures of modern thought34 a
concern to show that these kinds of final causes are not operative in nature, and hence
that an inquiry into what a thing is, is not an effective way to understand the principles
according to which it moves – i.e., to explain it. Francis Bacon argued that, if anything,
30
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we should concern ourselves precisely with violent motions as employed in mechanics,
and hence the laws by which all of the effects seen in nature are brought about, i.e., as
efficiently and externally caused.35 Mechanistic motion – as articulated for instance in
Newton – now becomes thought in terms of an axiomatic which determines the laws of
motion such as govern and hence explain the behaviour of every body. Any given body
can accordingly in principle be in any spatial position, such that space becomes a kind of
universal field or empty container wherein such reordering occurs. If the event of the
modern Cartesian subject had served to shift philosophy from ontological questions to
epistemological ones, in the field of natural science itself questions shifted from what
something is to how an effect has been produced, grasped in terms of causal relations
which trace the transference of external force acting upon bodies; and motion becomes
thought in terms of a quantifiably measurable change in relative position.36
To come to beings in this way, however, has the effect of flattening the qualitative
distinctions between them. No more the distinction between celestial and sublunary
realms; particular things now come to be understood as existing in substance but as
explicable in their objectivity as effects, configurations of a uniform materiality,
determined in their nature by forces external to them. “That which moves,” as one author
has put it, “is reducible to a force that acts upon it from the outside, and that force is
reducible to a law that governs the application of such force.”37 It is here that we see the
problem of calculability arise in its familiar guise: entities now stand to be analyzed with
a view to ascertaining principles of constancy that rule over quantifiably measurable
change in the form of laws, which we understand to be impersonal and to bear
universally. And in this particular configuration of the relation between the principle of
identity (identity and hence non-contradiction belongs to being) and the principle of
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sufficient reason (there is a sufficient explanation for everything that exists), we can also
see a basic and novel form of “intellectualized” and universalist perspective through
which fungibility is extended to things in the very nature of their being. For the Greeks,
even though every A was the same as itself and a realization of a universal idea, that
realization was always imperfect due to the individuating presence of matter. But we can
note what happens once identity is approached through the framework of universal law:
every A is the same, always and everywhere. This is what makes things calculable across
contexts.
Now, this shift in the understanding of causality – from a doctrine resting upon a
science of final causes to one which assumes cause to be efficient and external, operative
in the transference of force from one body to another – brings with it tremendous
consequences for the modern understanding of things. Mathews’ diagnosis that
modernity rests on a materialistic theory that assumes that nothing like mind belongs to
basic matter is one way of expressing what is involved here. For in a Cartesian
representational epistemology, there can be no real adequation of the intellect with the
intelligible essence or form of a thing – which would ascribe something like mind to
natural things inasmuch as they are enmattered essences.38 (Since a final cause is the end
towards which something moves, to say that natural objects move by virtue of a final
cause is to attribute to them characteristics that modernity ascribes exclusively to the
work of the soul – for instance, that they are capable of being moved as by love, which is
one way Aristotle describes the action of final causality.39)
But where nature lacks final causes, it follows that it does not make sense to speak
of a “natural” way of letting things be – as if left to themselves, natural beings come to
38
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rest at anything like an end proper for themselves. Indeed, in the final analysis there can
be no guarantee that nature has intrinsic ends, or sustains itself in this way, at all. Neither
does nature qualitatively speak to us what and how it is in the same sense. A host of
relationships that had once been viable with “nature” under the terms of Aristotelianism
now stand precluded.40
In an essential respect, this sets up precisely what we might call the emergent
technoscientific ethos of modern relationships to nature. That ethos, following Heidegger
and Mathews, assumes its shape by virtue of a relationship between a willful humanity
and a calculable nature of mute materiality. Though nature may lack intrinsic ends, the
selection of ends nevertheless remains pivotal to the action of the will: as the soul’s
internal organ of spontaneous efficient causality, the will operates in a way that is linked
with intention – that is, to having an end or object and freely turning to that end in
preference to others.41
The operation of the will in action is intelligible in terms of power or force acting
externally on a thing; and accordingly, as Francis Bacon for example asserts, there is no
essential difference between action wrought by nature and that wrought by man.42 And
so we find ourselves in a special position relative to the rest of creation: of being able to
lay bare the workings of nature43 so as to intervene ourselves in them, so that we may
even improve nature and subject it to our ends.44 And few would seem to express more
iconically than Bacon the kind of monological conclusions that stand to be drawn from
this metaphysical nexus. For the language of the will and of power has a longstanding
connection to metaphors of rule, of dominion, of command and “power over” in the
European imaginary – a connection grounded at once theologically (in the notion of God
40
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as willful ruler of the universe) and politically (in the godlike image of the king). And it
is precisely in accordance with this image of the will that Bacon draws the conclusions
for our (ontologically) appropriate relationship to nature: that human beings have a right
“over nature”, an “empire” and “dominion” over the universe “by divine bequest.”45
Finally, we might note that these changes in our thinking of nature correspond to
a change in the criteria relevant to cognitive success and the value of natural science.
The ancients in the West, by virtue of the distinctive forms taken by their metaphysics,
could understand the rational study of the world as part of a life of wisdom, of “life
according to nature”. But under modern conditions, where nature of itself becomes
meaningless, such a dictum itself loses its sense. At the risk of anticipating arguments to
come, we can note that even a generally contrapuntal thinker like Nietzsche does not
seem to escape the world this creates, as we sense in his own refutation of Stoicism:
You want to live ‘according to nature’? O you noble Stoics, what fraudulent
words! Think of a being such as nature is, prodigal beyond measure,
indifferent beyond measure, without aims or intentions, without mercy or
justice . . . To live, is that not precisely wanting to be other than this
nature?46
This point we must leave to one side for the moment. But more generally, we can
note that in dominant elements of our tradition, what we come to value instead of wisdom
in the study of nature is, as one author has put it, “the discovery of relevant, informative
truth, where the criteria of relevance and informativeness derive from the ability of that
truth to take us beyond our present state of engagement with natural processes to one in
which our degree of control over those processes is increased.”47 And here, no doubt, we
can hear articulated familiar refrains that speak volumes as to our own self-understanding
and dominant manner of being-in-the-world, the kind of doing and the kinds of relations
with “nature” we come to valorize under modern conditions.

2.2.1 Theological Contours (II)
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If changes in the theory of motion and causality are indicative of much that is
essential to the modern view of nature and consequent relations with it, it is once again
the case that this new philosophy does not arrive suddenly out of nowhere. Rather, the
case can be made that not only does this distinctly modern philosophy of nature leave us
squarely within the heritage of a Christian metaphysical tradition, but moreover that the
distinctly modern view of nature emerges here precisely through the rigorous application
of Christian theological principles to the domain of natural science.
This is the argument made by Miles Beresford Foster, for example.48 Though I
cannot review all the relevant points of his complex argument here, touching on a few
may serve well enough for my purposes – to show how, for all its self-neutralization as a
universal story of human self-maturity, modern thought remains profoundly embedded in
a distinctly Christian interpretation of the world and phenomena. If the emergence of the
modern theory of nature depends on the assumption that final causes are not operative in
nature, then we might well ask: why was this doctrine rejected, and on what grounds?
Later philosophers could rely on pointing to the distinct successes of modern science
once these had been well established; but if we look for example in Descartes, we find
that the initial argument is something else entirely. According to Descartes, we must
assume that final causes are not operative in nature, and that such a doctrine is useless for
us, because to know the ends operative in nature would be tantamount to knowing the
ends of God, and this knowledge is necessarily denied to us (and becomes, in effect, an
impiety) in our ontological finitude.49
But then, there is of course more to the modern view of nature than a negation of
Aristotelian principles. What of the positive differences advanced, for example, in the
view that intelligible order governing change must be apprehended at the level of
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impersonal and universal laws, bearing always and everywhere? Here again, Foster
suggests, the matter must be traced to Christian theological principles. Aristotelian
doctrine evidently did not understand phenomena in terms of deterministic laws
governing every case; “accidents” and monstrosities, where the end natural to a being is
somehow interfered with or interrupted, were an accepted part of the cosmos that
required no further explanation. Indeed, in principle matter must always corrupt the
intelligible form within individuated beings.50 Furthermore, Aristotle “could assert that
there are fresh beginnings (archai), not confined to human agency, without supposing
that there is a deterministic causal nexus occasionally interrupted by undetermined
events, for he simply did not see the question in these terms.”51 This manner of thinking
had not sat comfortably with Christian theological premises, since where God is the
omnipotent and rational Creator of all that is, nothing can lie outside of God’s total
plan.52 Material cannot be an impediment to God’s reason because that material was itself
created by God. And though a knowledge of God’s ends is out of reach for us, a
knowledge of His laws is not. And “the laws of an omnipotent lawgiver,” as Foster
writes, “cannot be related to the objects of his creation as ideals to which they more or
less conform, but as rules to which their submission is complete.”53 A rational science of
nature that admits of this finds its proper object precisely in the investigation of such
laws; it looks to find these at work and fulfilled always, everywhere, and absolutely.
A similar point might be made with regard to the shift in favour of analyses
concerning the operation of actual and efficient causal relations in the world, such that
causal relations become external: one body transfers force to another, entities are acted
on by external forces, and so on. Such an image of causality is appropriate, for example,
50
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to the acts of will by which God, transcendent and external to nature, is understood to
create and govern the universe. The supplanting of final causality by the efficient in this
sense is analogous to the supplanting of the Aristotelian conception of “God” qua
Unmoved Mover with the Christian conception. The Unmoved Mover was precisely a
final cause: as pure actuality, absorbed in eternal contemplation of itself, the Unmoved
Mover moves things by way of their love for it – and so is, in a sense, impotent. The
motion that Aristotle’s mover initiates is that of moving things from potentiality to
actuality – that is to say, the fulfilment of motion in an end.54 Such an image of divinity
may be appropriate for an eternally existing and uncreated nature; but is clearly
insufficient for a philosophical conception of God as omnipotent Creator who is the
Author of all things as such.55
One might well go on here. But perhaps the above suffices to clarify some of the
ways that, for all the pretensions of early modern writers to rely on “reason alone”, this
modern manner of thinking and relating to nature is inseparable from the assumption of a
particular, Christian metaphysics, and the application of Christian theological principles
to the domain of a mathematical projection of nature. In the next section, I turn to
consider some of the ways this modern view of nature in turn sets up and buttresses
distinctly modern forms of political authorization and experiences of freedom qua selfsovereignty. But in this, we would do well to remain mindful of the ways referring to
“nature” and to modern “common sense” understandings of this can serve as what Foster
calls a kind of quasi-independent “datum” for later thinkers.56 From this, a variety of
distinctly Christian interpretive decisions concerning ourselves, the nature and structure
of the world, and the kinds of questions worth asking, etc., can in turn be redrawn in
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neutralized fashion, effectively smuggled through the back door – a matter of no small
relevance for the ways we continue to think about politics and political freedom.

2.3 Monological Politics
The modern “problem of nature”, as I have been trying to show, is not something
that only concerns “nature” exclusively, or something that can be easily separated out
from a relation with other spheres of modern life. It is rather a question of a whole
constellation, a basic structuring through which any one part of that whole comes to be
what it is. Such is the case as well with our modern experience and construal of politics.
We might otherwise tend to think of this as a distinctly “human” domain – as concerning
questions about human freedom; about the consequent struggle between human beings
within and between polities; as concerning the problem of the aporetic and yet mutually
constitutive relation between human liberty and logics of security, law and rule; as
therefore concerning the problem of establishing relations of compromise between
principles of (human) identity and difference, unity and diversity, and so on. But
precisely this human interactive domain, in the dominant ways we come to think it,
presupposes certain ways of understanding and relating to nature, grounded in what will
by now be a familiar ontological framework. And indeed, it can hardly be surprising if
we consider how, historically, the colonial spread of the modern polity (i.e., state) has
always been bound up with a particular sighting and codification of the land (as natural
territory) in ways that reproduce standard modern views thereof. For nature, in a
particular guise and relation to culture, is itself an integral and constitutive part of the
dominant, modern political story, and consonantly of the domestic logics modern polities
have been concerned to enable situationally.
Much that is at stake in the constitution of our dominant, modern politics, and the
relation with nature this involves, can be made clear with reference to the modern
problem of sovereignty. This is an especially important problem to consider in this light
because it allows us to see what is at stake in the stories of freedom typical of modernity
and broadly consequent upon the story of the modern subject. Moreover, it allows us to
see what is at stake in establishing the political and legal conditions, the forms of
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collective and worldly order, etc., requisite for enabling the modernization of selves qua
subjectivities.
Let us consider, for example, the way this problem is delineated by that classic
and influential theorist of modern sovereignty, Thomas Hobbes. In light of the
relationship modern thought has tended to accept between epistemology and selfresponsibility, one encounters a continual and dominant imperative: that any mature selfunderstanding of human beings in the world must remain tied to and in step with science,
that one must begin by asking about the conditions of possibility of knowledge and only
then proceed to other questions. And indeed, Hobbes’ political thought (and its continued
salience and self-legitimating stories) is not dissociable from this general context. In
effect, his argument in Leviathan works to show how given modern conditions – which is
to say, given the problem of the modern subject, its familiar representational
epistemology, and connected views of (a mechanistic) nature – one can arrive at no other
conclusion than the necessity of the modern state.
This is precisely how Leviathan begins: i) by asserting the problems of a
representational epistemology at the starting-point of what can be said; and ii) by
repeating the familiar gesture of rejecting the Aristotelian doctrine of final causes in
favour of a mechanistic natural philosophy.57 This philosophy of nature establishes a
context where neo-Aristotelian natural hierarchies can no longer tell us how to live,
57
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where human beings are in this way cut off (epistemologically) from nature.58 And
Hobbes accordingly draws the conclusions: that it falls therefore to us to decide
definitions and meaning for ourselves, to set our own foundations, which include the
securing of new political foundations from out of such doubt. The political problem of
security and order in this sense recapitulates the epistemological problem of certainty,
and indeed establishes the possibility of certainty in lived situations. But what is
moreover noteworthy here is the universalism implicit in this problem for Hobbes: the
problematic of sovereignty, as a solution to what our politics must be, pertains to human
beings generally – because it is rooted in the problem of how human beings can have
knowledge at all and as such. (As we saw with Descartes, this is in turn grounded in the
assumption of a certain atomism on the one hand, and a singular and universal nature on
the other.)59
It is interesting to note here how the capacity of the sovereign to ground and
establish the conditions for certainty and security are in turn understood to enable
precisely the kind of self-development most proper to human beings. For it is only on the
basis of sovereignty that one is purportedly able to cultivate culture, knowledge, arts, and
so on (and here again is Hobbes’ blackmail: that in the absence of sovereignty, one can
have none of those things properly speaking).60
This is a theme memorably reprised by Kant – who is able, in his writings on
politics, to reproduce a recognizably Christian view of what kind of cultivation is proper
to us not by relying directly on Christian doctrine, but on the modern view of nature and
its presuppositions.61 For if the Critiques and the Prolegomena show how we must be
constituted insofar as a mathematical science of nature (i.e., Newtonianism) is possible,
and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals shows how the categorical imperative
belongs to us as so constituted, Kant’s political writings theorize accordingly the
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possibility for fostering the moral maturity of human beings, given a widespread context
of immaturity. Thus the state system arises both as a consequence of man’s freedom, and
of the need to inculcate universally in humanity a mode of living in accordance with
general laws. Cosmopolitanism arises as a political ideal because such a civil union
would be most in keeping with the ethical demands of reason – i.e., to act only in such a
way that the maxim of one’s action might be willed as universal law.62 But the point here
is that this story, as a universal history, re-enacts much the same form of blackmail. It is a
story of the development proper to man as such, whose cultivation to a full and worthy
life demands that one quit the only alternative – a live of savage and individualistic
freedom – and submit to the ordered security of a lawful civility, that first rung along a
unitary route upwards. It is by this route that a greater, mature freedom becomes possible
– a freedom in accordance with law and hence capable of co-existing within certain limits
with the freedom of others.63
But what is especially important for my purposes here is simply to note that in the
story of sovereignty, we witness the self-inventing, creative powers of the willful human
subject repeated isomorphically at the level of the state – and moreover in such a way that
either one can be seen to enable and reinforce the other. And in either case, that freedom
is set over and against nature as a mute and intrinsically meaningless backdrop. (If Kant
will suggest a teleological theory of nature as universal history, this is nevertheless
precisely only something we can assume as a regulative idea of reason – once again,
because we must critically admit to ourselves that any such ends necessarily lie outside of
our ken as finite beings.64) And it is hardly difficult to see that sovereignty, as an enabling
logic that establishes the limits of modern political domesticities, sets the terms by which
our dominant understandings of freedom continually play out in familiar stories of liberal
democracy as the actualization of freedom and self-rule and so on. The commonplace
understanding of politics and political programmes as concerning the way we as beings
strive to bridge, through willful action, the perceived gap between the way things are, and
the way reason tells us they ought to be, can also readily be seen to inhabit this same
62

See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Political Writings trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 42-46.
63
Ibid, 44-48.
64
Ibid, 44, 52.

94
basic ontological terrain (insofar as we see a subjectivistic iteration of a Christian
soteriological ethics in this manner of thinking about normative problems.)
And here too, in the domain of politics, of course, it is possible to detect
everywhere the impact of our Christian ontology upon the ways we think and experience
ourselves, and imagine what living a full life most proper to us must be. “All significant
concepts of the modern theory of the state,” Carl Schmitt has written, “are secularized
theological concepts. . .”65 After all that has been said concerning the onto-theological
provenance of the modern self-authoring and self-responsible subject, it will perhaps not
be necessary, for my present purposes, to go much further into the matter to begin
appreciating how this is so. Perhaps especially notable is the way that, under modern
conditions, freedom appears as self-same with the problem of sovereignty and selfauthoring. For is this not precisely how it makes sense to think of freedom once we
understand that this must be modelled after the image of an omnipotent Creator God?
Similarly, the very notion of power here as something attributable to acts of an atomistic
and free will, and understood in terms of the alternative of either subservience (under
another’s power) or of active dominion, of power-over, would seem to take its sense for
us from a secularization of God’s position of dominion as the benevolent ruler of all that
is. As Hannah Arendt has emphasized, such a notion of power and or freedom makes
little sense within, for example, polytheistic modes of thought. This is not only because
one encounters here a different vision of the “psychological” structure of the self relative
to the world, of the problem of its relative unity and multiplicity, etc. Moreover, no Greek
god could ever be sovereign or offer such a model for thinking power, because any god
was always only ever one in agonistic struggle with and amongst others.66
Parenthetically, it should of course be noted that not all modern ways of thinking
about politics are reducible to the problem of the state or of liberalism, or are such as
could find their fulfilment therein. Though I can only touch on the matter briefly here,
Marx for instance provides an obvious example of a modern thinker for whom the
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problem of freedom – though also being oriented towards a universal historical struggle
and hence a kind of cosmopolitanism – necessarily sets us at odds with the terms of
liberal law and statehood. In his basic ontology, however, we nevertheless encounter
much the same set of contours as we find in liberalism: the classical Marxian story in this
sense is precisely a humanistic one, rooted in our altogether familiar modern ontology. It
is by virtue, for example, of a metaphysics of willful human agency, and a distinctly
modern materialism, that we understand that the vocation of the human, the actualization
of our species-being, is precisely to (monologically) work over objective nature so as to
become at home in the world. Though I cannot go further into the matter here, it will
perhaps be sufficiently invocative to note that this way of thinking sets the ground for the
precise way the Marxian problematic of alienation takes shape, and for the political
programme that follows.67 But we can moreover recognize a basic theme here that
becomes pervasive in the modern imaginary: art as freedom, as a specially human
freedom whose actualization is the creative transformation of the world.
I emphasize one further point here with regard to the problem of the modern state
and the space this enables. Insofar as the modern state both presupposes a particular view
of nature, and unsurprisingly reproduces this view through the generalization of modern
forms of order, we can simply note that these same constitutive limits and basic
suppositions concerning nature and culture and their proper relation continue to form the
barriers one runs up against even where one strives to “protect” nature through the
politics authorized therein. We may consider certain contemporary environmentalist
discourses as exemplary in this regard – of which Bruce Braun, in particular, has I think
provided an important analysis. He has shown how (at least the more mainstream of)
these remain an altogether domestic possibility within the terms set by the modern state.
Frequently the problem is posed as that of saving “natural” or “wilderness” spaces, in
their wilderness (i.e., the absence of culture), from the intervening power of human
agency (industry). But the appeal to save nature here first of all involves sighting the land
and nonhuman others as nature – which possibility is itself part and parcel of the logic of
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the (colonial) state, its claims to sovereignty, and so on. Visualizing the land as nature, as
mute territory claimed for dominion, as natural wealth to survey and bring to account,
and so on, we simultaneously bracket away as separable any prior “cultural” presence on
the land – i.e., in colonial places like Canada, Indigenous peoples. The subsequent
possibility of lobbying the state or its authorized body politic to decide in favour of
preserving its “natural heritage”, etc., does but reaffirm and remain internal to this basic
enabling structure, and the conceit that the land is something that it is the public’s
vocation to decide (monologically) over.68
And indeed: though one might complicate earlier modern views of “nature”
through (e.g.,) more contemporary forms of natural and ecological science, this
complication seems to remain always bounded within specific limits, especially as one
attempts to make this knowledge efficacious through the collective apparatus of the state.
That is: such science remains bounded as a privileged knowledge of what remains sighted
ontologically as nature. And nature as such stands to be engaged in its relation to the
human/cultural – and hence in relation to rationalized managerial problems, the
configuration of the political domain and its constitutive concerns, etc., as already
delimited in their essence by the classical contours of modern thought. Thus we slide in
our political reasoning continually back to the anthropocentric rationales vouchsafed by
our subjectivism: to problems of balancing “environmental” concerns with a range of
other (human) “interests” and with the demands of economic and political rationales
already delineated on the basis of longstanding ontological, epistemological, and ethical
assumptions; to divergent notions of what “managing” “natural resources” to best
68
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advantage means; and so on. The possibility may well arise here to appeal to a more
sophisticated management, but not a change in the basic established framework and
relationship.
The foregoing should suffice as a brief overview of some of the fundamental
respects in which modern politics expresses and enables monological possibilities of
thinking/relating, as delimited in its essential structure by the modern ontological
settlement. Let us now turn to one final site of tremendous importance in the delineation
of distinctly modern views of nature and nature-self relations: namely, that of modern
conceptions of property. For in this, we encounter perhaps the dominant set of
codifications operative within (neo)liberal state law, and the forms of life this enables, of
the appropriate relationship between human beings and the nonhuman, “natural” world.
These codifications are moreover essential for understanding the way we monologically
experience the world as fungible and calculable “standing-reserve”.

2.4 Modern Property as a Manifestation of the Monological
Relation
Modern property is often described as a “bundle of rights”, or a legal relationship
that governs social relations between people with respect to (tangible and intangible)
things.69 It is an enforceable claim in being grounded in the state and its sovereignty; and
it moreover forms a central pillar of contemporary forms of (globalizing, modernizing,
neo-liberal, capitalist, etc.) political-economic order and the kinds of worldly relations
that characterize and sustain these. Indeed, the scope of “things” being assimilated to
the proprietary relationship would seem to be growing: as we witness a continued,
widespread, and globalized enclosure and privatization of land and “resources”, an
intensified commodification of “things” (including genetic code and biological processes)
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through patent and intellectual property law, and so on.70 One author has eloquently
suggested, on this account, that contemporary (neo)liberal law expresses an
understanding that “all existents, as actual or potential property, are subject to one or
another individual’s rightful, transactional power.”71 If therefore we wish to ask after the
kinds of relations to the nonhuman and “nature” cultivated by modern liberal society and
dominant within it, property in its Western, liberal-capitalist form constitutes a necessary
site for consideration.
What is moreover essential for us here is the way Western understandings of
property – and the elevation and generalization of the proprietary relation within
contemporary Western/modern life – express, foment, and enforce particular
understandings about what it is to be a human being in the world, what beings are, what it
means to live a good life, how it is meaningful and authorized to relate to extant beings
qua “nature” within everyday life, and so on. Specifically, it privileges a largely
transactional and economistic view of existence; a reduction of beings to calculable
fungibility under the sign of exchange value; and a profoundly anthropocentric evaluation
of nature and relation to it. Let us try to see a little more closely some of what is involved
here.
“The most revolutionary modern contribution to the concept of property,” Hannah
Arendt once wrote, was that “according to which property was not a fixed and firmly
located part of the world acquired by its owner in one way or another but, on the
contrary, had its source in man himself.”72 An emblematic thinker for us to consider
relative to this development is John Locke. And indeed, in Locke’s theorizing of
property as having its source in man, we would seem to find a particular transmutation of
the general modern view that nature is intrinsically meaningless, combined with the view
that it is human beings who furnish meaning. In this instance, however, the problem of
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“meaning” stands to be posed in terms of worth, which is implicitly worth for, and
originating from, us.
For Locke, nature left to itself is conceived as lying in waste, given by God to
man in common. In this state, nature of itself is worth little until appropriated, removed
from nature and transformed through human bodily activity, understood as labour: “’Tis
Labour then which puts the greatest part of Value upon Land, without which it would
scarcely be worth any thing: ‘tis to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful
Products.”73 It is in being mixed with my labour, imbued with my own activity and hence
an extension of myself, that nature gains value and becomes productive. And this process
simultaneously grounds my right to something as property, which is to say as exclusively
enclosed from the commons and subject to my own right of use and possession, to be
ordered and disposed as I see fit.74
It is important to note here that by framing nature as common, and by setting up
the alternative between common nature lying in waste and property qua objects
appropriated and reworked by willful labour, Locke also sets up a blackmail whose
colonial consequences are drawn out quite explicitly and deliberately in his text. Land
unappropriated in the modern sense (and it is clear that Locke is thinking of English-style
enclosure and agriculture here), and thus not monologically reworked, must be viewed as
lying in waste. Such land is held by human beings (as a general class of beings) in
common, and this means nothing other than that Indigenous relations to the land
(especially, we presume, those of hunter-gatherer peoples) must be null and void. “In the
beginning all the World was America,” Locke asserts: which is to say that America now
can be viewed as terra nullius.75
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The labour of our bodies, for Locke, is an essential human behaviour; but it also
furnishes an original model of the proprietary relationship and source for it more broadly.
In the first instance, human beings can be said to be the proprietors of their own person,
and of the labour of their bodies. From this, Locke reasons that we must accordingly have
a right of property in whatever our labour has been “joyned to”.76 This proprietary
relationship has its roots moreover in the way we can be said to properly be the masters
of ourselves.77 We can see again the centrality of a metaphysics of the will and its
constitutive metaphors of rule and dominion here: as laying the very possibility for me to
be the self-directing master of myself, i.e., the commander and author standing behind the
labour of my body.78 But these metaphors extend into our relations with things: in
labouring, we subdue79 nature; in ownership, the freedom to “order and dispose”
similarly returns us to a willful relation of rule. (And, it hardly need be said, we can see
how a Christian vision of the ethical and existential uniqueness of human beings as
godlike, persons in the fullest sense, etc., is reproduced here.)
It is interesting to see how the proprietary relationship here, grounded in labour,
dovetails with the conception and valorization of technoscientific mastery articulated for
example in Bacon. If in the latter, subduing and commanding nature, compelling “her” to
obey our ends, etc. is to be the route to material progress and the assumption of our
proper vocation in the world, in the former the same activity (intervening in and subduing
nature, reworking it through our own self-authored activity) grounds precisely our right
of ownership over extant things, their individualized enclosure under human dominion.
(And we can also see the atomistic ontology at work here, both in the identification and
hence appropriation of objects, and on the side of the human proprietary and labouring
Indigenous audience on Vancouver Island in 1876: “Many years ago you were in darkness killing each
other and making slaves was your trade. The Land was of no value to you. The trees were of no value to
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subject.) Needless to say, understanding things in these terms ensures that the relation of
“mixing” (Locke) that occurs between people and things is something that occurs in a
monological, one-way fashion.80 But most importantly, we can see here how – turning
from the domain of Cartesian epistemology, to technoscientific discourse, to politics, to
ownership – the same basic relation to the world, grounded in a metaphysics of the will
and an effectively materialistic and hence mute, intrinsically meaningless nature, comes
broadly to prevail and to be enforced.
Beyond the anthropocentric relationship established by grounding ownership in
use and labour, however, it is also necessary to consider here the role of wealthproduction as the defining economic goal of market capitalism in coming to define the
nature of property and hence the way we apprehend the nature of worldly objects/entities
under modern conditions. Much of what is involved here takes us, not surprisingly, well
beyond Locke. Bradley Bryan for example has argued in this vein that changes in the
legal understanding of property should be understood to reflect the way the law has
evolved in application to, and relative to the needs of, capitalist society. Most
particularly, these shifts reflect the kinds of contexts in which property rights come
before the law – namely, in matters of contract, tort, and succession.81 For Bryan, what is
essential here is the way that “’use’ comes to be subsumed in the capacity to contract and
bargain that goes with the [proprietary] entitlement to use and enjoy;” and through this
development, we see a slide occur through which “what something is,” insofar as it is
understood in terms of its being property, “is not determined by who owns it but by what
it is worth.” The “use” value of something, in other words, tends to be occluded by
questions about the value of something as it can be bargained for, about the monetary
value of appropriate remedial compensation for damages, and so on. Accordingly,
property comes to be increasingly understood in terms of the value for which it can be
exchanged – at the same time as we, through generalized processes of commodification,
80
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come to understand the relations we have to the world and to each other in increasingly
transactional terms.82 Arendt offers this diagnosis of what is at stake here:
In the progressing transformation of immobile into mobile property . . .
eventually the distinction between property and wealth, between the
fungibles and the consumptibles of Roman law, loses all significance
because every tangible, “fungible” thing has become an object of
“consumption”; it lost its private use value which was determined by its
location and acquired an exclusively social value determined through its
ever-changing exchangeability whose fluctuation could itself be fixed only
temporarily by relating it to the common denominator of money.83
This development, which is also not separate from the growth of “consumer
society” generally, says a great deal about how we as moderns come to understand
ourselves, the world around us, and what constitutes “real world” relations with the “real
world”. Owned things (and we can recall the suggestion here that all extant things now
seem to stand as actual or potential property) lose their uniqueness, their essential
emplacement in the world, their irreplaceability and the substantive ties we might have
with them: since the fundamental assumption in reducing anything to the terms of market
value is that things are precisely exchangeable (this is precisely what reducing things to
monetary value within the capitalist market does).84 And it is this being-replaceable, for
and before other humans qua transactional agents, that determines their value – in ways
that moreover come to expression and enforcement through the rationalizations of law
and everyday social life.
It is also interesting to take note here of a concurrent phenomenon, which is the
slide in everyday usage from understanding property as a right in something (to use,
enjoy, exclude, etc.) to simply taking property to mean the things themselves. As one
text on property law in Canada has put it:
[This change] came with the spread of the full capitalist market economy
from the seventeenth century on, and the replacement of the old limited
rights in land and other valuable things by virtually unlimited rights. As
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rights in land became more absolute and parcels of land became more freely
marketable commodities, it became natural to think of the land itself as
property.85
We can return at this point to Heidegger’s diagnosis, that under the terms of
modern thought qua “technology”, things themselves come to disappear, even to cease to
concern us in their own right; what matters rather is the story of us and our will, our
values, and hence the availability of things before us for use and abuse.86 This availability
now determines things as what they are – resources, related to exclusively as “standingreserve”. And in this we can also feel the danger of solipsism that attends our
subjectivism: that in the end we come to encounter in the world only ourselves and our
self-authored activity, which is at best elevated to concern with the (no less atomized)
aggregate of human social relations managed by the state. And property would seem to
be a crucial site in which to see how this occurs in far-reaching and consequential ways –
especially in the continually expanding conflation of object and marketable property (i.e.,
as commodities, or things produced for sale) under modern conditions. Beings disappear
on the one hand into a story of human freedom (to imbue with value through labour, to
use, enjoy, transact, etc.) on the one hand, and calculable fungibility (i.e., monetary value
and hence exchangeability) on the other.

2.5 Singular Nature or Multiple Worlds?
Having covered the ground we have, it will hopefully be possible now to clarify
my reasons for dwelling on the theological and cosmological roots of our dominant,
modern ontology and the fundamental interpretation of the world this lays out. What
lessons are to be drawn here?
At one level, I emphasize the theological heritage latent within our thinking as
one way to undermine the guise of neutrality in which modern universalism tends to
present itself. A key component of that sense of neutrality stems from the way modern
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thought has understood itself as secular – as marking the self-freeing of humanity to itself
independently of its former religious and theological tutelage, and so on. By identifying
and separating out fact from value, and science from religion – and connectedly, the
public realm (purportedly) in step with science from the private realm of belief – modern
thought and society enact what are effectively strategies of containment that localize “the
religious” while preserving the domain of a universal, “real world” as that which is of
common concern. (The meaning of the word “secular” as connected to a this-worldliness
and temporality that only makes sense as opposed to matters of faith or otherworldliness,
and so on, is indicative here of its own constitution within a Christian framing and its
domestic dualisms.) In ways touched on briefly in the last chapter, this containment of the
religious within a separate sphere (as being eminently a private matter pertaining to the
cultural realm) furthermore sets the conditions for a generalized disenchantment by
providing the terms through which alternate ways of thinking and being stand to be
domesticated within the modern order – i.e., by structuring the categories through which
these are able to speak and be identified (e.g., cultural as distinct from natural, as
“values”, “beliefs”, and so on). Here is, in other words, the false peace of
multiculturalism, where one nature is preserved.
From what has been said, however, it will be clear that this containment is always
something of a ruse. For it can only ever occur within the context of a basic framework, a
prior construal of “the world”, of nature and culture and the human and so on, that is
already determined in its basic features by the distinctive interpretations and ontological
decisions wrought by a particular tradition of inextricably religious thought – i.e., by
Christian metaphysics. As I have traced it, many of the ontological dicta crucial to a
distinctively modern way of seeing must be understood to first gain prominence through
the acceptance of terms set by Christian revelation over those emergent from Greek
paganism.87 And the interpretive differences involved here are moreover of central
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theological importance – i.e., they concern the relation of the divine to the world, and to
the human, and accordingly the character assumed by all three.
Etienne Gilson, in tracing the origins of much that is distinctive in our accustomed
(modern) thinking, offers a helpful gloss here concerning what is at stake in the
Christianization of our thought. For him, medieval (and hence modern) Western
philosophy is, crucially, Christian philosophy precisely because, in its emergence, “the
Christian revelation [was] an indispensible auxiliary to reason.”88 That is, Christian
revelation decisively presented philosophers with new possibilities and new horizons for
thinking, opened through the presentation of new onto-theological dicta/presuppositions
that had to be accepted first of all as a matter of revelation, known through faith. Only
subsequently could philosophers then set about the task of knowing what had thus been
accepted through reason, and working out all the consequences. And it was precisely in
adopting Christian principles in this way that Western metaphysics has come to assume a
distinctly changed character, and has come to understand the world in terms of problems
whose primacy or necessity would not at all have been obvious to Greek thinkers.
The neutrality of modern thought, predicated upon a universal nature and its
neutrality, in this sense must be taken as undermined: insofar as the isolation of nature
from “cultural” matters in the first place must now appear much less convincing, as must
the neutral authority with which nature is then to be made to speak, in being brought back
to the cultural domain to authorize specific forms of political order and relation and so
on. Approached more adequately, many of those points we are accustomed to take as
more obviously questionable (matters of culture, of “value”, of religious belief and
interpretation, etc.,) are seen to escape from the safeguards of their neutralizing
confinement and take up their proper residence within the fundaments of our thought. For
this reason, though, they also grow restless, circulating and surfacing now here and now
there, traversing in manifold and extensive ways the domain of the sayable, thinkable,
and sensible.
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A second point might be made here, anticipated somewhat in the last chapter.
Namely: that to reflect in this way upon the presuppositions of our dominant thought, as
irreducibly interpretive and in a sense always “experimental” or “problematic” conditions
for understanding and speaking about reality, opens up the possibility of relating to these
in a critically reflexive way, of experiencing them as questionable. In other words, my
interest here is in the possibility of viewing these not as necessary presuppositions for
understanding the world “as it is”, for apprehending the identity of the given exclusively
in its being. Rather, it is in understanding these simply as dicta that have opened up one
set of ways for thinking about the world amongst others, one way of letting what is
assume coherence and be investigated, and so on. But to construe matters in this way
requires a certain opening-up of the grounds upon which our dominant thinking rests –
which is precisely what I take the insistence upon interpretation, thought relative to an
analytic of worlds, to do.
It is of course possible to avoid taking such a path as the one I encourage here,
even while admitting the essentially “revelatory” or “evaluative”/interpretive provenance
of the basic contours of our thought. To describe the initial acceptance of such
ontological dicta in the manner of Gilson may well admit a certain obscurity as to the
initial grounds on which e.g., the Christian set of dicta must be taken as final and
exclusive. But then, it is fully possible to take our familiar and basic assumptions simply
as “decisions” that we can or should continue to stick by, with an untroubled conscience
(and don’t all decisions admit of a certain mysteriousness of origins, thought within a
metaphysics of the free will?89). Such a position has the advantage of being able to draw
its legitimacy from the purported successes of our familiar ways of thinking, to which it
can profess its faithfulness. We can see again, however, how a basic blackmail is apt to
enter in here – along with, I think, an undue limitation of our capacities for critical
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I.e., thought in terms of a metaphysics of the will, “decision” (like those of the sovereign, or that of God
in the Creation of the universe) refers us to an initial voluntary and free power, relative to which we can
understand the resulting action to be contingent. C.f., Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 71.
Structurally, we can see how this problem, taken in this particular metaphysical guise, is ultimately
identical with the problem of sovereignty and the necessarily exceptional foundation of law, what Derrida
has called the “mystical foundation of authority,” that is, the problem of the ultimate groundlessness upon
which the exceptional and autological act of founding the law, of pronouncing forth its discourse, etc., must
rest. See Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law,” in Acts of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2002), esp. 241-243.
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reflection and ultimately a difficulty in avoiding the repetition/reproduction of all the
basic problems and positions outlined in my opening chapter. While one can certainly
provide retrospective arguments as to the rationality of such commitments that draw on
criteria established or enabled by them, neither is it difficult to see the circularity that
threatens such an exercise.90 Set up the initial parameters, and move on; however these
have come about, we must now leave them to hold the field undisturbed. And certainly, if
we accept the Cartesian (or the Hobbesian) story of the real on its own terms, and as
sufficient, we can come to no other conclusion.
This is why, in thinking from out of the modern, Western tradition, I consider
extremely valuable91 the manoeuvres by which the problem of worldhood displaces the
initial logical grounds of Cartesian epistemology through what Heidegger calls the
“ontological difference” – i.e., the difference between being and beings. As Heidegger
shows, Descartes covers over the phenomenon of worldhood or being-in-the-world
because he thinks the existence or being of something as though this were a kind of being
– namely, as substance. The existence of something is accordingly taken to be thinkable
through those terms by which our tradition has tended to understand what is cognizable
about beings (i.e., as having identity in their enduring presence). For Heidegger, it is this
that enables “the [Cartesian etc.] opinion that the supposedly strictest ontic knowledge of
90

We might consider the case of M.B. Foster himself, who takes the modern view of nature and the
connected Christianized understanding of divinity as more true than those of the Greeks. But in what can
this “more” consist? The essence of Foster’s position in this regard seems ultimately to be: it is more true
simply because we know that it is; and this “more” means, more like the truth as we think it. We can
recognize that Greek thought is less true than our own, because “our possession of certain truths is so
secure that we take them for granted, [such that] we cannot conceive that they were not equally obvious to
men precluded from the sources of our own enlightenment.” (“Christian Theology (I),” 455.) But how is it
possible to establish the conditions of such certainty, or indeed establish its desirability and universal
exclusivity, outside of precisely the enframing of thought we already familiarly accept, many of whose
central contours Foster himself traces to Christian theological sources? Foster at least is helpful in drawing
the full conclusions here: continually in his own argument he will return to the position that what is
incomplete in the Greek understanding of nature follows from their inadequate conception of the divine,
and their inadequate separation of the divine qua God from the world. But clearly this position only holds if
one accepts the fundamental teachings of Christian theology from the beginning, deriving exclusive
certainty on key philosophical points from that theology: and thus we experience the ultimate selfreferentiality of such an argument. Hence we find ourselves again back at the same basic question, though
in the process we have avoided an experience of the questionability of these interpretive assumptions that
this problem potentially opens. (c.f., Foster, “The Christian Doctrine of Creation,” 456-457.) C.f., on this
point, Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 117.
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Though I certainly accept that there may be other ways of accomplishing similar philosophical effects or
grappling with much the same set of problems. I offer here only one possibility to which my own thinking
tends to be attached.
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a being is also the possible access to the primary being of the being discovered in such
knowledge.”92 In other words, it enables a distinctive conflation of ontology with
epistemology.
To think through the ontological difference, however, undermines the Cartesian
equivocity grounded in substance, and the particular kind of universalism this gives rise
to: which arises from the assumption that, from a godlike point of view, the truth for each
(substantive, atomistic) thing must be one – that each substance is created and held in
being and as knowable by God.93 Rather than understanding being as infinite substance
(or indeed substance at all), then, Heidegger thinks being as that on the basis of which we
encounter things in a worlded way, such as is inseparable from the horizon of time. But
the worldhood of the world is that it is that world; and our being-in-the-world is nothing
other than the event of truth qua worldly disclosure as such. And if being itself always
withdraws from the terms of identity (or more broadly, perhaps, the terms of
metaphysical coherences which delineate the what-ness of beings), it precisely cannot
ground a godlike optics of uni-versalism in the Cartesian sense (which first secures the
possibility of apprehending reality in approach to a transcendent, unconditional vantage
point through a metaphysics of substance). The Heideggarian thought of being rather
opens a capacity to understand our thought as at any moment irreducibly “thrown” – i.e.,
conditioned, worlded through language, enclosed within the hermeneutic circle of
interpreted-ness.94
As such, Heidegger’s thought of worldhood here admits us not to a universalism,
so much as to the acknowledgement of a positive multiplicity of possible and viable
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Heidegger, Being and Time, 88-92.
It is interesting to note in this connection that in a certain respect, traditional Christian metaphysics
comes to sharpen the ontological atomism attributable to things. As Gilson has it: [for Aristotle,] in order
that things should change, as we see they do, it is not sufficient that, stable in themselves, they should
simply pass from one state to another as, in the Cartesian physics, a body passes from one place to another
without ceasing to be what it is; on the contrary, as in the Aristotelian physics, even the local displacement
of a body marks the intrinsic mutability of the body which changes place, so that, in a way, the possibility
of ceasing to be where it is attests a possibility of its ceasing to be what it is.” (Gilson, The Spirit of
Medieval Philosophy, 66-67.) But then, we can see how important a sharpened atomism becomes
especially for the Christian idea of the self – which must necessarily be self-identical through a great
variety of changes as the condition of its doctrine of personal salvation, the self-unifying requirements of
the Christian moral life, and so on.
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C.f., Heidegger, Being and Time, 143-144; Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, 26, 41. See also
Ekeberg, The Metaphysics Experiment, 134.
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“versal” turnings of what is to intelligibility and coherence.95 And because the way is
opened here to think matters of truth not, from the beginning, in terms of certainty
concerning the real, but in terms of interpretive disclosure, we can see the possibility for
a different kind of relationship to the metaphysical delimitations of our thought than that
found in Descartes, and thereafter. Rather, the way is opened for a certain reflective
stepping-back and mindfulness of the (necessarily interpretive, and therefore contestable)
conditions under which certain vistas rather than others become possible. And with this,
we also open the possibility of a more sympathetic exploration of alternate possible
framings. And along with this, it is to be hoped: a certain ethos, a thoughtful or
questioning reconsideration of ourselves and/in the world.
This brings us to a final question. How do we begin to think about what goes on
in such “interpretation”, and what is at stake in it? How might we attempt to gauge any
one specific interpretation relative to others? If we admit to ourselves that there is no
escape from localized interpretation, I think we might nevertheless take some guidance
from Nietzsche here – who himself asserted that (perspectival) interpretation is all there
can ever be. Within this context, he invites us to think about divergent interpretations in
terms of divergent typologies ultimately referable to questions of morality, or
“evaluations” of existence – that can be seen to be operative within them. Nietzsche
differentiates here between more affirmative, active evaluations, and more reactive ones,
which begin by saying No towards existence. And it is the latter that, for Nietzsche, finds
expression in soteriological moralities that judge existence with reference to a standard
outside it. One first defines the world, and the good, in such a way that it can make sense

95

Obviously this is my own adopted terminology. To admit of this possibility, it must be emphasized, is not
the same thing as to simply suggest that anything anyone might ever say is true in the same sense, or that
one might as well ignore “the world” or be inattentive to it. The alternative can no longer be between one
universal framing/turning and blind nothingness. There is an essential difference, I wish to suggest,
between thinking poorly or with manifest ignorance within the space that is delimited by, say, our dominant
framing of what is, and being a sensitive or attentive thinker within the space of an alternate framing of the
world and existence: the two are not simply “different ways of thinking” in the same sense. The former is
more precisely a version of not thinking at all, which can not at all be said of the latter. These two
possibilities are, quite precisely, worlds apart; to annul this and simply conflate them as analogous forms of
“difference” is simply another iteration of the standard modern blackmail: that all that matters is one’s
orientation to a singular and universal historical trajectory, lawful ordering, etc.; hence that children and
underdeveloped adults, criminals, and Indigenous peoples, for example, can all be characterized summarily
under the unitary sign of immaturity.
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to take our orientations beyond the world, and then one works to correct existence in the
image of how we imagine it ought to be, but is not.
The basic question we might ask, then, in finding that our thinking is
fundamentally interwoven with a specific theology in its basic contours, is: what kind of
morality, what mode of being and evaluative sensibility, speaks here as a symptom, in the
ways our presumed dicta interpret the world, and in the various paths by which we carry
this particular theology forward? Nietzsche’s diagnosis is precisely this: that the
dominant terms of our Christianized tradition, and its manner of distinguishing the real
from the apparent world, of setting up our dualisms of mind and body, being over against
becoming, perfection as against our ontological imperfection, our search for a universal
God’s-eye perspective, etc., evince within themselves precisely a soteriological spirit.96
But so too does our conception of the self and of others, as atomistic self-subsisting doers
framed through the metaphysics of the will, unified through an ascetic hermeneutics of
moral judgment and salvation. Indeed, in ways that will by now be fairly obvious in light
of what has been said in this chapter, one could well work through all the central
ontological dicta and epistemological orientations I have discussed here – and trace these
to soteriological imperatives in the Nietzschean sense. It is also not difficult to see a
certain “progressive” soteriological ethic, rendered within the (now) mundane sphere of
the world, active in the ways we continue to understand what our freedom is about –
moving nature willfully across the gap we presume there to be between “is” and “ought”
– within our politics, our technoscientific ethos and its development schemes, and so on.
It will also be obvious, moreover, that the problem of soteriology (and hence the
kind of moral imperatives latent within our thought) is of no small relevance to the
problem of our relationship to “nature”, to the nonhuman, to our bodily being-there
amongst these and so on. And the problem accordingly becomes: what might a more
affirmative way of thinking/relating to the world be? This is a question I suggest we carry
with us in our engagement with Indigenous relational thinking; and it is one that will
come to preoccupy us in Chapter Four.
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C.f., for example, Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Anti-Christ,” in Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ trans.
by R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1987), 121-129.
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Once again, however, it is not (for either myself or Nietzsche) a matter of simply
decreeing that the understandings of the world that emerge for us from our dominant
intellectual history are straightforwardly false, nor is it a matter of precisely refuting
these.97 It is more a question of disrupting the seriousness with which we purport to
know and master and ratchet down a singular reality, to wed ourselves to our
disenchanting technoscientific ethos and our universal history of “progress”, and see all
alternate framings nullified. It is a question of asking ourselves what it is that we are
doing when we insist upon such terms and manoeuvres – of asking whether there is not
something of what Nietzsche calls a “life-denying” ethos that comes to live and act
within us in such moments, and to harm us. For what is crucial is to see that this kind of
universalizing seriousness can be worthy of disdain.
For Nietzsche, this is because this kind of ethos springs as a symptom of an initial
impotence, a slavishness, a smallness of self – not being “up to” the struggle, the
difference, the heights and depths and also ferocity of a nobler, life-affirming existence.
And what lives within us in our universalizing seriousness is nothing other than such
pettiness turned active in resentment and revenge-taking upon a world found terrible in
the first instance.
We can begin to see how this might be so through Nietzsche’s story in The
Genealogy of Morals. On the one hand, he recounts how the thwarted strength of the
slaves turns inward to rage, to learn the masochistic joy of punishing the difference and
“animality” within, of stretching oneself upon the atomizing and ascetically selfscrutinizing rack of existential guilt before a transcendent standard of how one ought to
be but is not. On the other hand, however, this cruel joy has its counterpart in the
sublimated punishment of others judged guilty by a law understood to be universal and
hence neutral. Nietzsche’s aristocratic pagans, whose own life-affirmative strength had
proven daunting in the first instance, could now be made to suffer through an indirect
agency: for they become transmuted under a slavish valuation into criminals, sinners
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Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Genealogy of Morals,” in The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals
trans. by Francis Golffing (New York: Anchor, 1956), 152-156.
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before a universalized law.98 Subsequent punishments visited upon such “criminals”,
purifying tortures for the godless, and so on, are not however viewed explicitly as
vengeance fuelled by hatred. Rather, such hatred hides cloaked and sublimated as the
triumph of an impersonal justice, of a moral law that understands its ordering as progress
towards an ideal of peace and love.99 For all this, however, it is the slavish will here,
with its seething resentment, that develops the cruellest imagination, a love of
punishment and a whole fantasia of tortures for its enemies; in this it goes well beyond
the (admittedly considerable) violence that any aristocratic, life-affirmative valuation and
ethos could give rise to or condone – for it precisely does not grow from the soil of health
and strength.100
The image with which Nietzsche leaves us, then, is of a pettiness and smallness of
the self grown ugly and vengeful, in a profound coupling of the will to abuse with the
will to order. In light of the ground covered in this chapter, it will likely be easy to see
how this spirit can find all manner of surreptitious pathways – not least, in the
transference of the language of law to the language of nature, and then back again to
structure our questions and imperatives to establish/enforce our universally-valid order in
political, economic, and social relations, and so on. And Nietzsche’s insight here, I think,
is of no small relevance to the problem of opening up non-colonizing and respectful
relations with Indigenous peoples and traditions, of grappling with our universalism in
this connection.
For indeed, throughout the literature and experience of modern European
colonialism we encounter the same paradoxical unity of a logic of order on the one hand,
a mission of making the world reasonable and civilized, married on the other hand with a
monstrous excessiveness of violence and brutality, torture for the sake of sport. This
latter might explain itself as “necessary violence” within the rational economy of order –

98

Nietzsche, “The Genealogy of Morals,” 181-182, 208. The invention and appeal to such a law, for
Nietzsche, is rooted in a spirit of No-saying not only because it denies the basic condition under which we
might say anything at all – which for him means perspective, interpretation.
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but this kind of confinement of violence by reason would seem belied by experience, by
the excess, by the sadism of cruelty.101
This is the legacy we find ourselves having to respond to – and which should
perhaps never be far from our thoughts as we strive to do things differently – which this
dissertation strives to do in its own way. And neither is this problem separate from that of
attempting to disrupt the logic of our own universalism, which has for so long necessarily
drawn its limit conclusions, and its zones of exceptional violence in the enforcement of
its norms, in the space of relation between itself and Indigenous peoples and lifeways.
And indeed: are we not all-too familiar, in our dominant colonial culture, with the way a
simplistic and unproblematizing acceptance of our dominant sense of ordered reality –
the world “as it is”, spoken even in the most platitudinous workaday language – dovetails
with a resentful sadism and schadenfreude, a barely-cloistered rage at difference in its
more meaningful sense, as that which does not play our game but demands instead that
this game be rethought?
But I think we do well to remember Nietzsche’s other suggestion in this context:
that slavishness is not the only possible mode of being we might imagine or come to
enact – even for us late moderns who inherit the trajectory we do. Might not something
like the Nietzschean invitation to more affirmative ways of being and thinking be of
pertinence, then, not only as we strive to respond to the question of our relationships to
“nature”, but to the connected problem of our (colonial) relationships to other ways of
thinking and being in the world? If we are serious about extricating ourselves from a
vengeful, reactive form of moral interpretation and action, we might ask: why insist upon
a universal reality at all, a singular logic of the identifiable referent as against
multiplicitous appearance and (non-Western) cultural fictions? Why not, as a basic
orientation, simply affirm difference of the (cross-cultural, cross-ontological) kind raised
here as difference? Why not – and here is my question – begin by accepting a multiplicity
of worlds and ontologies, and reconsider our ethical questions from within the space of
101
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intercultural thinking this opens? Why not begin to ask what a less resentful and more
affirmative way of being and thinking might be, within this space – granted altogether
that we necessarily begin philosophically localized where we do?

2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored some of the basic contours of the way our
dominant modern tradition has tended to understand nature and frame various key
problems accordingly. I have elaborated on some of the interlocking logics by which a
certain view of “nature” – and accordingly problems of knowledge and technology, of the
self and its freedom and worldly vocation, and of ownership relations, come to be folded
together within a singular self-supporting constellation. I have also tried to show how
these logics are enabled by a particular set of ontological resolutions, and to foreground
some of the specific interpretive (and in this, moral/theological) manoeuvres that make
these possible and arguably sustain them.
It has been my intention, through this effort, to lay out a sufficiently detailed point
of comparison on the dominant-Western side of things, for the defamiliarizing work to
come in the next chapters.

For it is only on the basis of such a grasp of our starting-

point that we will be able to think about what kinds of interpretive and philosophical
differences are at stake as we turn to Indigenous traditions of thinking and being, and in
particular as we begin to ask how Indigenous relational ontologies might open
possibilities different from the terms and the alternatives that we are accustomed to.
Having covered the ground we have, let us now begin this second phase of my
argument.
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Chapter 3
3

Ethnographic Meditations
The aim of this chapter is to begin a process of defamiliarization from the kind of

“monological” and “technological” understandings I have been describing as essentially
modern. We are no doubt mindful by now of the way these dominant dicta come to show
up for us within everyday contexts and interactions, and purport to supply the framework
through which to understand what living involves and is about, how we are in the world
and how it makes sense to engage other, worldly entities. But while one might be
disinclined to accept the hard logics of the modern story, and the notion that these supply
the only grounds from which thinking and living is possible, it is another (and potentially,
I think, more transformative) matter to begin more meaningfully exploring what other
possible premises for thought and ethical existence might be available. A beginning point
would be to see that the blackmail of modernity is false – that is, we are not caught in a
“choice” between modernity and incoherent and impossible nothingness, “no Knowledge
of the face of the Earth,” no arts, society, or stability on the other (Hobbes)1, nor between
modern property and industry and its fictive negation of nature lying in waste (Locke).2
But more interesting still, I would suggest, is for those of us who are accustomed to
thinking in modern/Western terms to explore how we might begin to think with different
terms, and so become greater strangers to ourselves in order that we may begin reflecting
upon matters in ways we otherwise would not have.3
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Hobbes, Leviathan, 89.
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 296-7.
3
Evidently, this present chapter (like this work more generally) is written from and primarily relative to a
particular kind of vantage-point – i.e., a vantage-point similarly localized, or more or less akin to, that of
the author (a non-Indigenous settler trained to think primarily with the modern Western tradition, and so
on). In other words (and to largely reiterate a point made in Chapter One), this present chapter – which
invites the reader along for a defamiliarizing process – is necessarily focused in ways that make fairly
definite decisions and assumptions about the kind of audience to which it is most directly pertinent and
which it is primarily intended to impact. Of course, I take for granted that not every reader will occupy this
position, and hope this work will nevertheless be of use to those who do not. But such decisions and
assumptions are nevertheless necessary, especially given the kind of meditation this is – that is, insofar as
this philosophical process of defamiliarization (which must assume at least primarily a certain audience for
which the familiar is identifiable in a certain way) is my aim.
2
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This chapter is an attempt to begin such an exploration by means of a series of
brief engagements with diverse Indigenous American traditions. I have selected three
“sets” of traditions, in particular, for discussion in this chapter: Algonquian traditions of
thought as evinced especially amongst the Ojibwe and related peoples in central Canada;
Northwestern Amazonian traditions in South America, focusing on lowland Quichuaspeaking and related peoples4; and North Pacific Coastal traditions in North America,
focusing most on the Tlingit. Each set will offer an opportunity to engage philosophical
and practical traditions which stand in marked contrast to modern Western ones on
decisive points, and hence invite us to begin imagining how other ways of seeing and
engaging the world – of letting beings be – are possible.5
In particular, the section on Algonquian traditions will allow an exploration of
alternate ways of thinking about what it is for something to be “animate” and,
accordingly, to be a person. This will bring us to broach as well the closely-connected
concept of “power”. But in these will be found suggestive openings onto a radically
different vision of existence and of the world. Perhaps most importantly, this vision is
informed by a relational ontology and style of thought in contrast to our traditionally
atomistic one, and expresses a correspondingly different sense of human beings’ ethical
and comportmental horizons in relation to “nature”. Accordingly, it will begin to be
possible to make sense of how the world might plausibly be understood to be full of
4

The language spoken today in much of the Ecuadorian Amazon is Quichua. But the underlying cultural
stratum of the peoples I am describing here is Shuar and Záparo; and a great many cultural and
philosophical affinities exist between these peoples and a number of other groups in present-day Ecuador,
Peru, Columbia, and Brazil – e.g., the Aguaruna and other Jívaroan peoples, the Cashinahua, the Achuar,
the Piro, the Airo-Pai, and a number of others. The adoption of Quichua, the language of the Incas, within
this region has largely been a consequence of Christian missionary efforts in the twentieth century – since
missionaries, pushing further into remote lowland areas (in the Amazon forests east of the Andes), found it
prudent to bring with them an Indigenous language with which they had greater familiarity from Andean
contexts.
5
A word of clarification should perhaps be offered at this juncture. I do not mean to suggest here that all of
these Indigenous traditions together, or even these sets of traditions by themselves, constitute a monolithic
cultural grouping or tradition. But I do think that there are sufficient commonalities or family resemblances
between the examples used to justify bringing them together in the way I have. At the broadest level, our
examples here share recognizably similar ontological suppositions: for example, all of them understand the
world to be composed of a plethora of human and non-human persons, think relationally, and extend the
notion of personhood in a manner which also includes beings viewed as inanimate by Western thought.
Broadly similar notions are held about what it is to communicate with non-human persons, what bodies are,
and about the viability of dream as “real” experience. In the case of the sets themselves, I must simply hope
that the differences I overlook will be indulged as forgivable omissions in the service of drawing out
consonances adequate for the context of the present discussion.
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other-than-human persons, and of corresponding understandings about what it is to be a
self within it.
The section on Northwestern Amazonian thought will further pursue the question
of what it might mean to live within and engage a relational world of other-than-human
persons. In particular, this exploration of lowland Quichua thinking will flesh out more
clearly some of the possible implications of such alternate ontological understandings,
while indicating some of the ways these show up within everyday contexts and practices.
Modern metaphysics, as we have seen, has led us to conceive of the human, the self,
order and maturity, knowledge, skilled or “instrumental” practices, and human
“creativity”, in certain (interrelated) ways – which together frame and inform our
dominant relationships to “nature” in the context of everyday life. I will accordingly
attempt to show here how alternate conceptions on roughly comparable points might live
and breathe within an Indigenous and relational ontology. In order to let such matters
assume coherence in an appropriate light and more closely on their own terms, they will
be broached in the course of an exposition of what has been called Amazonian
“perpectivism”, focused around the central question of what it is, for lowland Quichua
thinking, to become yacharishka with (accustomed-to, having come-to-know) something.
For reasons of economy, the section on North Pacific Coastal peoples will focus
most directly upon one people, inhabiting the northern reaches of this broad “cultural
area”6 – namely, the Tlingit, whose traditional territory straddles portions of northwestern
British Columbia and southeastern Alaska. But I will also draw some examples from
other peoples within this broad cultural area, where these offer roughly consonant,
suggestive, and illustrative variations of themes under discussion.7 My aim in this section
6

As defined classically by Franz Boas, this area extends from Yakutat Bay in Alaska to the Juan de Fuca
Straight south of Vancouver Island. Others have extended this cultural area to roughly the middle of
California. Franz Boas, “The Indian Tribes of the North Pacific Coast,” in Indians of the North Pacific
Coast ed. By Tom McFeat (Toronto: MacMillan, 1978), 1; c.f. Philip Drucker, Cultures of the North Pacific
Coast (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 7-8, 105.
7
E.g., examples which refer to Gitxsan, Wet’suwet’en, and Nuu-chah-nulth contexts. Between these
examples, a vast area is spanned; the Tlingit, for example, inhabit the northwestern reaches of British
Columbia, while the Nuu-chah-nulth reside close to its southern reaches, i.e., on much of the west coast of
Vancouver Island. But it must be stressed from the outset that appreciable differences exist between
peoples within this broad area – not only in terms of the land involved and interacted-with, but in terms of
significant linguistic and cultural differences, including differences in kinship structures. For a helpful
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will be to explore one set of variations on what ownership or “property” relationships can
look like and comprise, given philosophical grounds not dissimilar from those elaborated
in the first two sections of this chapter. This will provide a point of poignant contrast
with the way in which liberal notions of property crystallize the kind of technological and
anthropocentric ontology with which we are now familiar.
It should be noted that my aim here is not to try to account for all Indigenous
traditions, nor is it strictly speaking to make an argument about similarities or differences
between them. Rather, my concern here is to offer a kind of sampling of philosophical,
defamiliarizing provocations that Westerners like myself may encounter by taking
Indigenous traditions seriously. It is intended to be not the end of the conversation, but a
beginning; and in this I prefer to leave open the question of the degree to which
distinctions and understandings operative in any one of my examples may be taken as
transferrable to the others. The Indigenous traditions included here are, quite
emphatically, not identical to one another, and substantial differences exist between (and
within) them. But I do think that any one of these can be helpful for puzzling though
how it might be possible and viable to say the kinds of things the others do. And even to
begin this process of puzzling, I think, can be sufficient for our purposes.

3.1 Animacy, Power, and Relational Personhood: Algonquian
Examples
Modern thinking, we know, has tended to be framed by a metaphysics that
entrenches certain themes. Of especial importance for our purposes here are: i) an
understanding of the human being as willful and free. As we have seen, the endemic
image here is one of the atomistic human who, closed off within himself, is the
autonomous author of his own actions. ii) This image of human personhood is,
furthermore, imbued to its roots with a very distinctive moral framework which situates
the human being, rational and created in the image of God, over and against the rest of
discussion of some of these differences ranging from the Tlingit in the north to peoples like the Nuu-chahnulth and the Makah to the south, see Robert Bringhurst, A Story as Sharp as a Knife: The Classical Haida
Mythtellers and Their World (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2000), 156-159. See also, on this point,
Bradley Bryan, “Property as Ontology,” 17-29.
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Creation as his dominion. For if humanity has both freedom and reason, the other beasts
of nature have neither; it is humanity who, grasping the plan of the world, is able to
complete Creation by directing it to rational ends. iii) The pursuit of rational knowledge
is classically understood to be tantamount to epistemologically ascending an ontological
ladder towards a universal viewpoint. The theological resonances here have not been
absent from modern, more secularized variants of what is effectively an epistemological
morality; iv) since at least Plato, dominant elements within the Western tradition have
also tended to understand beings atomistically – e.g., as individual substances possessed
of properties. Questions about what is “alive”, for example, still tend to be framed in this
way, such that life is a property of objects: thus modern taxonomic methods can
accordingly arrange disparate beings into animate and inanimate categories; and those
classes of beings that are animate can be grouped according to similarities and differences
in traits, etc.
But what is most important for my purposes is that understanding “aliveness” in
this way, within the context of this general metaphysical complex, has worked to
reinforce familiar assumptions about the proper relationship between human and other
beings, and the kinds of moral considerations we find ourselves owing to the non-human.
A materialist, atomistic, Christianized (and then secularized) ontology, framing modern
epistemological premises, gives rise to certain ways of partitioning phenomena such that
only certain kinds of beings can count properly as beings. One has the mathematical
projection of objectivity on the one hand; any remainders here (e.g., “gods”, “noncorporeal spirits”, etc.,) become phantasms ontologically relegated to the internalities of
the subject. Of those beings recognized, mineral ones such as mountains and stones are
worth no special moral consideration in themselves, being inanimate matter. But then,
neither particularly are plants and animals, for though these are alive they lack the moral
status of personhood. Some animals may or may not qualify for “rights” or moral
considerations depending on how similar they are to us, and our special (e.g., rational,
and hence instrumental, advanced “cognitive”, etc.) faculties/behaviours, which we take
to be the index of personhood in the proper sense. This kind of anthropocentrism, which
comes to underlie our apprehension and categorization of other beings, plays no small
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role in rationalizing the modern slide to viewing all things as mere and mute “standingreserve”.
Our dominant sense of the superiority and reality of such premises, interestingly,
has also structured the way modern thought has tended to encounter and dismiss nonmodern ontologies which understand matters differently. Thus, since the days of E.B.
Tylor, accounts of “animism” have propagated tales of supposedly primitive peoples
understanding everything as “alive”, believing in the existence of anthropomorphic souls
“behind” all natural phenomena (presumably in the same way we understand the will to
lie behind our actions, hidden within the noumenal depths of the atomistic self), or
confusing subjective mental phenomena with things happening “out there”, or being
unable to distinguish at all between animate and inanimate beings, etc.8 The “animism”
concept, in other words, has not infrequently been one further site in which the logical
blackmail of modernity has become entrenched, not infrequently by fitting “animist”
thought into the early stages of an evolutionist trajectory crowned with modern man and
science. And if one assumes that something’s being-animate must be thought as described
above – that the singular nature/culture division and all the other standard modern
metaphysical dicta are unproblematic – it indeed becomes difficult to imagine how
thinking in “animist” terms could be possible or to give rise to meaningful insights about
what it is to be in the world. But a more careful listening to Cree and Ojibwe thought,
however, reveals something quite different from this projected image. Accordingly, we
can also find in a more careful engagement an invitation to imagine differently not only
animacy or personhood but the very nature and structure of existence and our ethical
horizons within it.
In Ojibwe thinking personhood is extended to include things that we would
classify as inanimate beings – for example, certain stones have been said to be alive, to
answer questions put to them, to change form. Indeed, the occurrence of phenomena
generally tends to draw questions not about the work of impersonal forces, but about
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personalistic actions: who has done X?9 In this world full of persons, no sharp line can be
drawn between the personhood of human beings, or of animals, or of other-than-human
“grandfathers” or ätisokának. Moreover it is assumed that it is both possible and desirable
to develop a range of social relationships – including relations of exchange, of empathy
and nurture and obligation, and so on – with many of these persons.
Parenthetically, it can be helpful to note here (for the purposes of getting a general
flavour of thinking) that that many Indigenous traditions conceive the relationship of
human and other beings almost inversely to the Western hierarchies. Rather than being
the rational animal above all others, many traditions tell stories which begin by setting all
beings on the same plane: all are persons like us; but at some point something happens
which introduces bodily differentiation and the emergence of distinct species. It might be
more accurate to say that in the case of animals and plants, something is added to a basic
condition of humanity rather than subtracted. Needless to say, though the bodies in
question hamper subsequent easy communication between species under normal waking
circumstances, the notion that animals remain persons would seem to set the ground for
the understanding that, given the capacity to transform, communication again becomes
possible.10
But to understand the conception of personhood involved here, at least in
Algonquian traditions, it is necessary to take a detour through Algonquian conceptions of
animacy. Tim Ingold has argued, in this connection, that animacy for the Ojibwe is not
understood as a property of atomistic objects which endure as self-identical through time,
but rather as a condition of being.11 And as such, to say that a particular thing is animate
is less to embark upon a taxonomic venture than to describe the positioning of something

9

In this, and in much of the account which follows, I am drawing upon A.I. Hallowell’s classic
ethnographic essays, as collected in Contributions to Ojibwe Studies: Essays 1934-1974 ed. by Jennifer
Brown and Susan Gray (University of Nebraska Press, 2010), especially “Ojibwa Ontology, Behaviour, and
World View” (535-568).
10
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, “Exchanging Perspectives: The Transformation of Objects into Subjects in
Amerindian Ontologies,” in Common Knowledge 10:3 (2004), 464-465. See also Umeek, E. Richard Atleo,
Tsawalk: A Nuu-chah-nulth Worldview (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 59-63. Versions of this kind of
origin story are also found in the Amazonian Quichua context.
11
Ingold, “The Perception of the Environment,” 97.

122
“within a relational field,” in which the speaker herself is always presumed to be
immersed.12
Let us try to see how this might be the case. Across Algonquian languages
generally, nouns grammatically assume either an animate or inanimate gender. And it
has, I contend, been compellingly shown that a more or less coherent set of semantic
criteria inform grammatical assignment in this regard. Regna Darnell and Anthony
Vanek, in particular, have argued with reference to the Plains Cree (a people closelyrelated, culturally and linguistically, to the Ojibwe) that at its simplest, animacy lies in
something’s having power. That is, something is animate if it stands in a relation of
effecting others, if it manifests “the ability and freedom to act and interact.”13
Some examples are helpful here: a rosebush’s animacy is evident in its having
thorns, and hence the capacity to protect itself; other shrubs, however, such as
blueberries, are inanimate. Animals are always animate, but lose their animacy when
dead or rotting; similarly, a tree may be animate but a piece of wood from that tree,
having lost its capacity for growth, will be inanimate. Spoons are classed as animate,
because they contain and give shape to the inanimate liquid they hold. (Forks and knives
are inanimate.)14 The case of the spoon here is especially interesting because it
underscores how animacy operates as a relational concept: it is by virtue of its effecting
something else (i.e., that which it holds), it is in its relationship with the liquid, that the
spoon’s animacy is manifest. (And it also here that we can see, I think, an edifying
instance of power showing itself as power: that is, in containing something else. And
indeed, as we go on to think about what it is to take on or familiarize gifts from nonhuman persons, it seems to me that this image of containment will prove especially
helpful.) Tools like canoe paddles or hunting bows are also animate in that they add to the
strength of a human arm by being employed in relationship to it.15
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It should be noted, moreover, that it is possible for a particular thing to pass from
animacy to inanimacy; but it is also possible for the reverse to happen. Something that
generally has power associations can be referred to as inanimate as a way of indicating
that it has lost its normal power. Furthermore, “any inanimate thing may, under certain
conditions, come to have a power association, and will then become animate (although
the usage will be restricted to that situational context.)”16 The key here is experience, and
whether or not a particular thing has displayed animate characteristics. And we can
expect, accordingly, that not everyone will necessarily refer to a given object with the
same gender, and that variations in this regard can in part be imputable to differences in
direct, personal experience with it.17
It is worth recalling A.I. Hallowell’s well-known anecdote here: asked whether all
stones are alive, Hallowell’s Ojibwe interlocutor answered that some are.18 From what
has been said, it should be evident that this more abstract and taxonomical question, are
all stones alive? falls rather beside the point for an Ojibwe thinker, as does the question
of whether stones display animate properties (e.g., speaking, moving) outside of our
relation to them. Just who has seen something, or who one has heard something from,
tends as a rule to be specified in Indigenous speech patterns19; and we can infer from this
that an occurrence spoken about is implicitly an occurrence-as-witnessed-by-someone, a
happening within that relationship.
What is interesting and important here are the positions and interactive capacities
of things relative to each other, within (or, rather, as) situations. And more broadly, the
environmental world in which one is so immersed is always, in effect, composed of such
relational situations; indeed the cosmos is understood precisely to be moved and held in

16

Ibid, 164.
This is a point also made by Terry Strauss with reference to another Algonquian people, the Cheyenne.
Terry Strauss, “The Self in Northern Cheyenne Language and Culture,” in Semiotics, Self, and Society ed.
by Benjamin Lee and Greg Urban (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1989), 55.
18
A.I. Hallowell, Contributions to Ojibwe Studies, 44.
19
Relative to the Tlingit, see Thomas F. Thornton, Being and Place Among the Tlingit (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 2008), 135. In Quichua, this tendency is manifest in the grammatical use of
perspectival markers in the making of any statement: what is being recounted was seen by someone; and it
is necessary to take care in specifying one’s own relative proximity or removal from that relational
happening.
17

124
balance by power. And “balance,” Darnell and Vanek write, “in this instance is not
passive, but a dynamic tension of forces” which is nevertheless susceptible to change.20
We may leave open, I think, the question as to whether some things are more
animate than others, i.e., whether animacy per se necessarily implies personhood. But
persons are animate, and so should I think be understood to arise and be experienced in
this same kind of relational way. Ingold has argued that to be a person in this context is to
be something like a relational gathering or focal-point of power.21 Different persons have
different amounts of power; some have less than human beings, and many have more.
But to experience something as a person opens up certain kinds of ethical and interactive
possibilities, not in terms of engaging that being as a person capable of its own agentive
actions, and of entering into relationships and conversations with it.
This claim is perhaps an especially difficult one for moderns, raised on our classic
nature/culture divide. But we must acknowledge, first, that understanding “natural”
phenomena like the sun or the winds as agentive persons cannot seem so strange if we do
not assume from the beginning all the classic Christian dicta: that the (natural) world
must be governed universally and by necessity, but that nevertheless the person must be
recuperated as the (quasi-miraculous) locus of spontaneous freedom therein. To see
“natural” phenomena as persons is not to blind oneself to them, but to approach them and
pay attention with a view to different questions and a different assumed framework for
interpreting occurrences. For we can expect and notice that other persons, like ourselves,
will generally have predictable habits. But habits can in principle be subject to change,
and we can anticipate that patterns will not repeat exactly. The whole problem of
ir/regularities in the world can thus be approached and given a space in which to assume
coherence without from the beginning posing the problem of the in/calculable.22
Secondly, and in ways that will become clearer, it is important to stress that the
Ojibwe view of personhood as such is not the same as our own, and so does not imply the
20
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same kinds of assumptions that we are wont to import into the matter. A person as a
relational focusing of power is not the Christian moral person or the unique, selfsubsisting and individual soul endowed with a creative power of free will after the image
of its Creator. And thus to attribute personhood to non-human beings here is not the same
as to presume everything modern thought holds to be essential to human beings and then
generalize these attributes throughout “nature”.
Thirdly, it is important to emphasize here that to attribute personhood to nonhuman beings is not the same thing as to anthropomorphize them. To see the mark of a
non-human person’s agentive action is nothing other than to see it doing what it does:
e.g., the sun shining and giving orientation to the trees; the winds moving boughs; the
thunder thundering.23 Does the caribou reveal itself to the hunter, or is it hidden away?
But then, does not agentive personhood at a minimum imply a point of view, an
awareness rooted within the body, which senses and engages the world through it and as
it were from the “inside”? Ojibwe thinking would seem to hold such a view.24 But how
can this be said of stones? Again, the notion of relationality is key here, I think, in
framing the problem. If we think about an interpersonal recognition of others in this way,
it would seem above all to involve, from the “outside”, a claim not about what something
23
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is “in itself” but about the ways in which something can be seen to be interactive as it
relates to me and as I engage it situationally. As Nurit Bird-David has put it: “I am
conscious of the relatedness with my interlocutor as I engage with her, attentive to what
she does in relation to what I do, to how she talks and listens to me as I talk and listen to
her, to what happens simultaneously and mutually to me, to her, to us.”25
But we can gain a sense for the way an “internality” can be understood to be
present here insofar as Ojibwe (and, generally, Algonquian) thought understands it to be
possible to share in what such perspectives are “internally” to the extent that it is possible
to transform, to become “x” by taking on and inhabiting another’s mode of being and
seeing (more on this below). Alongside this possibility of becoming, however, it must be
noted that there is a pervasive concern not to impose upon the freedom of others to act
and interact as they do, and little willingness to attribute states of mind to other persons
(human or nonhuman). Transformation, as we will see, opens up the possibility of
interpersonal communication and of approaching an empathetic condition of “seeing like
others” – but this is emphatically not the same thing as being able to judge that another
person’s experience of meaning is identical to one’s own.
The question of transformation gains clarity in connection with a further question:
what of non-human persons speaking, or answering questions – when and how can they
reasonably be said to do that? This is a complicated question that requires us to touch on
Ojibwe understandings of dream and the body, and of the kinds of relationships that
Ojibwe peoples generally pursue and understand to be possible with powerful non-human
others. For understanding the sonic “doing” and hence manifestation of phenomena like
the thunder (which is a powerful person, the Thunderbird) as speech requires work,
namely the development of a special relationship with that being in question. The prior
occurrence of such work can largely be taken for granted where individuals are able to
speak with e.g., the Thunderbirds: for one can only do this where one has dreamed the
Thunderbird and hence has established and deepened a relationship with it. By the same
token, not everyone can be expected to be able to speak with a given (nonhuman) person,
to be able to establish such relations.
25
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The way a particular being speaks, acts, moves, and sees – in short, its mode of
being – is determined by its body; and Ojibwe thought understands communication to
normally be transparent between beings who share the same bodily equipment. If under
normal circumstances I can understand what humans say but not what bears say, it is the
case that bear seem to understand other bear. But Ojibwe thought – like all the other
Indigenous traditions touched on here – assumes that under certain circumstances it is
possible for beings to transform and so open different channels of communication.
Indeed, it is precisely another mark of powerful beings to be able to transform easily.
(Ingold offers another gloss on “power” which is relevant here: as “the potential of the
life process to generate beings of manifold forms.”)26 As a rule this is more difficult for
humans (who are by no means the most powerful beings in the cosmos), but
transformation for us becomes easier in dreams, and so generally it is in dreams that one
is able to see other beings in their more transparently agentive and communicative guise –
e.g., appearing to us as humans. Indeed, another word used for the ätisokának (otherthan-human grandfathers), in Ojibwe, is pawáganak, “dream-visitors”, “that-which-isdreamed”; and it is in the course of practices such as puberty vision fasts that Ojibwe
individuals hope to establish communicative and tutelary relationships with these.27
Dreaming here is not understood as a realm of unreal hallucination, or the
phantasms of the self withdrawn into itself, but rather as a viable mode of experience and
one for which awareness is cultivated. This view of dreams can be understood to follow
from the way the Ojibwe self is relational rather than atomistic. That is, one cannot
assume the kind of purely private, atomistically isolated, internal experiences of the self;
the self is not closed off and outside/over-against the world but embedded and opened out
into it. Terry Strauss has suggested with regard to the Cheyenne, another Algonquian
people, that “thoughts, the ‘internal dialogue,’ like dreams and visions, and all internal
mental activity, always connect outside the self and are in some aspect always understood
as ‘messages,’ communications from another (human or other-than-human) person.”28
26
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Understood in relational terms, dreaming is especially valuable as a way of engaging,
opening up and revealing the world beyond what is ordinarily seen, though what is
unveiled in this way might be confirmed through subsequent investigation.
And so, when one says that human beings cannot ordinarily communicate with
bear, for example, or with thunder, one must also add that it depends entirely upon who it
is we are referring to. Some people may have learned to do so perfectly well, on the basis
of relationships developed through the cultivation of dreaming, and on the basis of gifts
received in and through such interactive contexts. (The greater challenge, indeed, might
be for the rest of us to communicate easily with such people.) But what is involved in
such communicative interaction, in such gifts, such that they can carry over into waking
life and be understood as speech within it? Part of what is involved is that the dreamer, in
communicating with pawáganak, has learned to take on another mode of being, to
understand their speech “not through translation but through metamorphosis.”29 That is,
under conditions of a more fluid dream-self, it is possible to develop a kind of empathy
with particular non-human beings – which arises on the basis of a transformative
becoming, an education in other ways and registers of being. Hallowell gives the example
of the man who, hearing a rumble of thunder, asked his wife if she had heard what was
said.30 But the thunder precisely does not cease being thunder here; nothing else is
expected of it. Ingold suggests, instead, that what is important here is that “the
thunderbird [as the thunder] . . . invades the perceiver’s consciousness, whence it
becomes generative of his or her own capacity to see.”31
It is generally understood, however, that the knowledge gained in such
communications is of a kind that one keeps to oneself. To reveal what one knows
casually is a misuse of the knowledge; there is a certain ethic of secrecy at work here. At
one level, we might conjecture that this follows naturally where personhood is expanded
beyond the human: it is not a question of there being a Book of the World neutrally open
to all, but of specific and intimate relationships, divulgences, gifts and transformations.
To share knowledge casually and too explicitly: would this not be something akin to a
29
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betrayal of confidence, that also cuts out the agency of others (including nonhuman
persons) to enter into relationships on their own terms? But we might also wonder,
perhaps, whether one reason for secrecy here might be that such knowledge does not
translate well into propositional terms or casual conversation, or indeed straightforwardly
into human language at all.32
To return to the example of stones speaking or answering questions put to them: it
is probably easiest for us to assume that such claims refer to things that happened in
dreams. But we can also, perhaps, begin to imagine how something like this could occur
in waking life as well, in interactions with a particular stone claiming our attention, in a
situation of sensory engagement which gives rise to a whole unfolding play of thought
and empathetic listening, which is itself not separable from the relational being-present of
this stone. Recall that there is no primary distinction between the “internal space” of the
atomistic perceiver apart from the “external” world of objects perceived. Taking into
account the reverberating echoes of past dreams and interactions called forth by what is
present, the ongoing work of a cultivated and transformative listening, and the murky
encroachments of myriad possible “states of consciousness” from which waking life in
turn is never fully exempt, it will perhaps begin to seem less strange to speak of moving
and speaking stones.
And further, we might intuit a challenge levied to us here by Ojibwe thinking:
though we readily recognize the phenomenon of “internal dialogue”, why are we so
insistent that it is something purely “internal” – as though it were something
spontaneously grown one-sidedly from us, and unmoored from one’s bodily relations in
place and to others? Where precisely does one draw the lines between my bodily being
and the “outside” world, or between my body and my mind – and why are we so certain
32
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that these must be drawn at all? Is there not a whole particular metaphysical (as Nietzsche
will tell us, moral33) securing at work here? Might “internal dialogue” not instead be
inextricably bound up with one’s emplaced, bodily engagements with other particular and
sensuous happenings, and a whole complex interplay which gathers together the
resonances of memory, quality, allure, feeling and affect?34 It is perhaps in light of this
challenge that we can glimpse more adequately the space in which Ojibwe thought moves
and in which such claims begin to show their coherence, and relative to which we can
witness here a tremendous cultivation and sensitivity, as especially in practices for
deepening the conversation involved, following it to its profundities.
Opening out onto the world, the crucial problem for the Ojibwe self is the
development and cultivation of helpful relationships within it. Because non-human
persons are attributed the power of agency and action, positive relationships with them
are understood to be necessary in order to receive favours and gifts required successfully
navigating the dangers of life. Among the examples of powerful ätisokának that
Hallowell mentions in this connection are especially “bosses” or “owners” of plant and
animal species (for instance, Birch, Bear, Caribou, Golden Eagle, and so on) as well as
phenomena such as thunder (the Thunder Bird), or the winds.35 They can be associated
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with the ownership of particular “skills”; and an animal “boss” pawágan may be moved
to help a hunter e.g., by gifting skills or sending his “pet” animals to him.36 But soliciting
and receiving such gifts from one’s relations involves on our part cultivating the capacity
to transform and hence become communicative with them, as we have seen. And it is not
for nothing here that the Ojibwe word for non-human persons is ätisokának, “our
grandfathers”. For grandfathers precede us in the world and nurture us, help to raise us
into what we become; they are older and have more experience, and therefore more
power and wisdom – to which we do well to listen.

3.2 An Amazonian Study in Knowing-Becoming
Let us turn now to a different context, and another set of traditions, in the
Northwest Amazon. Here, I draw from other ethnographers37 but also from fieldwork
with Quichua-speaking people in the Amazonian lowlands of Ecuador, in order to flesh
out more fully one set of possibilities for what it might mean to understand oneself as a
relationally-constituted person engaging a plethora of other-than-human persons. In this, I
will attempt to indicate something of how Quichua understandings play out in everyday
contexts, and give rise to alternate ways of thinking about various problems that,
construed in modern ways, form central pillars of our self-supporting sense of things
(e.g., what knowledge, maturity, art, skill, selfhood are, etc.).
But in order to let Quichua thought and practice assume something of its
coherence, my central concern must be to clarify the nature of (one variant of) what has
been called Amazonian “perspectivism”. This term refers to a basic set of ontological
understandings upon which many of the central concerns and aspirations of Northwest
Amazonian thought hinge. A central problem here, as I understand it, concerns the
possibility of playing-across-and-yet-preserving the boundaries that delimit the
perspectival orders of being. The basic ontological relationality which frames this
concern suggests that i) what we might call “atomistic” individuals or beings are
as it is possible to do this it would seem that a notion of animal bosses could quite plausibly suggest itself
as a working solution which stands to be confirmed by dream experiences, and so on.
36
Hallowell, Contributions to Ojibwe Studies, 375.
37
Most of the other writers cited here work with linguistically different but culturally similar groups within
the same broad region. See supra, note 3.
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constituted as what they are from out of a prior network of relations which one already
encounters as distributed across a range of speciated38 and perpectivally differentiated
bodily forms; and ii) change to the self and to other beings continues to be possible in the
unfolding of ongoing relational engagements, which life consists of. My strategy for
approaching this perspectivism and seeing it at work will be to try to understand a set of
concerns which frame and give nuance to the problem of what in Quichua is called
becoming yacharishka, or “accustomed to” something.39
As a problem, becoming-yacharishka is especially interesting because it allows us
to see something of what comprises local understandings of what it is to know (yachana)
and be knowledgeable; and it is significant in this regard that the Quichua word generally
translated as “shaman” (i.e., yachaj, “one who knows”) stems from the same root verb.
By tracing what is involved in becoming yacharishka, and in other concepts that connect
closely to it, we will see something of how lowland (i.e., Amazonian) Quichua thinking
understands what it is to be an attractive, mature, cultivated and thoughtful person. And
all of this will prove profoundly indissociable from the normative problem of developing
a thoughtful and sensitive relationship of “listening” to the non-human world we think of
as “nature”, and the cultivation of meditative and dialogic techniques to that end.
But we will also see how what is involved here is no naïve “Romanticism” which
imagines the world of “nature” as benign or simply cultivates identity or one-ness with
38

I use the word “speciation” here to describe the way beings within our everyday world are understood by
Amazonian thought to have withdrawn from an original human-ness in “beginning-times” into the various
differentiated bodily forms of animals and plants as we now encounter them. However, it should be
stressed: i) that indigenous identifications of something like “species” in this sense cannot be assumed to
overlap with Western biological taxonomies, and often in fact do not; and ii) that, as we might expect from
our above discussion of Ojibwe thought, we likewise cannot assume that indigenous and Western traditions
share assumptions about the kinds of things that are “animate” and hence in some sense “alive” as persons.
In other words, the kinds of entities Amazonian thought will understand as persons and hence as
“speciated” in the sense used here also includes beings we assume to be inanimate, e.g., stones used in
gardening who must be fed, who have been reported to speak to their human “owners” in dreams, who are
capable of fighting with one another, and so on.
39
The root verb here is yachana, to know. Yacharishka is a past participle form of yacharina, which
modifies yachana with a reflexive –ri suffix, which generally indicates that an action of a verb is being
undertaken by the subject of a phrase, though this will also alter the meaning of the verb in question. In this
case, becoming yacharishka has the meaning of something like “becoming accustomed” to something. One
might use the word in a phrase such as, “Pai sachawa yacharishka tukun,” – i.e., “s/he is becoming
yacharishka with/accustomed to the forest,” – where the word tukun here is a verb that means something
like “becoming” or “happening”, and often connotes transformation.
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“it”. Nor is it the ontologically transcendent cadence of mystic self-dissolution, nor an
emancipatory search for an unfettered and infinite becoming. What one finds instead is
rather a complex set of ethical, philosophical, and aesthetic practices normatively ordered
around the problem of living well as a relative and amongst relatives and giving rise to
distinctive modes of flourishing.
The term “relative” here would seem to imply a smaller subset within a larger
ontological category of “relations”, insofar as it implies a certain degree of fixity and
discipline, and also of a certain degree of shared transparency with others who are one’s
relatives. But to be in a relationship is not necessarily to be in a transparent relationship.
(And indeed, some degree of differentiation or opacity would seem to be a necessary
condition of dialogue or communication at all and in any circumstance, even amongst
relatives, as much as transparency per se.)
What living well as a relative requires is developing a mature and “contained”
becoming, a kind of moderate, dynamic fixity within the ontological scenario described
above, and within an existential horizon where the world is understood to be
fundamentally ambivalent and dangerous, to always and of necessity contain a “dark”
side. This refers us on the one hand to relations of predation and accordingly the promise
of (violent) death. But it also refers us, I think, to particular dangers that arise on the basis
of a more relational and dynamic ontology and ethical horizon. There is always the risk
of an uncontrolled becoming-otherwise, which can be fatal. Transformative becomings
with the nonhuman, which break down borders of relative fixity and bring us to see the
world closer to their point of view, often have a sense of being spooky or even outright
frightening. On the other hand, there is always the danger (not unconnected to the
possibility of becoming-otherwise) of a breakdown in social relations, of envy and anger
and offense overtaking bonds of empathetic caring. But such “dark” elements of
existence are not viewed as something to be cosmically vanquished as such but rather as a
set of contexts and possibilities set by structuring relations that make the world we must
navigate what it is and sustain it as such.
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3.2.1 Sharing Bodies and Perspectives
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has argued that Amerindian thought generally tends
to assume that different beings occupy different viewpoints which understand the world
in ways that are structurally similar, but that shift according to that being’s situated
position relative to others. Whereas we see animals as animals (under normal conditions),
a given animal – say, a fish – will see other fish as people. As people, and to their own
way of thinking, other animals engage in much the same kinds of activities we do, and
see the world as analogous versions of the way we see it. But they will not see other
specific beings in the same way we do; rather the ontological identity of something is
determined by its position relative to the viewer.40 Thus what we see as a spirit being
might view other spirits as humans, but see human beings in the same way we view birds
– i.e., as prey; and so to that spirit-being, human beings appear as birds, and so as
something to hunt.41 An underwater cavern might be a longhouse to a fish, and riverbed
stones might look like stools. This kind of play between perspectives also characterizes
the way particular entities might be named or “classified” on the basis of this kind of
relational logic. For example, a plant that looks like a domestic plant that humans use but
is either poisonous or useless for us might be a version of that domestic plant for or
relative to another being, e.g., that of the forest spirits.42
A basic presumption found amongst Indigenous peoples throughout much of the
Americas, but also specifically amongst peoples of the Northwest Amazon, is that it is
nevertheless possible to transform to be like other beings and so not only to communicate
40

Viveiros de Castro, “Exchanging Perspectives,” 468-473. De Castro rightly emphasizes that Amazonian
“perspectivism” is not rooted in anything like the kind of representational epistemology that informs our
familiar versions of “relativism” or postmodern perspectivism. To paraphrase de Castro’s suggestion,
human beings ontologically are birds relative to spirit-beings in a way analogous to how kinship terms
identify people by functioning as relational pointers. That is, we are birds for spirit people in the same
manner that Liam might be at once my nephew and his father’s son, without either term being any less what
he is.
41
This example is taken from Belaunde, “The convivial self and the fear of anger,” 215.
42
For example, manioc is a cultivated, starchy tuber that is central to the local diet. Quichua speakers might
call a particular forest plant “sacha lumu” or “forest/wild manioc”. This is a way of saying that it is similar
to the “alli lumu” or “good manioc” which is cultivated in gardens, but does not actually produce edible
tubers and so has no use for us; but such analogies are often understood on the basis of a perspectival
ontology which presumes that sacha lumu very well might be useful for someone else (e.g., the sacha runa
or forest spirits) and so appear like alli lumu to them.
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with them but to share their way of seeing, to occupy their perspective on the world. As
with the Ojibwe, meaningful dialogic interaction with other beings is only properly
possible on the basis of such becoming-aligned, and thus through co-habitation of what
we might call shared planes of transparency or modes of perspectival being. As we will
see, becoming yacharishka with something precisely involves this process. And so
“knowing” or “understanding” something in this sense takes place within an ontological
and philosophical context which involves bodily change, and accordingly a taking-on of
another way of being, a transformation of one’s aesthetic and moral horizons, and a
transformation of one’s sense of what is beautiful and good.
But what then is a body, in this sense? De Castro’s gloss is helpful here: the body
is something like an “assemblage” or “bundle of affects and capacities”, “dispositions”,
“ways of being”, that delineates a particular perspective but also and accordingly forms a
kind of equipmental set defining possibilities for acting within the world. The body, in
other words, expresses and enables the uniqueness of a person in terms of “what it eats,
how it moves, how it communicates, where it lives, whether it is gregarious or solitary.”43
However, to understand the kind of normative and relational horizons in which
such cross- or inter-species metamorphoses are undertaken, it is necessary to see that
becoming-yacharishka is something that one can always find already taking place in a
multitude of ways as the condition of possibility of successful living, eating, taking
medicines, and so on. And it occurs, in a crucial way, between human relatives – and this
forms the condition of collective living-together. And so if one image of becoming
yacharishka might be a spider who has come to take on the camouflaging colour of the
flower it hunts upon, and another is the hunter who has learned to become-boa and learn
the boa’s mode of hunting and killing-desire and ability to attract and deceive prey,44
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Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, “Exchanging Perspectives,” 474-5.
C.f. Elsje Lagrou: “Hunters are said to imitate the hunting techniques and qualities of the boa much more
than those of the jaguar. The boa is famous for seducing its prey, attracting it through the emission of a
high-pitched sound and the hypnotising power of its eyes, and also through its charm (dau), incorporated in
the design on its skin.” In Elsje Lagrou, “Homesickness and the Cashinahua Self: a reflection on the
embodied condition of relatedness,” in The Anthropology of Love and Anger: The Aesthetics of
Conviviality in Native Amazonia ed. by Joanna Overing and Alan Passes (New York: Routledge, 2000),
158.
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another is quite simply the way husbands and wives living together and caring for each
other will start to share traits, think alike, and finish one another’s sentences.
Let us pause here a little longer to consider the way becoming-yacharishka is
understood and cultivated in terms of human kinship relations. The problem of sharing a
body with one’s kin and taking part in caring and mutually-supporting relations with
them constitutes in many ways the prime point of orientation relative to which Quichua
people understand the dangers of uncontrolled becoming (and hence the value of
discipline, moderation, and so on). In becoming-yacharishka, one comes to share a body
and to occupy a shared body with others. This notion of a shared body reflects a basic
ontological supposition, it seems to me, that relations come first, constituting the
individual as a kind of concrescence or fixity which nevertheless always retains a certain
transience and mutability about it, which is constantly “becoming” in a range of ways and
requires deliberate work in order to retain its stability and identity. Elsje Lagrou
consonantly suggests, with regard to the culturally-similar Cashinahua in western Brazil,
that “paths followed, experiences shared, and food eaten mould a being into what it is, an
identity that nevertheless has its ephemeral side.”45 And accordingly, Lagrou describes a
whole series of practices intended to shape the individual as he or she is brought up
within a network of kin relations. These effectively imprint a set of relations bodily upon
the child and in so doing entrench him or her within shared planes of communication,
seeing, and empathy with the kinship group. Babies’ faces are moulded and straightened
at birth in a way which transmits a certain likeness to the infant of the one moulding
them, just as care is later given to transmitting to children good posture, in painting their
bodies with specific designs, and in introducing particular (bitter) foods understood to
harden their bodies against unduly strong outside influences and seductions to dangerous
becomings, and so on.46
45

Lagrou, “Homesickness and the Cashinahua Self,” 152.
Ibid, 156, 165. The sweet/bitter duality here, for the Cashinahua as with Quichua peoples, is a central one
for schematizing bodily and emotional states, and qualities of character. Sweetness carries a connotation of
sociability, warmth, openness; bitterness is the taste of medicine and is understood to harden the body, and
in this sense to close oneself off or at least become resistant to undue external influence or dangerous and
uncontrolled becomings-other. Shamans tend to have a lot of bitterness about them due to the frequent and
prolonged ingestion of bitter substances (e.g., tabacco, hallucinogens like ayahuasca or wanduj); but all
human bodies are understood to benefit from and require some degree of hardening bitterness. This is
particularly interesting and apparently paradoxical if we recall that bitter hallucinogens are nevertheless
46
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This shared body of the kin network or (in Quichua, the allyu) is something that is
in a sense constantly being cultivated, reaffirmed, held together. But the most important
element of the “glue” which holds family relations together – which both reflects and
cultivates the shared “fixity” of the kinship grouping, and ensures that family relations
are relations of shared transparency – is called, in Quichua, yakichina. This word, which
is either used as a verb or a nominalised verb, is derived from the verb yakina, “to love”.
Yakichina, however, contains the suffix –chi which modifies an action to be something
one causes somebody else to undergo or experience.47 Yakichina, thus, means something
like causing another to feel love for you; but this more properly has a connotation of
making-sad about it. A better translation might be “causing another to feel empathy or
compassion towards you”, if we keep in mind here the etymological connotations of
feeling another’s suffering.48 In the Amazonian way of thinking, this often involves
seeing others in their aloneness and helplessness whereas they should be multiple, i.e.,
part of a network of supporting relatives. Accordingly one becomes concerned for the
wellbeing of others, remembering them and caring about them both in immediate
interactions and when spatially distant from them.
To see others in this way (as I have suggested) is to be fixed within a particular
way of seeing, a plane of transparency amongst persons – i.e., in a position from which
we are able to see another being as a relative and hence as a person in the fullest sense. It
is significant in this connection that the Quichua word for person or man, runa, does not
properly have the same kinds of universalist connotations which our “person” or “human
precisely a means for opening up the world in a manner which subjects the taker to an increased intensity
and scope of possible communications with other-than-human persons, not least by making one’s sense of
self more fluid. But I would speculate in turn that what is at play here is precisely an example of the
delicate ambivalence with which Amazonian peoples tend to regard communicative interaction with the
non-human: it is necessary in order to live well and be a thoughtful and knowledgeable person, but it
carries its risks that, for example, one might be carried away into a non-human world and abandon one’s
prior human relations. There would seem to be here a sense in which if one makes it through such
interactions, however, one is stronger for it, one has obtained gifts and knowledge which will help them as
a human being without being carried away.
47
Thus, for example, the verb wañuna means “to die”, but wañuchina means “to cause another to die”, i.e.,
to kill.
48
See Peter Gow’s exposition of an analogous concept amongst the Piro, getwamonuta, which he translates
as “to compassion-ate” (which reflects the way the verb refers to a feeling caused in another in a manner
which corresponds to the Quichua use of the –chi suffix), in “Helpless – the affective preconditions of Piro
social life,” in The Anthropology of Love and Anger: The Aesthetics of Conviviality in Native Amazonia
ed. by Joanne Overing and Alan Passes (New York: Routledge, 2000), 47-51.
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being” has – for example, as a class of beings made everywhere in the image of God.
Runa, instead, has the connotation of being a term most properly for one’s kinship
network – that is, for relatives, who are relatives by occupying a particular relational
position with reference to one’s own. In a sense moving outward from one’s human
family, the word runa (and its coupled term, warmi, or woman) is also used for the
persons which plants, animals, and certain minerals are – but this is precisely, I would
suggest, because these are persons with whom relationships analogous to the familial type
are possible. As with the Ojibwe, the whole style of thought here is not to begin with a
God’s-eye view, sorting all classes of beings into their places within a universal
taxonomy, identifying what it is to be a human being as against other beings as such, and
so on. Rather, one begins where one is, immersed in the world and starting with the
specific kinship networks one has and inherits therein.49
This attracting and aligning yakichina occurs in qualitatively differentiated ways
ordered in terms of the kinds of sentiments and affective bonds ideally appropriate to
various specific kinship relations. Examples here might be to see another as cute or
cuddly (as one might regard a baby), or after the manner of fondness that a grandparent
might have for a grandchild, or in the manner in which one might care about a lover for
whom one feels sexual attraction. To feel yakichina is to be made to care about someone,
to be part of the fixity and shared multiple-ness of the kinship grouping by being
emotionally moved by it and bonded to it. And yakichina in this sense is something one
must cultivate as the positive, affective condition of living together with relatives, and
which is manifest precisely insofar as co-habitation with others is possible.50
Of course it is always possible for such ties to weaken and become undone – and
here we see part of the danger of uncontained becoming. Luisa Belaunde, writing about
the Airo-Pai in Peru, has described how anger can be understood as a transformational
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The term Quichua-speakers use for their own language, runa shimi, in this sense might be translated as
“the language of our relatives”, or the way one speaks as to relatives, to one’s allyu (kin relations) as
opposed to aucas (outsiders) – and it can be noted that non-human persons are also addressed in Quichua.
See Tod Swanson, “Singing to Estranged Lovers: Runa Relations to Plants in the Ecuadorian Amazon,” in
Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture 3:1 (2009), 62; Viveiros de Castro, “Cosmological
Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism,” 475-476.
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Gow, “Helpless – the affective precondition of Piro social life,” 51.
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force which changes one’s perspectival way of seeing such that it becomes possible to
think of one’s relatives as enemies or prey and so be moved to do (potentially lethal)
violence to them.51 Conversely, to feel the pull of homesickness while away hunting is a
good thing and part of what it is to be a relative; we might say that, in Quichua terms, it is
a manifestation of yakichina at work. But to cease feeling the bittersweet pain of
homesickness is precisely to cease being a person properly speaking, to have moved on
and become a wandering outsider, something untrustworthy and unsettling.52 And this
moving on can also be characterized by developing other relationships, becomingsomething-else. Lagrou gives the example of an old man who, despondent with grief and
wanting to die, was described as now being “called” by rootless, wandering spirit beings
“without fixed abode” or form. The appropriate countermeasure, Lagrou recounts, was
for relatives of the man to gather and remind him about all of his living relatives who
cared about him and would mourn the loss of him, and in this way to make him care
about them again and come back to them.53 In Quichua terms, they re-established and
strengthened a weakened bond of yakichina.
As we will see, it is both possible and desirable in lowland Quichua thinking to
develop relationships of yakichina – as part of becoming-yacharishka – with beings other
than one’s human relations. But as I have already suggested, the thrust of Quichua ethical
thinking is that the orienting “set” of one’s specific allyu or human relatives lays the
terms relative to which excess or lack of discipline, and dangerous becoming, stands to be
understood. What is important is that you be a good relative; and you should not allow
yourself to be distracted from the kind of work appropriate to you insofar as you are a
relative and hence part of a domestic system of roles and exchanges. To be carried away
too far – to become something else entirely, to abandon your own work and try to be
someone else, to be seduced into forgetting your own spouse and family and your duties
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And this, as we might now expect, is understood precisely in terms of shifting to another perspective
which simultaneously “dehumanizes” one’s relatives – as in the example of seeing them from the
perspective of spirits called huati who feed on human beings and accordingly see them in the way we see
birds. See Luisa Elvira Belaunde, “The convivial self and the fear of anger amongst the Airo-Pai of
Amazonian Peru,” in The Anthropology of Love and Anger: The Aesthetics of Conviviality in Native
Amazonia ed. by Joanna Overing and Alan Passes (New York: Routledge, 2000), at 209, 215-16.
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See Lagrou, “Homesickness and the Cashinahua self,” 154-155, 160.
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to them, and hence to forget who you are: this is to be quilla. Being quilla carries the
sense of being lazy, undisciplined, lacking judgment, but also of being sexually “loose”
or promiscuous; and it is a tremendous moral fault that is understood to threaten the
breakdown of healthy marriage and kin relations.54
Now, the whole problem of developing more transparent relations with nonhuman others is fraught with this danger of being quilla. To be a successful person at all,
to be able to respond to the uncertainties and contingencies of life, requires becoming
yacharishka and developing bonds of yakichina with a plethora of non-human others. It is
in this way that one gains strength and attractiveness, that one obtains medicines, that one
is able to do the tasks of hunting or gardening, that one is able to do and make beautiful
things. The key here, as we will see, lies especially in developing a kind of disciplined
sensuousness and sexuality, an ability to be alluring and also be allured, to enter into
sensuous registers of interrelation, care, and interplay without being swept away and
forgetting oneself. Quichua stories recurrently feature human characters who go too far
in this – who are quilla and disregard too much the barriers between species, who thereby
undermine the separations and differentiations that allow normal life to function. For
speciation is not of itself a bad thing; in many respects it is the necessary condition for the
kinds of positively contributing, non-quilla relationships that other-than-human persons
now have with us.55
And yet, it is just as much a mark of being an unthinking and unknowledgeable
person if, in encountering a medicinal plant in the forest, one cannot see a person there
(or, more precisely, a speciated person56 who used to be human but has since withdrawn
into the privacy of other speciated bodily forms). And so it is upon this edge between
unthinking insensitivity and uncontrolled becoming that so much of Quichua
54

Swanson, “Singing to Estranged Lovers,”47-50.
See, on this point, ibid, 53-54.
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Tod Swanson uses the term “ex-person” in “Singing to Estranged Lovers,” e.g., at 63. This is useful
insofar as it allows expression, within the space of a single term, of a kind of temporalized, liminal quality
to the kind of person that e.g., a tree presents itself as being. Namely: as a person-that-has-withdrawn
relative to us and so must be approached and treated in a certain way; “ex-personhood” in this sense
specifies a kind of relationship and also sets the context from which a deeper relationship might be
developed. For the purposes of consistency with my own usage, however, I will tend to employ the terms
“nonhuman person”, drawn from Hallowell, and “speciated persons” – which have the advantage I think of
emphasizing in the context of my discussion that, e.g., a tree is still a tree-person.
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philosophical practice plays. As I understand it, the mark of maturity here is to be capable
of inducing yakichina and becoming-other in such a way that, perhaps rather like an
Ojibwe spoon, one is still able to contain powers obtained in this way. Thus one is able to
have a breadth of seeing that is attentive and drinks deeply from the surrounding world,
and to receive gifts from non-human others, but without travelling so far as to lose one’s
own rootedness or directedness.

3.2.2 Coming to Know Non-Human Persons

Becoming yacharishka with the plethora non-human persons which, for example,
the domestic garden or the surrounding forest are, is not something that occurs without
effort. Neither is it something that occurs one-sidedly, hanging only upon the agentive
actions of a human “knower”. It is no less significant that the garden-plants and the forest
also become yacharishka with you. Women relate to their manioc plants as to children
they care for and nurture; but this relationship is dialogic. Manioc plants might speak to
their gardener-mother (most directly, in dreams) and express their needs; and other
women will be wary of inserting themselves unwarrantedly into this special relationship
or taking over another woman’s garden. Consuming medicines from plants is also
something that requires becoming-yacharishka. Medicine is not understood to work in a
causally necessary or calculable way, but through a communicative relationship that
requires the co-operation of the plant-person in question.
The medical example is also helpful here because it affords us another instance in
which to see how becoming-yacharishka makes sense within the space of a middleground between non-communication and uncontrolled becoming. The Quichua word for
medicine, ambi, means at once medicine and poison.57 At one extreme end, in the case of
poisoning, we have an image of an uncontrolled becoming-other, the “invasion of strange
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It is also notable here that the flavour of ambi, which is associated with its strength, is bitterness (ayak); a
certain (we might say moderate) amount of which is understood to harden and strengthen the body.
Shamans, indeed, as exceptionally strong (sinzhi, i.e., powerful) individuals, are especially associated with
bitterness. See supra, note 32.
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elements in the body”58 such that the body cannot become accustomed to and contain.
Tod Swanson has similarly described how entering into a relationship with the powerful
hallucinogen wanduj59 involves opening oneself to an “erotic contest of power” where
one of the parties involved will be taken by the other; and to lose this struggle is to be
pulled into a dehumanizing transformation into the wanduj world – i.e., for us, death.60
By contrast, a successful taking of medicines – which is something Quichua
people typically do in a habitual and preventative way and not only to combat symptoms
when they occur – allows qualities to be transferred from other non-human persons to
oneself, in a way that is ultimately strengthening. You come away having received gifts
and not having lost yourself. For example, successfully ingesting an infusion from the
bark of the amarun caspi (Cespedizia spathula) tree is understood to make one strong and
hard like the tree itself, difficult to knock down, and to induce a vital feeling of
wakefulness and mental acuity associated with the healthy red “skin-colour” of the tree’s
inner bark.61 Similarly, just as the samai (breath) containing a yachaj’s power may be
passed to another by his blowing over a cup of water or of ayahuasca, so can the samai
and hence power of a plant be passed to a person by means of steam-baths or smoking.62
But this kind of successful becoming-yacharishka is always bound up with a series of
communications with the plants themselves. Plants are meditated upon as persons; they
are spoken to and their permission is sought before taking medicine; it is generally
expected that, if approached properly, the specific plant-people in question will appear in
one’s dreams, often giving instructions as to dosage and so on. Learning to dream well,
with focus and mindfulness, as we might expect, requires work; it is an ability that is
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example, describes how the jaguar acquired his camouflage pattern and hence his especially deadly hunting
capabilities by fanning himself with leaves displaying that same pattern and hence by having their samai
pass over his body.
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cultivated throughout one’s lifetime.63 And dreaming of a plant person already shows
that, quite beyond this, one has already begun to be yacharishka and hence
communicative with the plant in question.
In addition, it should be noted that much as the becoming-yacharishka involved in
taking medicine is a continual part of everyday life, so does the relational constitution of
the self, in and through engagements with non-human others, show up in all spheres of
social and personal existence. For example, the qualitative and affective natures of the
forest and its beings can be seen to play and weave together even in the most domestic of
human actions and interactions. The iconic laughter of Quichua women together, for
example, is a kind of ideophonic repetition of the sounds of the oropendula bird.64 The
bird itself appears in large groups and is also thought to attract other species to it; in this
sense it exhibits a power of sociability and social allure that Quichua women themselves
aspire to exude. It is likewise a sign of a healthy and happy domestic environment to pass
by a house and hear this laughter ringing out from the women inside. But there is also a
particular toucan that is often remembered and felt akin-to in times of sadness and
aloneness; and I have mentioned already the hunter who takes on the power of the boa. In
other words, we can see from these examples that although the human kin network
provides a basic orienting fixity for the Amazonian self, the texture of human life is
absolutely permeated from the beginning with the non-human – and this in the form of
affects or modes of being acquired through relations encompassing a crowded and
diverse world of persons. The specific fixities of the self, and of dwelling-place as
composed through the situational being-together of such persons, are intimately linked.
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One helpful way of glimpsing what might be involved in cultivating dream in this way (for us, in part
because it has been more extensively documented and in this sense textually rationalized through its
history) might be by looking at the kinds of yogic practices found in Tibetan Bön Buddhism. One glance at
Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche’s The Tibetan Yogas of Dream and Sleep (New York: Snow Lion Publications,
1998), for instance, can show something of the wealth of ways in which dream-awareness may be honed,
refined, imbued with meditations, etc., in ways that extend in quite different directions from the ways we
moderns are used to engaging and understanding the value of dreams and what goes on in them.
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The stereotypical female laugh tends to approximate something like, “hoohoohoohoooiiiieeeee” or
“ahaaaaiiiiiiiiieeeeeeee”. Interestingly, this laugh is not a “realistic” imitation of the oropendula so much as
an ideophonic invocation of it, in a manner not too unlike the way abstract geometrical designs on pottery
tends to invoke and make-present the sense of other beings without being exact figurative representations
of them (see my discussion on Quichua pottery further below).
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Seeing and learning to see non-human others as persons typically involves a
complex set of practices which bring together acts of remembrance and mindfulness,
modes of listening to the world and to stories which disclose a communicative and
agentive face “within” the forms of speciation. Upon entering the forest, one should
generally be quiet and avoid making noise – and this is at once a sign of respect and, it
seems to me, a way of calling up or sinking into a particular kind of attentive mindfulness
conducive for letting the work of becoming-yacharishka happen. Attentiveness to one’s
surroundings and the beings in it, in minute and often hidden detail, is cultivated. Seeing
a particular medicinal plant might trigger practices of remembering what stories of
“beginning-times” say about it – about the kind of person which it was before it withdrew
into its present form. I would suggest that this reflecting on the “past” here is not simply a
historical recounting, however, but a powerful, evental practice of making-present, of
seeing-as-present and rendering-visible the personhood of a speciated person as it may
here and now be engaged. One might reflect, to similar effect, upon autobiographical
details of past engagements with this plant, songs one might have been taught to engage it
with, the histories and teachings of one’s human relatives and ancestors concerning the
plant and its uses, as well as other species connected in one way or another with it.
The word for this kind of practice, and this continual unfolding of reflection, is
iyarina;65 and iyarina is central to what it is to be a thoughtful person and move through
the forest thoughtfully. And in this kind of reflection, there is a sense in which a whole
chain of remembrances serves to gather up as present the whole multiplicity of one’s
shared body (which includes one’s ancestors) and mindfully experience it as the
condition of one’s living engagement with the forest (or indeed with anything). “One” in
this sense is never just “one” – but a whole network of kinship and relational constitution
which remains present within the isolated part.
I have mentioned already that dream practice is important here; it must be
emphasized once again that dream-experiences are not any less “real” for Amazonian
65

Iyana means to think; iyarina includes the reflexive –ri suffix which changes its meaning slightly to
denote a kind of remembering-thoughtfulness. It is also interesting, for speculative purposes, to note that
the root verb here (iyana) can carry a sense of lively attentiveness; iyangui! for example is a second-person
imperative form of the verb that means, as in warning, watch out! C.f., Tod Swanson, Napo Runa Shimi:
Introduction to the Kichwa Language of the Napo Headwaters. Unpublished manuscript (2012), 202.
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peoples than are waking ones. Included (indeed, pre-eminent) here are those “dreams”
one experiences as the result of ingesting hallucinogens. These enable more intensely
agentive, face-to-face communications with non-human others; but it is also important to
see that there appears to be no strict division in kind between the sort of listening which
one is able to develop and deepen through the use of hallucinogens and that which
characterizes “normal” consciousness. What is learned through the ingestion of wanduj
reveals the world in a way that then carries over into everyday life and informs the way
things now show up and are known – the way they stand to be thoughtfully remembered,
engaged, drawn upon. But what is involved here is perhaps more a difference in degree of
intensity than anything else. Nevertheless, it is the case that one can expect to deepen
one’s understanding and one’s relationships through the use of hallucinogens, and to open
up channels of communication and registers of the phenomenal world ordinarily unseen.
Again, this is not a solipsistic practice. For example, I have heard accounts from
Quichua people of taking wanduj in the forest and coming to see trees as people, and
saplings as children, and of meeting the wanduj people, i.e., the humanlike form of the
persons which the wanduj plant is.66 More interestingly still, my interlocutor (a somewhat
older yachaj with a vast knowledge of the forest and its medicines already) recounted
being introduced by the wanduj-people to the rest of the forest and the beings in it, and
shown medicines which the taker had not previously encountered. Such a notion must
seem strange for us who expect nothing like an engagement between agencies from the
taking of medicines like wanduj, and view hallucination as fantastical, an exploration if
anything of a subject’s “inner space” and “consciousness”. But it follows quite naturally
as a possibility within a world of other-than-human persons who would have wisdom and
relationships of their own that we are not necessarily privy to.
Perhaps we ought to dwell a moment longer on the kind of seeing and affective
becoming that we might imagine the use of hallucinogens and the cultivation of dreaming
66

Interestingly, and (from what I gather) somewhat unusually, I have heard wanduj described not as one
but as two people, a man and a woman who work together. This description however came from one
individual; and in truth I cannot at this time say how idiosyncratic or generalized such an account of wanduj
would be. In describing her experiences with wanduj, however, this person directly explained this as a
process of learning, of coming to know, of becoming yacharishka with the forest – at the same time as the
forest becomes yacharishka with you.
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to facilitate. If one is serious about gaining in capacities, about becoming someone who is
properly sinzhi or strong – whether in hunting, in making pottery whose designs carry the
force of beauty, or in healing, etc. – it is necessary to undertake such work, to study the
forest under the influence of hallucinogens such as ayahuasca67 and, less frequently,
wanduj.
Writing about ayahuasca use in Amazonian Columbia, Michael Taussig
beautifully describes an experience which “is awful” and yet “wondrous” and
“unstoppable”. Moments of stark terror arise, washed up viscerally in waves of nausea
and shitting. But there is also tremendous joy that in its own registers strains the self to
the crazed edge of bursting; also moments of hilarity, interruption, ambivalent unease,
lucidity and “drunkenness”, tremendous tension. A montage of feeling unfolds in the
emergence and oscillation of vivid scenes, vistas, patterns, colours; in creatures laden
with an intensity of moodiness, sentiment, agentiveness. In Taussig’s telling, snakes and
alligators, frogs croaking out from the muddy slime, flowers and birds and others, enter
together into an alternating play of “laughter and death” carried out through zones of
sensuous particularity;
Thoughts become feelings and feelings thoughts . . . in a friction-filled
rasping of planes of different types of experience grinding on a sort of noperson’s-land where concept and feeling fight it out for priority, leaving a
new space where the sensation lives in its glowing self. It is also the case
that, associated with this, the world “outside” trembles into life and unison
with the world “inside”.68
The world “without” inseparable from the world “within”: here is relational
selfhood in vivid relief. This trembling unison opens as a world of intensity amped up by
the power of ayahuasca: “feeling sensations so intensely that you become the stuff
sensed.”69 And this intensity, inseparable from the qualitative registers of the senses,
rushes onward in a modulating and dynamic unfolding whose aliveness and movement, I
67

A vividly potent hallucinogenic brew made from the combination generally of at least two ingredients:
the vine Banisteriopsis caapi and the leaves of Psychotria viridis.
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Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man, 406. My overall gloss here of Taussig’s account
paraphrases especially from 406, 438, 444-5.
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think, ought not to be overlooked here. We are familiar, elsewhere in Indigenous
America, with masked dances where the dancers “imitate”70 – or more precisely, I think,
become – particular animals and spirits in and through partaking in and “internalizing”,
immersively taking-on, living-through their bodily movements.71 Perhaps something
similar occurs here – not least in the hallucinatory slippage between passively
experiencing visions one does not control, and finding oneself actively involved in the
“doing” of these visions – a doing which strangely is, and is not, one’s own (not unlike in
experiences of “inspiration” so seductive for Western thinkers). As one is caught up in
the unfolding-revealing of visions, might there not be a heightened sense in which one
finds oneself partaking, to the profundities of one’s being, in the movement of its
deepening and self-showing, experiencing it as it were “from the inside”?72
Insofar as one’s attentions are directed dialogically upon the sensuous fabric of
the forest, opening up a special participatory sensitivity to qualitative zones and loci of
dynamic power within it, all while a shifting and destabilizing fluidity is lent to one’s
feeling, one’s sense of self, to the surface of the world – might not hallucination in this
sense quite plausibly be a mode of “studying” the forest and its beings, and exploring
new bodily assemblages? I have heard from one yachaj a story of seeing stingless bees
suddenly proliferate all over her arms and body after drinking wanduj. Afterwards, she
was able to feel an empathetic warmth towards them, a sisterly kinship, seeing them as
(speciated) persons though they did not cease being bees, and feeling the joy of their
company when otherwise alone in the forest. We might wonder, perhaps, whether the
learning of this empathy was not something that occurred in part precisely in and through
70

There are dangers, of course, with using more common words like “imitation” here – and not least is the
implication that one must choose between an alternative of either being or imitating something, which only
entrenches an atomistic way of approaching the matter. As should be evident from the language I have been
employing, it is my sense that the notion of “becoming” and “becoming-animal” (i.e., as a transversal,
relational, ontogenetic process, more akin to a contagion than a strict imitation), as elaborated by Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is much more germane to describing the dynamics involved here, and
preserving the sense of “realness” accorded such dynamics in Amazonian ontologies. C.f. Gilles Deleuze
and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia trans. by Brian Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 237-243.
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Alaska, in The Perception of the Environment, 124, 128.
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And indeed: if the self is not the Cartesian subject standing apart from what is “out there”, but a self
immersed within the world and extended out bodily into it, constituted from out of its relations, then might
not “transformation of the self” be a perfectly valid way to describe what happens in hallucination?
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the very participatory movement of this proliferation itself, a covering-over which was
also an alteration of the surface of her own body.
From what has been said, it will perhaps not be surprising that the experience of
seeing non-human persons in their more agentive guise is expected to be unnerving.
Swanson offers this gloss on Quichua descriptions of seeing non-human persons, or
supai, face-to-face: “They are overwhelmingly attractive, mysterious, and terrifying
(words that Mircea Eliade, following Rudolph Otto, used to describe an experience of the
sacred).”73 But it should be emphasized here that such experiences are not tied to a
vertical cosmology of mystic flights as towards a supramundane and infinite deity, but
fundamentally to a horizontal cosmology74 of this-worldliness – and hence to specific
engagements and becomings with the trees, with the rivers, the animals, the insects in all
their strangeness.75 It also seems suggestive in this regard that the word supai can also
generally be used as a superlative form for something – in the way of remarking upon an
unusually strong downpour of rain, for example. This would seem to further support an
interpretation of vision not as otherworldly journey but as an opening up of this world,
facilitating an engagement with others in more intensified, agentive forms.
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Tod Swanson, “Singing to Estranged Lovers,” 60.
Which is not to suggest that there are not different “domains” of Quichua cosmology; one can for
example speak of kai pacha (this world), uku pacha (the world “inside” the water or the mountains,
entering which through the use of hallucinogens means entering the house or wasi of spirits), and awa
pacha (the world above). Missionaries have attempted to encode the latter two as Hell and Heaven,
respectively; but the fit is fundamentally a poor one, and not only because the dualistic moral connotations
of the Christian vertical cosmology do not match those of Quichua culture. For neither do Quichua
preoccupations with, e.g., uku pacha seem to make much sense described as an “otherworldliness” in the
Christian sense – it is rather an integral part of engaging the forces and persons of the phenomenal world. I
concede that one could also, accordingly, describe contemporary Quichua culture (in which most speakers
will identify in one way or another as Christian) as evincing a very different kind of Christianity, which it
does; though I prefer to understand this as a Christianity incorporated and reworked within a ground
prepared by Indigenous Amazonian thought, and a profoundly shamanistic ontology and cosmology and so
on.
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Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1995), 211-217.
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And though the supais are “frightening, deceptive, or dangerous,” Swanson
suggests, “they are also attractive and regarded as sources of life.”76 Life – i.e., power,
vitality and capacity in the context of a dangerous world in which other beings may seek
to feed upon us and consume our strength.77 We can intimate a connection here between
such vitality and experiences of such awesome intensity, akin perhaps to the electricity
we might associate with the presencing of a god, as described above. But in and through
becoming yacharishka with other persons, such intensity seems always qualitatively
differentiated: it is the seductive and fearsome hunting power of the boa, the sociable and
magnetic exuberance of the oropendula, the vitality and focus of the amarun caspi as
against the sleepy feeling of dying.78
At the same time, it is also the healing power that would seem latent within the
dialogic introspection associated with the use of hallucinogens like wanduj and
ayahuasca. For such medicines are often taken in times of trouble, unease, and anxiety, in
times of illness when other medicines seem not to work. They are taken as a means of
gaining clarity about situations that are worrisome, of enlarging one’s understanding and
seeing. Through the effort of clarifying the present, one works to open up different
possible futures, to heal. Wanduj and ayahuasca at once make visible things that are
unseen, and enable human beings to transform, to interact and speak with the other-thanhuman beings. To understand the healing power of such interactions it seems necessary to
see that they occur within the context of particular troubles. The appearance of other
beings in this sense would occur within a background of understanding and meaning that
would inform the kinds of interactions and conversations that follow. Accounts of
interactions with other beings on wanduj or ayahuasca often describe individuals being
brought to moments of realization or insight, having been prompted by their interlocutors
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To understand this context of predation properly would take us too far afield here; but suffice to say that
it forms a widespread element of Amazonian thought which characterizes its general sense of the
fundamental ambivalence of the world. Mountains from whom shamans seek power, for example, must
also be fed and will from time to time take human life e.g., in landslides. Manioc plants, which supply the
staple starch of the lowland diet, are also understood to get thirsty and drink the blood of passing
individuals if they are not given an adequate substitute – as do various forest plants, powerful stones used
in gardening, and so on. Various precautionary measures are taken to neutralize this danger relative to
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to reflection upon their own lives. Might we propose that these individuals would
precisely have gained, through that relationship, a different perspective on things?
Furthermore, insofar as visionary experiences facilitate processes of transformative
learning-becoming (becoming-yacharishka), we can perhaps begin to imagine how in the
context of worry and anxiety these processes might be pursued as sources of capacities or
powers, registers of vitality, necessary for turning the tides of the present.79

3.2.3 Yakichina and Yacharishka: Attraction, Caring, and the
Relational Play of Sentiment
Because engaging non-human others and becoming yacharishka with them is not
a solipsistic affair, it involves opening a communicative and often dangerous engagement
with other agentive powers that retain the capacity for refusal. The key, here as with all
persons qua relatives, lies in establishing bonds of yakichina – and once again, we recall
that the register of a particular instance of yakichina will be different depending on the
kind of relationship it belongs to.80 But one pre-eminent (though not the only81) mode of
engaging, for example, plant persons in this regard is in terms of the kind of seductive,
cross-gendered yakichina which bonds and draws together romantic lovers.
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See Regina Harrison’s thoughtful study of a Quichua woman’s interactions with a snake-woman through
the use of wanduj, precipitated by a debilitating back pain but subsequently connected to feelings of
loneliness and fear of abandonment by her husband and children. Regina Harrison, “The Metaphysics of
Sex: Quichua Songs from the Tropical Forest,” in Signs, Songs, and Memory in the Andes: Translating
Quechua Language and Culture (Austin: University of Texas, 1989), esp. 148-157, 166. And to reflect
further on the example of our yachaj and her stingless bees in light of this: it would seem reasonable to
assume that the comfort she now feels at seeing these bees is bound up with the emotional context in which
she would have likely taken wanduj and encountered these bees in her vision. On ayahuasca healing
sessions, see also Taussig’s wonderful study on the subject, in Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man.
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Notably, Quichua words for relatives specify the gendered position of the speaker in ways which allow
one to be clearer about the precise nature of the relationship involved. For example, the word for sister is
different depending on whether the speaker is male (in which case, the word is pani) or female (in which
case, the word is ñaña). It is understood that a pani relation will be and feel quite different from a ñaña
relationship; and we can extrapolate that the kind of yakichina operative within either will also be different.
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For example, the relationship between manioc plants and women gardeners is akin to that of child and
mother; the lumucuru or manioc caterpillar, understood to help manioc grow and produce tubers, is
engaged by women gardeners like a daughter-in-law – or, in other words, like the lover of one’s child.
Evidently the kind of care, attentiveness, and yakichina appropriate to each will be different; e.g., it might
make sense to say that the lumucuru is cared-for perhaps less for its own sake than because it makes one’s
child happy.
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Amazonian origin stories typically recount how a breakdown in normal and
successful relationships in “beginning-times” precipitated the withdrawal of once-human
persons into the privacy and relative incommunication of different species-bodies.
Reopening lines of communication is accordingly a delicate business not only because of
the strength and allure these persons can themselves have (recall: to be overtaken by them
means to be pulled into irreversible transformation and death), but because it involves reopening a relationship that has already gone badly. And so, in a way befitting their status
as speciated persons, plant and animal supai are often engaged as ex-lovers who are,
accordingly, likely to be moody.82
The gendered, sexual element connoted by romantic love here is notable for
several reasons – and not least because, to us Westerners, it is liable to seem strange to
speak about relationships with plants or animals in this way. But we should not forget
how the conversation is initially set here by the terms of differentiation: ex-lovers, exhuman persons. Indeed, sexual attraction makes sense to us most readily with reference to
other human beings, and the Quichua would say rightly so; it is part of the
communicative interpersonal play characteristic of shared planes of transparency. Other
beings, inhabiting different bodies, seem too strange to us for this: they are beautiful
perhaps, but in a different sense from a desirable man or woman. And yet, it is perhaps
instructive, as we try to understand Amazonian thought, to meditate upon the
apprehension of beauty in this way as another mode, a transmutation of the same “kind”
of feeling as that which draws us in sexual attraction. For here we have another language
through which to poetize the localized “powerfulness” and allure of powerful persons,
and the kind of charismatic charge interpersonal engagements with them can give rise to.
This connection between power and attractiveness would seem to be essential. And we
might hypothesize that the further one goes in becoming-yacharishka with something,
and hence the more one gains in capacity through relations with the non-human, the
closer such engagements might begin to feel to the kind of charge we associate with the
erotic.83 But we are also afforded another instance in which to see how being quilla can
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constitute a danger here, as encountering supai means opening oneself to a flood of
emotional attraction that can be overwhelming and carry one away.84 But if being quilla
is a danger, what does one aim for?
Engagement with non-human (as with human) others involves the communication
of emotion and feeling and its “causing” in others through yakichina; and as such it
frequently involves what Michael Brown has termed “technologies of sentiment”.85 And
it is, I think, in the use of such “technology” that one is able to apprehend one instance of
a disciplined or mature sensuality of the sort necessary for becoming-yacharishka and
successfully engaging other persons. One example is the use of song, which is sung to
the (human or non-human) person in question. Parenthetically, though I (after Brown)
speak of “technology” here, and while the use of song might suggest comparison with the
kind of purposive rationality we associate with the “technological”, it should be clear that
such analogizing is also awkward. For the relationships involved are not the same; and
the difference can be conceived as growing not least from a difference in underlying
ontology: e.g., there is no assumption of the human agent as atomistically self-sovereign
over and against a calculable nature, playing an instrumentally rationalized game of ends
and means here.
Let us try to see, then, what is involved in such songs. The songs have words; and
it is necessary, if not to sing them aloud, at least to do so in one’s mind while the melody
precisely having sacha runa/warmi (“forest men/women”), or yaku runa/warmi (“river men/women”,
“water spirits”) with whom sexual relations akin to those between human beings takes place, and who are
treated as husbands or wives. In a related way, Philip Descola has described how, amongst the Achuar of
Ecuador and Peru (but also, I would suggest, more pervasively in Amazonia), sexual abstinence is a normal
protocol at certain times where commerce with non-human beings is necessary – e.g., at planting time in
the domestic garden. These kinds of prohibitions, Descola suggests, are partly thought to be necessary in
order to marshal vital energies for other tasks, not least dreaming and communicating with non-human
beings. For my part, I am inclined to speculate in this vein that the invocation of sexual energy here is also
perhaps not so far from its use in systems of Tantric meditation – i.e., as a gathering of forces capable of
being directed and marshalled into forms of heightened concentration, sharpness of focus, intensified
awareness. But then, it also seems quite fitting that Amazonian thought should meditate so deeply upon
relationships of gendered and erotic allure, insofar as this also constitutes one of the primary ways of
establishing inter-agentive bonds of attraction between beings who are in a sense “strangers”. C.f., Regina
Harrison, “The Metaphysics of Sex,” 170; Swanson, “Singing to Estranged Lovers,” 60-61; Philippe
Descola, In the Society of Nature: A Native Ecology in Amazonia (Cambridge: University of Cambridge,
1996), 210.
84
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is played, e.g., on a flute. Such words tend to be rich with imagery densely rooted in local
understandings and associations. They often dramatically position the singer relative to
their interlocutor, and make possible specific explorations of that relationship on the basis
of the imagery used. Within the qualitative space of such exploration, songs can facilitate
a marshalling of efforts germane to particular aims. (Swanson gives the example of one
song in which they words sung work to position the singer as a lover relative to the
Matiri tree, identifies the plant’s reticence to share its gifts in terms of a sexual
coyness, and invites the plant to offer his gifts in the same way a husband would
offer meat to his wife after returning from the forest – so establishing an exchange
relationship precisely akin to the ideal of human marriage partners.86) One important
element here is the way that, as Brown has suggested, words become powerful as part of
a meditative and disciplined interlocutory practice insofar as they are “indices of
powerfully structured thoughts” which, if done properly, have the potential to manipulate
the emotions of others.87 Regina Harrison similarly suggests that for the lowland
Quichua, songs are “a specialized kind of ‘thinking’”; on our end, she suggests,
contemplation (iyarina), “a gathering of forces, is necessary to begin the process.”88
Another word frequently used to describe such a mode of gathering forces up into
one’s own self, “summoning” “creative energies”, is shayana, which means to stand, but
also can connote having a stable selfhood, a “presence” or “stature”; a variation,
shayarina, carries the sense of “standing-up”, “standing-appearing”.89 “To appear
standing,” suggest Norman and Dorothea Whitten, “is to be poised, to be ready, to be
capable, to feel power.”90 Variations of the verb shayana can also be used to describe the
appearing of non-human persons and the way they exert their allure.91 For human beings,
shayana connotes a kind of sensuous gathering of oneself into a standing-forth, which at
once “draws inspiration from the vivid imagery of the tropical forest” and is, in so doing,
a “contemplative process which remembers and calls forth the repetition of sexual
86
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attraction.”92 But such a repetition entails precisely a kind of containment and
directedness, a mature marshalling and employment of energies and capacities – we
might say a disciplined gathering of relational (and by no means atomistically
commanding) selfhood.
But it is perhaps further worth emphasizing how song constitutes a special kind of
saying – i.e., a musical one. For much has been made, even in our own tradition, about
the way music, especially done well, plays upon, enlivens, and influences emotional
feeling. Indeed, music might be said to communicate (and with tremendous capacity for
nuance) within the registers of feeling itself, to give rise to particular “morphologies of
feeling”.93 For Amazonian thinking, a beautiful melody can call forth emotions of
sadness, joy, mournfulness, good humour, etc., in a listener, as we might expect; but in so
doing it actualizes, makes tangible, and thus gives “proof” (camai) of the capacity or
power of the singer (and the beauty they might feel within themselves) in and through
impacting others.94
Notably, songs can also be learnt from (human and non-human) others; and such
learning similarly requires having opened such channels of empathetic communication,
and thus involves the sharing and establishing of a perspectival plane. It is pertinent that
the songs an individual might sing to others (human or non-human) might in turn have
been learnt and passed down from kin relations, or learned on one’s own through
visionary interlocutions with non-human others. In Quichua, songs are figured precisely
as an instance of the samai, or breath, which I described earlier;95 and as such, they can
transmit capability, as “gifts”. And here, I think, we can begin to understand the sense of
how, quite broadly within the Amazon, songs function as exchangeable forms of agentive
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intensity.96 But we can also begin to appreciate how singing songs in subsequent
contexts can be a way of meditatively gathering-forth and remembering past visionary
and communicative experiences, lessons and modes of being learned, and of calling up
the charge of vital energies and feelings of beauty as have been gained relationally.97

3.2.4 On Knowing-Thoughtfulness, and Flourishing

In the foregoing, then, we have come to see something of what is involved in
becoming yacharishka with others. I have tried to show how this problematic involves
cultivating modes of contained becoming, a careful and disciplined play along a thin line
between being knowledgeable and gaining strength, and death, being quilla, undergoing
uncontrolled becomings-other and the dire consequences this can mean. But we have
also, I hope, come to see something of the stark differences between Amazonian and
modern/Western, “technological” ways of understanding the world. Standard logics of
disenchantment would have us see Indigenous practices such as the use of medicines as
muddled versions of our own, “folk” remedies that have somehow chanced on real causal
effects while remaining oblivious as to why, as though beneath the superfluous layers of
culture we glimpse the distilled and refined version modern technoscience makes
available to us.98 But it should be clear by now that to come to Amazonian practices in
this way is to uncritically import too many assumptions about the kinds of relationships
that can possibly or meaningfully be involved, about what “ends” direct behaviour, and
about what it is to be a self within the world.
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Instead, I have tried to develop an appreciation more on its own terms for the
complex horizon of meaning and practice that is gathered together in the Amazonian
understandings of becoming-yacharishka. We have seen how these practices serve to
continually emplace individuals within an extensive network of living relations, and in
turn how navigating the demands of day to day life requires continually remembering,
actualizing, and deepening the various registers and communicative possibilities of one’s
multiple and relational selfhood. And in this we can sense in outline, perhaps, an
intriguing and remarkably sensitive intuition as to what it is to be thoughtful, wise, and to
develop and cultivate oneself, which is profoundly relational and rooted in emplaced
interactions with non-human “nature”.
The kind of knowing involved in yachana is deeply connected to understandings
of power, to the problem of becoming strong or sinzhi – and the more one knows, the
stronger one is. Knowing in this sense involves the whole of one’s being – it is a deep
and immersive, embodied knowing, perhaps not too unlike the way the ancient Greeks
would say that someone knew virtue precisely insofar as they were virtuous.99 And it is a
knowing that draws upon the surrounding world with a basic orientation to being up to
the challenges of life – but in a way that comes to bloom, not least, in distinctive and rich
experiences of beauty and (we might say) flourishing that can be seen to permeate
everyday life.100
Regina Harrison has suggested that purina (walking) is a privileged metaphor in
Quichua for thinking about existence; to have travelled far but well (i.e., not aimlessly or
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in a fashion that is quilla) is to have a broad understanding, to have seen and taken in
much.101 But on occasions when I have gone walking in the forest with traditional
Quichua people, it has always been immediately clear that such travelling is not simply a
movement through space, but a whole immersive and engaged interactivity – an occasion
for singing, remembering and developing relationships, calling forth capacities, which is
richly folded in layers of iyarina. To walk through the forest is to move through a
community that is deeply familiar, in which one finds companionship – and through
which one also continually recognizes and rediscovers, in all the many registers of pathos
and joy, the multiple faces of one’s own selfhood, one’s shared body. It is in such
practices, I think, that we gain an inkling of what living fully means in Quichua thought.
In the image of travelling far but not carelessly, one intuits the outline of a piety alive
within the dual intuition that living well demands a careful balance between drinking
deeply from the differential and interactive registers of perspectival being, while still
preserving one’s orienting situatedness as a particular relative.
In a connected way, we can also appreciate one further sense in which walking
through and dwelling upon the land carries a kind of pedagogical force. Not only is it a
process of stretching and growing the self, and one’s (bodily) capacities for thinking and
feeling. But one simultaneously makes a study of the land and its (seasonal, etc.)
rhythms, of the interplay and interconnections between all the range of persons and
beings therein (including oneself); and one learns to understand oneself with reference to,
and as embedded in and constituted by, that broader context. And one comes to cultivate,
through this process, forms of timely (and stylistic, and courageous) response to the
happenings that transpire there.102
Let us close this section on Amazonian thought with one final image that I take to
be indicative of a kind of flourishing indigenous to Amazonian lifeways – namely, the
making of “art”, in the form for example of beautiful designs painted on pottery. In the
modern Western tradition, of course, art is commonly taken to be the distinctive site of
human creativity, an activity where the uniqueness of the human spirit and the freedom of
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the individual artist become manifest. Such notions have a long and familiar affinity with
modern political concepts and programmes which place man at the center of the world
stage. But Amazonian pottery, as we might expect, is understood differently. From the
beginning, making pottery is a story of relationships: in gathering clay from the Clay
Mother of the riverbank, a specific tree-sap for glaze, stones and clays for paint – and no
less in painting the designs themselves.
One way that power or strength is paradigmatically manifest is in works of beauty
– as in songs, but also in the making of pottery painted with “abstract” geometrical
designs. (Notably, the activity of the female potter has been argued to parallel that of the
usually male yachaj.)103 So far as I understand the matter, such designs as I have seen
derive from a careful study of specific plants and animals. They are intended at once to
display an intimate familiarity with patterns and hard-to-notice details in “nature”, and to
evoke and bring to articulation the movement, character, and resonances104 of a particular
being. But they are not exact copies or figurative replicas of plants or animals.
The liveliness of the designs, so far as I understand the matter, arises in their
“abstractness”. Patterns are repeated from “nature” in a way that is intended less to be
literally precise than, it would seem, dynamically evocative, an “imprecision” which
nevertheless captures all the more faithfully a sense of a particular movement and
intensity. The process of apprehending and painting such patterns is not itself separate
from the modes of “listening” described earlier; and if the patterns painted on traditional
bowls are in a sense reminiscent of “psychedelic art”, this cannot be surprising – since
studying the forest under the influence of ayahuasca and wanduj is one part of what is
involved in being an attentive listener. Particular elements of the imagery may be
evocative of stories or evoke a particular encounter the potter may have had with the
animal in question. And so to make and show one’s pottery to others – which is an iconic
activity of women and bound up with traditional gender roles – is to make manifest and
bring together all the skills and sensitivities involved in containing and becoming-
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yacharishka that I have described so far.105 And it accordingly displays and renders as
camai an artist’s own attractiveness, sensitivity, attentiveness, thoughtfulness, and
knowledge.
Tod Swanson has offered this description of the ethical importance and value of
similar practices of sharing and experiencing beauty in different Indigenous traditions
that is worth repeating in this context:
Much of the native traditions’ ability to expand the affections in response to
the natural order comes from the close tie they retain between aesthetics
and the moral life. Traditionally, Indian peoples have recognized beauty in
the syncopated patterns of the natural world. Moral character is the ability
hold those patterns in memory and respond to them appropriately. Since the
patterns are beautiful, faithful response to them will be beautiful. Therefore,
the moral character is a person with style. Beautiful and original dancing is
the outward sign of an individual’s ability to respond in time to the concert
of species of which he or she is a part. By contrast, being a mediocre dancer
is a sign that the performer envies the part of someone else, or that the
performer is too slothful or fearful . . .106
The impact of Quichua pottery designs, in their abstractness, is also such as to
invoke the viewer’s own remembrances and familiarities with the beings in question –
they point one back to the plants and animals in question in an invitation to iyarina. And
so a beautiful piece of pottery is in a sense dialogic not only between the potter and the
viewer, but between both of these and other, particular beings. And accordingly such
force of beauty as the pottery has draws upon, evinces, and reinforces in its own way a
shared culture of becoming-yacharishka and a kind of style appropriate to it – and there is
a joy and flourishing, I think, in such sharing. As such, this artistry is precisely not
understood as a form of individual “creativity”, generated from out of the inventive
power of the free artist (as atomistic, made in the image of God the Creator, etc.). Rather,
Quichua pottery, and the joy and beauty it partakes in, is profoundly rooted in the
relational soil of becoming-yacharishka.
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As a kind of addendum on this point, I think it is also worth considering the way
something like pottery-making can function pedagogically – a question that brings us
more directly to the conditions under which I myself encountered it during fieldwork. In
the abstract, I suppose one might expect ethnographic fieldwork to consist in the main of
interviews and (largely verbal) conversations with human beings – which one could
record in notes or audio/video files to take home and ponder and so on. In the course of
my own interactions with Quichua elders, however, it became clear that much more was
always going on, and being given space. Stories and anecdotes would always be
occasioned, for example on walks through the forest, by the presence of particular plants
or animals, the memories and songs these might invoke, and so on. But another way of
saying this is that stories, anecdotes, songs, and so on, were always relayed in contexts
where the nonhuman itself was able to participate and itself be an interlocutor in a more
“direct” or “present”, if not necessarily verbal, way.
To my mind, this was certainly not “accidental”, and should be considered not
only in terms of the immanent coherence of Quichua thought and practice generally, but
also in terms of its relevance to a pedagogical process of teaching and learning that
framed the common purpose we were all there together to engage in. Michael Uzendoski
and Edith Calapucha-Tapuy have argued that by its very nature, Quichua storytelling and
speech immerses us in a much broader communicative landscape, of relational “somatic
poetry”, in ways of “experiencing” and “seeing” the world that extend quite beyond what
tends to come across in verbal transcriptions.107 As students, we were being invited into
this broader communicative landscape, and hence into conversations that were not
necessarily verbal and that engaged the nonhuman in a range of ways.
That we as students were also introduced to the practice of Quichua potterymaking should not I think be separated from this broader pedagogical method. If my
account of these practices in general is true, then in sharing their own pottery with
fieldschool students like myself and guiding us in making our own, our teachers were
also inviting us to learn something of a culture of becoming-yacharishka. They were
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sharing something of the beauty that they themselves had come to learn from the
landscape, and directing us to ways of seeing and conversing, of thinking and “listening”
and gathering beautiful intensities and patterns on our own, that reflected their sense of
what cultivatedness means.
Let this suffice, then, for my brief discussion of Northwestern Amazonian thought
and culture. It is my hope that it will have afforded a somewhat substantive glimpse into
one possible variation of what it might mean to live and think as a relationally-constituted
person in a world filled with other persons, human and non-human. In order to push even
further this question of the differences that exist between Indigenous and Western ethical
regimes concerning “nature”, let us now turn to one final example of Indigenous
traditions, on the North Pacific Coast of North America. For if the Western
“monological” and “technological” way of seeing is crystallized par excellence in
(neo)liberal property law, it is edifying to contrast this with forms of Indigenous
ownership.
That I move to the North Pacific Coast here should not be interpreted as a claim
that other Indigenous peoples (or even those I have already discussed) do not practice
forms of something like “ownership” (or, indeed, other versions of land stewardship). I
turn to North Pacific Coast examples here not only to broaden the referential sphere of
my discussion, and to continue to show something of how American Indigenous peoples
may share broad philosophical orientations while not being monolithic, but also for
certain strategic comparative purposes. For at one level and on a certain number of
points, the examples offered below would seem to (superficially) approach more closely
the kinds of things we might associate with what it means to own things: for instance,
more sedentary subsistence patterns, a more formalized codification of (exclusive) legal
title and protocols surrounding issues of trespass, a relation perhaps more closely
resembling dominion over territory and animals, and so on. But this apparent proximity,
examined more closely, reveals beneath its surface tremendous differences. These also
aid us in understanding how broad themes in Indigenous thinking can find expression
even in more sedentary lifeways that are nevertheless very far from our own.
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3.3 Ownership Without “Nature”: Examples from the North
Pacific Coast
Among the first things we stand to notice in turning our attentions to the
Indigenous peoples of the North Pacific Coast is a more settled relationship to the land in
comparison, for example, with the semi-nomadic patterns of traditional Algonquian life.
Relationships to the non-human world and to particular places are interwoven with
appreciably different, and seemingly more formalized structures than amongst Ojibwe
and Amazonian societies – evinced most especially in elaborate systems of rank and
hereditary privilege. At one level, these structures comprise and determine something like
a system of inherited “property” which comprises claims of “ownership” relative to
particular places. But then, to begin to see such practices in their proper and meaningful
context requires that we try to see how these also involve a range of relationships that go
well beyond what we might expect to be constitutive of property relations. This can
hardly be surprising, however, insofar as the institutions in question express an ontology
radically different from our own – an ontology which is in many fundamental respects
similar, but also not identical, to those already explored.
At the northern end of the North Pacific Coast area, the Tlingit are a matrilineal
society composed of a number of organizational levels or groupings which serve to
determine in different ways the status, roles, privileges, and identities of persons within
them.108 For example, all Tlingit belong to one of two moieties: the Raven and the
Eagle/Wolf, under which are grouped some seventy clans. Moieties are exogamous and
matrilineal; their division from one another is important not only in determining marriage
structures but also in structuring the kinds of roles and obligations that groups of relatives
perform in the context of ceremonial gatherings and “potlatch” feasts or ku.eex’.109 The
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clan, also exogamous and matrilineal, is another extremely important grouping (Thomas
Thornton suggests that it is the “oldest and most basic unit of Tlingit social structure”).110
Together with sub-clan “houses” or hít, clans form the primary units through and within
which ownership relations, relations and activities of “resource” procurement, and
aristocratic orders of rank and prestige, are determined and distributed.
The Tlingit word for “owned things” is at.óow. But what is owned here includes
names, crests and regalia, sacred stories, songs, and dances; as well as rights of access to
ancestral territories and to specific “resources” within these, and other forms of both
tangible and intangible property. But although at.óow is passed down and in a crucial
sense belongs to the house or clan, it is also individuating. For the totality of at.óow that
accrues to an individual will make him who he is by emplacing him in a particular
position within a rich matrix of relations; and no one living person’s at.óow, tied to and
including individual names, will be quite identical to anyone else’s.111 Being so
emplaced, he not only acquires a specific rank and status amongst living relatives, but
also rekindles and lives-out ancestral relationships with the land. With at.óow, one
inherits and gains the means to partake in shagóon, which Federica de Laguna has
glossed as “the destiny of a people (or individual), established in the past by the ancestors
and extending to the descendents. It is one way of expressing ‘the way things are’.”112 In
ways that I hope to make clearer, at.óow enfolds the individual within a rich sense of
being from which one comes to understand and realize what it is to live well, and which
moreover establishes profound, localized, and caring relationships with the land and the
other-than-human beings who dwell there. Let us try to see something of how this is the
case with reference to two (not unrelated) forms of at.óow: that is, names and crests.
Tlingit individuals traditionally have several names, including names given at
birth, as well as “nicknames” accrued during their life. In familial contexts, kinship terms
were typically used. But in addition to this, aristocratic individuals also possessed (often
purpose. See Kan’s article on this point; c.f. also Umeek, E. Richard Atleo, Tsawalk: A Nuu-chah-nulth
Worldview, at 3, who traces the word “potlatch” to an Anglicization of the Nuu-chah-nulth verb pachitle
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several) “potlatch” names. These were hereditary within the house or clan; and upon the
death of an individual, they were conferred on an heir or heirs and publicly validated as
part of the process of the memorial potlatch.113 It is significant here, Thomas Thornton
suggests, that the Tlingit word for “name” (saa or ya saa) corresponds with the word for
“breath”; for in passing on names and titles to living successors, these names were
“recycled” and “reanimated through ritual.”114 But at the same time, there would seem to
be a sense in which the names themselves carried with them a kind of “animating” force,
in a manner perhaps not dissimilar to the status and operation of breath or samai in
Amazonian thought – i.e., as a means of conferring power or capacity. Thornton quotes
Frederica de Laguna on this point:
It is through his name, and the meaning of his name, that a Tlingit knows
himself. His name or names identifies the spirit or spirits, formerly
animating a long line of forebears, that have come to live again in him,
shaping his body or lending character to his personality115.
But if names confer spirit, the spirits in question derive not only from the
ancestors but from also from specific places. Names of individuals are sometimes taken
from the names for places; and the names of most clans are taken from names belonging
to the landscape those clans inhabit.116 As commentators are wont to point out, it is
significant that in this relationship, Tlingit almost never name places after people (as in
the modern European-American tradition); rather it is the other way around.117 This
would seem to express something essential: not only of the non-anthropocentric character
of Tlingit culture, but even further of the way cultures of the North Pacific Coast tend to
understand themselves as profoundly rooted-in, nourished by, and constituted within the
landscape, to have become who and what they are by virtue of longstanding
interrelations, becomings, and exchanges with specific places.
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Moreover, even within the character and composition of place-names themselves,
it is possible to discern something of the complexity and sensitivity manifest within
Tlingit relationships to places. Place-names in Tlingit are frequently complex and
compactly convey within them an extensive set of associations and inherited knowledges
that together convey and pass on particular ways of seeing and being. They also tend not
to be arbitrary, but to reflect a heritage of attentive “listening” to the places in question.
For example, Tlingit place-names can descriptively reflect the character of a particular
place or the relationships between elements that come together in it; this is accomplished
succinctly by virtue of the Tlingit language’s especial adeptness at conveying, e.g.,
relational and directional ideas by compounding often multiple verb-stems and prefixes
together in the space of a single word.118 But place-names can also do a good deal more
than this. They can also convey information about particular or notable species that live
there and give account of their interactions with the land (e.g., Médzíh E’ol, “PlaceWhere-Caribou-Swim-Across-In-Groups”)119. Important events can also be recorded here
which refer to the histories of the ancestors, or to events told in “myth” or sacred stories
(Yéil Áx’sh Wulgeigi Yé, “Place-Where-Raven-Swung”).120
To invoke or remember such place-names is to invite up a whole series of
reflections and remembrances which in a sense actualize, strengthen, and carry forward
shagóon (and which unfold in a manner not dissimilar, it seems, to the Quichua practice
of iyarina described earlier). To remember a place in connection with the ancestors, for
example, not only calls forth and affirms a sense of how one came to be here and live on
this land and have title to it. It also calls forth a memory of relationships with the land
which one inherits and which were opened up with/by the ancestors. These relationships
might be recorded in stories which connect to and are mnemonically triggered by places
118
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and their names. These accordingly enfold the individual within a landscape rich with
meaning and a sense of living history which is not simply “past”, but continues to be
made present in ways which supply lessons on how to live. Keith Basso has described
how, for the Western Apache, the act of speaking place-names works to call forth
remembrances which “deepen and enlarge awareness of the present”; they “speak the past
into being . . . [and] summon it with words and give it dramatic form . . . forging
ancestral worlds in which others can participate and readily lose themselves.”121
Something similar would seem to occur amongst the Tlingit; stories continually supply
necessary tools by which to think. Stories hand down knowledge and wisdom accrued
from the experiences of ancestors and other beings, and are frequently recalled in the
course of analyzing and evaluating present and ongoing events.122
Names and place-names in this sense at once unveil and preserve a storied
richness integrally embedded in the landscape as dwelt-in by Tlingit peoples; to know a
place, to be part of it and to live-out one’s shagóon is to be enfolded within complex and
longstanding interrelationships with a whole host of other beings, human and other-thanhuman. But it is also in a sense to hear the wisdom of the ancestors murmuring within the
land itself, to understand places as reservoirs of teachings that can be set to work simply
by speaking their names. We might speculate that if we are to speak of power in the
landscape, one mode of this power being present lies in this capacity to impact
individuals, to trigger insight and thoughtfulness by means of self-questioning through
stories.123

121

Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places, 32.
See Julie Cruikshank, in collaboration with Angela Sydney, Kitty Smith, and Annie Ned, Life Lived
Like a Story: Life Stories of Three Yukon Native Elders (University of Nebraska Press, 1990), generally.
Also highly illustrative of mnemonic and moral roles of place-names which seem remarkably similar to
Tlingit usage is Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places.
123
A quote from Lola Machuse, one of Basso’s Apache interlocutors, describing how an instance of
“speaking with names” to others worked, seems apt here. Another woman, Louise, was in some distress
over recent troubles with her relatives; place-names in this sense worked to give comfort, supply
perspective, and give advice in an indirect way which allowed the conversation to be appropriately
respectful: “We gave that woman [Louise] pictures to work on in her mind. . . We gave her clear pictures
with place-names. So her mind went to those places, standing in front of them as our ancestors did long
ago. That way she could see what happened there long ago. She could hear stories in her mind, perhaps
hear our ancestors speaking. She could recall the knowledge of our ancestors. . . . Those place-names are
strong!” See Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places, at 83.
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If the above has permitted us to begin seeing something of the complexity of
relationships to the land embedded in at.óow, another instructive example can be seen in
hereditary crests. These are also richly “storied”, as Thornton describes:
Animals were taken as crests typically because of specific events that
occurred at particular places involving them and members of the social
group. In other cases geographic places, themselves animate, were
adopted as crests. When a place was appropriated as a crest, its image
served to link indelibly particular social groups to particular terrains.124
Notably, crests generally feature such animals or “geographic places” (an example being
Mount Saint Elias) presented in the form of a face. The face here assumes much the same
significance as we have seen within the context of Ojibwe and Amazonian thought: that
is, it signals the more transparent showing-up of personhood.125 In this sense, then, we
might suggest that to inherit such a crest is precisely to inherit a profound, specific, and
communicative relationship already opened by/with one’s ancestors but which also
requires continual and direct work to keep alive. In the context of ritual ceremonies, for
example, Thornton suggests that crests and other at.óow are understood to have the power
to “evoke and make present the spirits of those things they resemble and encapsulate.”126
One important point here is that although relationships are inherited in connection
with things like crests, what is involved is no mere static repetition of abstract, frozen
forms. Rather, the pedagogical mode would seem to be one in which successive
generations are invited to discover and “think with” traditionally inherited knowledges
and stories precisely in and through direct and interactive engagement with the land itself.
In this sense, the “traditional” must be understood to be something which is continually
living, and infused with all the dynamism it must be within the context of an attentive and
ongoing engagement with places and beings in their particularity. In this vein, a
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consonant note can also be heard further to the south, where the Wet’suwet’en understand
hereditary crests to be “infused with spirit power”.127 Such power is a necessary condition
for the Chiefs to perform the role of Chiefs; but though power comes through the crests,
what is required is also “individual contact with the spirit realm which comes from
dreams, [and] visionary experiences. . .”128
Further south still, Umeek (E. Richard Atleo) has suggested, from a Nuu-chahnulth perspective, that “all aspects of formal life” including “proprietary” and “resource”
rights, are “rooted in origin stories”; but that the insights and truths embedded in this
heritage are constantly being “validated” and explored by successive generations. This
occurs especially, he says, through the practice of oosumich – a term which might
vaguely be translated as “vision quest”, but which Umeek suggests is more aptly
translated as a “‘careful seeking’ in the context of a ‘fearsome environment.’”
Interestingly, and in a manner that resonates with what has been said about the experience
of encountering supai in Amazonian thought, Umeek translates chih-shitl, a word that
refers to experience with the “spiritual” or “supernatural”, as “fearful”. “Have you had a
fearful experience?” his aunt asks him as a child. Again, however, we must try to avoid
importing here all the Christian metaphysical assumptions that terms like “supernatural”
tend to invoke; but after all that has been said we will perhaps be in a position to more
carefully decipher what is meant here.129
Sewn into Chilkat and button blankets, Tlingit crests also literally clothe the
wearer in these kinds of relationships (and “clothing” here would seem to carry much the
same connotations as with the Quichua or the Ojibwe, i.e., as a privileged image to
describe the body and hence the constitution of self and perspective as such). This occurs
in a way that manifests and shows up a person’s identity and is legible to others as an
indicator of rank, but also functions as a declaration of legal title, i.e., of longstanding
“ownership” of particular places.130 (This broad legibility, however, remains limited, a
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kind of restricted disclosure: there is here, as among the Ojibwe, a certain ethic of secrecy
at work that conceals – in often quite formalized ways – the intimate details of the
relationships involved.131) As such, weighty adornments such as these blankets and other
regalia form at once a “material” and “symbolic” expression of a Tlingit ideal: to be
“heavy, stationary, and dry like a rock, as opposed to wispy, fleeting, and wet like a leaf .
. . the ideal person is conceptualized as situated and emplaced, like a feature of the land
itself, but also as ‘heavy’ in adornments and possessions, or at.óow.”132 And yet, it will
hopefully be clear by now that at.óow is precisely an integral part of what it is to be
emplaced in the fullest sense, that it of itself “is” but also “enacts” profound and
sophisticated integrations of self into place and vice versa.
Following on what has been said, let us turn more directly to the question of the
“control” and “ownership” of land and “resources”. Tlingit society (like, in general, other
Northwest Coast societies) has traditionally practiced forms of ownership that give
exclusive use-rights over specific resource-areas to particular families. For example, one
family might have rights to take fish from a particular stream, or gather berries from a
particular berry-patch. It has nevertheless been argued that, despite the fact that such
rights were “officially” exclusive (i.e., no others would have been able to legitimately
claim the same resource-area), actual use patterns were much softer – e.g., if permission
was sought from a stream’s owner, this would typically be granted. Moreover, Thornton
suggests that Northwest Coast ownership regimes in this connection provided a means by
which to ensure that the land was cared for by those who used it; for even when others
might seek permission to gather from one’s land, such interactions provided occasions for
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170
conferring knowledge about the respectful and sustainable use of areas from those who
knew them intimately.133
But it is crucial for us to see how radically different such proprietary relationships
were and are from “modern” ones. Notably, but not surprisingly, the relationships to the
land involved here have tended to be expressed in English in terms of stewardship, rather
than in the more monological terms associated with liberal property regimes. But then
even here, as Bradley Bryan has noted, our notions of “stewardship” would seem to
implicitly reproduce a sense of separation between human stewards and the land that is
clearly foreign to the Indigenous understandings under discussion here.134 It is worth
quoting Chief Delgam Uukw of the Gitksan on this point, for a sense of some of other
metaphors that might be invoked:
For us, the ownership of territory is a marriage of the Chief and the land.
Each Chief has an ancestor who encountered and acknowledged the life of
the land. From such encounters came power. The land, the plants, the
animals and the people all have spirit – they all must be shown respect. That
is the basis of our law. The Chief is responsible for ensuring that all the
people in his House respect the spirit in the land and in all living things.
When a Chief directs his House properly and the laws are followed, then
that original power can be recreated . . . By following the law, the power
flows from the land to the people through the Chief; by using the wealth of
the territory, the House feasts its Chief so he can properly fulfill the law.
This cycle has been repeated on my land for thousands of years.135
The differences between European and Indigenous understandings here, as we
will now expect, have their roots in differing ontologies. Rather than understanding
humans to be atomistic agents acting on passive nature, imbuing it with labour and
meaning and so on, Tlingit and other North Pacific Coast thinking understands human
agents to be profoundly and relationally embedded in place, which is itself an active
participant in events. Reverential invocations of “all my relations”136 by Indigenous
speakers in this sense can refer at once to plants, animals, and “geographical” features
like mountains or glaciers insofar as they are “out there” as agentive persons; but such
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relations are at precisely the same time part of who and what one is, how one is
constituted as a self, and of the “power” one has in navigating the challenges of life.
Indigenous emphases on the continued presence of the ancestors (i.e., as part of one’s
shared and relational body in effect continuing to live within ongoing relationships)
inculcate valuations and ethical stories oriented not around the autonomous freedom of
individuals to make new beginnings and do whatever they like with “their” land, but
around an understanding of present generations to be perpetuating longstanding
relationships which are to be handed on to those born in the future. (The Algonquian
notion that you should consider your actions relative to and in terms of their impact on
seven generations going in either direction, forms a noteworthy parallel here.)
Moreover, Indigenous ownership practices on the North Pacific Coast tend to be
predicated on the assumption that if one does not treat the land and other non-human
persons with appropriate and well-established forms of respect, these may cease to
provide for human beings.137 In the Wet’suwet’en House system, for example, the
authority of the Chief is bound up with the role of maintaining this delicate balance.
Disharmony or crises in such contexts are not understood to be accidental, but to arise as
a problem that it is the responsibility of the Chief to determine and resolve.138
A number of isolated comparative points – though these will perhaps be fairly
obvious – should perhaps be drawn out here. First, in contrast to the Lockean view of
“nature” as intrinsically valueless, lying in waste if not developed under the dominion of
human hands, Indigenous understandings here hold that the land itself is already
generous. The central problem human beings face accordingly is to take care not to
diminish this generosity; hence the scope of human action is already in a sense much less
brashly Promethean than careful and cautious about the impacts of human doings relative
to the land.
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Secondly, this kind of caution would seem reinforced by the very way problems
and disharmonies tend to be understood. Rupert Ross has described how, amongst the
Cree, wrongs tend to be understood, investigated, and redressed relationally. That is, the
question tends to be framed in terms of the relationships between things which helped to
produce the disharmony manifest in some particular act or set of circumstances. Because
relationships radiate out and connect disparate beings in any number of complex ways,
the list of relevant items can extend much further than what an atomistic ontology might
bring one to recognize. For an intricate balance of supportive interrelationships maintains
the world and makes life possible; it is this balance which constitutes the law itself and
finds expression in an ethic of respect for all things.139 Similarly, the Nuu-chah-nulth
saying, heshook-ish tsawalk, likewise expresses an understanding that “everything is
one”, i.e., one network of relationships. No being is “useless” or expendable within such
an understanding; everything has its role within the dynamic balance that maintains the
world and makes living possible. And it is pertinent to us as we consider what assessing
and rectifying problems might mean here that the Nuu-chah-nulth sense of this oneness
extends beyond the pale of what we recognize as belonging to material objectivity.140
Rather, it encompasses and requires relationships that we might try to awkwardly gloss as
“spiritual” ones – but which we might alternately attempt to describe instead in terms of
profound, communicative and self-constitutive relationships with non-human persons.
Maintaining balance in this sense must be something much more “involved” – in the
sense that it also would seem to call for a listening and an engagement in a way which
draws much more comprehensively upon the entirety of one’s “selfhood”.
Thirdly, although we might expect to find stewardship practices here that suggest
comparison with Western “managerial” ones, it is plain that Indigenous stewardship
amounts to a very different set of relationships. Certainly we see something very different
from the technological framing of modern man relative to a calculable nature. If one is
disposed to caution and understands everything as dynamically interconnected, then we
139
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might well be inclined to question the Baconian experimentalist dictum that the isolation
of causal variables through the controlled repetition of experience allows us to have a
grasp of things sufficient to know and control what changing the world will bring about.
The elevation of human beings to the position of managerial master of the world, and
indeed the whole modernist project of wiping away and replacing “traditional” practices,
is profoundly bound up with such a possibility for cognizance and a capacity for control.
But neither the moral imperative nor the ontological preconditions for such a positioning
seem present in the Indigenous traditions discussed here. And neither is it assumed that
problems in our relation to the land are likely to be fixed by self-sovereign individuals in
any piecemeal, isolated fashion – which is precisely the sort of solution we appear to
anticipate when we articulate faith that “science” or “technology” can “fix” whatever
discrete problems and impacts arise in light of modern doings.
Of course, one could well go on with such comparisons without gaining much as
to what subsistence and proprietary relationships substantively mean and meant for North
Pacific Coastal peoples. Indeed, even our best efforts here would seem capable only of
affording minor and formally abstracted glimpses into the matter, and reminding us all
the more firmly that we come to such things as outsiders. But then, perhaps enough has
been said by now about the nature of at.óow and shagóon in the Tlingit context, and the
constitution of the self within the context of these, that we can at least begin to imagine
something of the richness which is involved and made to live within Indigenous
ownership and use practices on the North Pacific Coast.
Not being anthropocentrically solipsistic, these draw together all that has been
described in terms of what interagentive engagements with non-human persons amount to
and require.141 Further, ensuring and perpetuating successful and productive relationships
with the land is precisely one of the functions of shagóon, i.e., the destining heritage one
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is bequeathed by those who have dwelt on the land sustainably for innumerable
generations. Subsistence activities, indeed, would seem to be an integral and inseparable
part of a living actualization of shagóon. Many major traditional ceremonial events were
integrated into the flow of seasons and the different activities appropriate to these. From
early in life, furthermore, subsistence activities would have formed occasions for
instruction from elders, for learning the stories of the place and fusing them together with
one’s own experience through ongoing reflection, for getting to know the other beings in
the land through one’s own direct experiences.142 Living off the land repeated and
reinvigorated the relationships of the ancestors – and in a sense continued to make those
ancestors present; and in so living, a Tlingit self could in a sense be most properly what
he was. The consumption of foods of itself further constitutes and reaffirms the individual
in his or her belonging to locales, incorporating and being nourished by the land and
specific relations thereon. Subsisting on the land – gathering, fishing, responding to its
changing rhythms, taking care of it – in this sense performs and lives-out what it means
to be a respectful relative in an extended community of human and non-human persons.
And in this connection, it can hardly be surprising that subsistence practices are
understood by Tlingit and other Northwest Coast peoples not in terms of meeting the bare
minimum in a hierarchy of needs, but rather as “real being” itself, as an ongoing
actualization of a full and rich existence.143

3.4

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have made a brief and partial survey of understandings operative

within three separate Indigenous cultural traditions: most especially those of Ojibwe,
Quichua, and Tlingit peoples. It will be noted that I have explored different, though
related, questions through each of my ethnographic examples. Through
Ojibwe/Algonquian examples, I tried to introduce a different way thinking about
animacy, personhood, and power that could be shown to rest on relational premises.
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Through my focus on Quichua thought, I tried to broach more directly the question of
what it might mean to live in a relational world of nonhuman persons – what knowingbecoming, maturity, skill, thoughtfulness, and so on might mean under such
circumstances. Through Tlingit examples, I focused more on questions of ownership,
land stewardship, and law.
There is a sense in which each example has sought to build successively and
suggestively upon the last: each should prepare us to come more thoughtfully to the next
by inviting us to rethink fundamental questions on relational terms. From a more basic
and fundamental discussion delineating alternate meanings of animacy and personhood,
we are then more ready to move to a discussion of inter-personal relations with the
nonhuman, experiences of relational selfhood, and so on, in greater detail and specificity.
Having done this, we are in a better position to think about questions of what something
like socially recognized and codified forms of ownership, responsibilities of stewardship,
and so on, might look like under relational terms.
In this, I certainly do not mean to suggest that Algonquian notions of animacy, for
example, may be simply transplanted to Quichua or Tlingit contexts with the expectation
that nothing will be different. To be sure there are differences: as one would fully expect
given the differences in language, in stories, in landscapes and the kind of styles with
which these might be inhabited, in subsistence patterns, and in everything else that comes
to compose the specificities of discrete cultural traditions. For its part, the tropical jungle
will invite very different kinds of conversations than, say, will northern prairie or
muskeg. But we can move from Algonquian to Amazonian and then North Pacific
Coastal contexts having at least come to trouble our usual assumptions about what
animacy can mean, having hopefully broadened our own thinking on the point, and
having begun to puzzle out at least one set of (to us) unaccustomed and more relational
possibilities. We cannot take identity for granted, but we are further ahead to a better
understanding than when we started, and we have hopefully learned at least how to ask
better questions.
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It will perhaps nevertheless be asked why I have not elected to focus on only one
cultural tradition, and flesh it out more comprehensively by following it through all the
thematic questions raised within this chapter. Why not, in short, describe one tradition
more fully than three only partially? To a certain degree of course my selection of
examples here has been the product of circumstance rather than design: inasmuch as they
are necessarily particular examples that I have come across in one way or another and
tried to engage in the course of my work. I have had to rely on the ethnographic work of
others who have been thinking and writing about such things much longer and with
greater expertise than I have; and at some level I have crafted my discussion here in order
to be able to draw on the work of others where they seem to speak most strongly and
directly to my overall purposes on particular points. That Algonquian languages, for
example, contain animate and inanimate genders, and that important work has already
been done on the meaning of animacy in this context, readily suggests Algonquian
traditions as a point of reference in breaking in to these particular concepts.
Beyond this, however, I consider a broader base of comparison more desirable
given my theoretical purposes here. My aim, once again, has not been to produce an
ethnography focused on any one particular localized example – but to get some sense of
what relational thinking might possibly mean and look like. In this regard, a broader
engagement that suggests workable themes of “family resemblance” across a range of
individual variations (and giving some sign as to what some of these variations might be)
is I think more appropriate, not least because it frees us from overidentifying “relational
thinking” or relational ontology with any one example to the exclusion of others. We
hopefully gain a sense for possible points of generalizability without tying ourselves too
inflexibly to some kind of pan-Indigenous ideal type, or an abstract discussion of some
thing called “animism” or whatever else.
It is also I think a better way to be suggestive of and relevant to the broader
political context to which this dissertation attempts to speak and within which it is
situated and oriented. In other words, the point to which we are moving is not simply one
where we come to think a little harder in the abstract about relational ontology and what
this might mean in contrast to an atomistic one, but moreover to understand that this
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disjuncture is one that is being played out broadly and in an ongoing way through the
political processes of contemporary colonialism itself. That is, that magic line we are
continually invited to draw in the constitution of our settler-state polities, property
regimes and economies and so on, is precisely a line that also inscribes an atomistic
ontology in the place of a specific range of relational ones. In this sense, giving space as
much as possible to variations and differences between Indigenous American cultural
traditions in the course of my discussion is also intended to invite reflection with greater
nuance on the political conjunctures informing life today in the Americas. The aim is to
have my attempt to “do theory” in light of political context have a somewhat broader,
more complex, and more suggestive sphere of relevance than a focus only on one people
would permit.
My attempt to balance my own more in-depth studies in the Amazon with
examples from the North, in this sense, also has a certain strategic element to it. Most
especially, I wanted to trouble as much as I could certain tendencies in what I take to be
the Canadian settler imaginary, which seems much more comfortable with appreciating
difference in the distant spaces of the global South than with confronting the idea that
Canadians are actively dispossessing similarly rich traditions here at home.
Between the traditions I have surveyed, we can see numerous point-for-point
contrasts with our dominant, Western philosophical heritage. These are oral rather than
textual traditions; they are primarily relational, rather than atomistic, in ontology and in
focus. As against the willful and sovereign self of modernity we find selves constituted
through a relational and yet ideally contained “becoming”; an anthropocentric tendency
for moral solipsism finds its counterpoint in worlds full of non-human persons. Time is
not such as to be the linear flow of history which leaves the past behind; rather, the past is
something which continues to live, continually present in one’s shared body and called
forth in one’s relations with a storied and living landscape. Our quantitatively-oriented
tradition encounters ones much more concerned with a knowing and perceptiveness of
qualities. One could go on.

178
But moreover, we have seen something of how such understandings can unveil
phenomena differently within the fabric of everyday life: in understandings of ownership
and stewardship; in the use of medicines; in the learning of “skills” or capacities; in the
experiences of being a relative, and navigating and understanding everyday emotions
within that context. In this process, we have hopefully come to see not only that relations
to “nature” here are different, but that the modern way of distinguishing nature and
culture is not present here – nor, indeed, is it necessary or “natural” as such. We have also
begun to explore and imagine what it might mean to think and live from out of different
terms altogether, how listening to and engaging the world in other-than-modern ways
might be possible, and what these might possibly look like.
Much of the value of this process, as I suggested at the outset of this chapter, lies
in the way it helps us undermind the blackmail logic of the either/or: either our dominant
sense of things, or its impossible negation. By learning to think alongside ethnographic
examples such as those I have presented, we come to see how alternate coherences are
possible . . . and coherent on immanent terms, thoughtful, giving space to a fullness and
richness of life along different terms. The referential vantage-point from which we are
able to ask ourselves the serious questions of life has perhaps begun to undergo a change.
Still, there is an unavoidable sense in which the preceding has been concerned to
think about others – other traditions of thought as inhabited by other peoples. Let us now
turn back and more explicitly ask questions of ourselves in light of the ground we have
travelled. Beyond the mere apprehension of difference, how are we to theorize some of
the ways Indigenous traditions might provoke us in our thinking, and bring us who are
moderns to critically interrogate ourselves?
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Chapter 4
4

On Dangers and Relations:
Thinking Between Traditions
It is hoped that the more directly ethnographic work of the last chapter will have

managed to offer a glimpse of the ways (certain) Indigenous traditions tend to understand
the world and the horizons of ethical existence within it. But if we can see how
Indigenous understandings contrast strikingly with those dominant in Western modernity,
it will perhaps be worth exploring with a little more focus some of the ways the former
might be brought to challenge us who are moderns – and who come to Indigenous
thought from the outside – to reflect on ourselves and the dangers we face in a new light.
To this end, it can be helpful to explore possible “bridges” – points of linkage, of rough
analogy or proximity between traditions – in relation to which its provocations and
divergences are able to stand out in sharper relief.
At some level, the work of engaging Indigenous traditions at all from an outside
standpoint seems unavoidably tied to such a search for bridges; and it is certainly the case
that this dissertation has already employed many of these in a heuristic capacity. In
particular, it has been my sense that some of the better and more helpful bridges from
within the Western canon hail from what we might call the Nietzschean tradition. In this
chapter, I will attempt to explore some of these bridges – as found in the thought of
Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger in particular – more directly and with more
focus, and to bring these into a more explicit conversation with Indigenous thought.
What is important here is not only that Indigenous thought (at least, as I have been
engaging it) arguably arrives from different directions at points similar to these Western
thinkers (and I will try to show, in greater detail, that to an extent it does). Rather, it is
important to first understand Nietzsche and Heidegger’s thought in the context of the
powerful critiques they offer of contemporary life and many of its defining aspirations.
This brings us back to the worries foregrounded at the opening of this dissertation: for

180
both Nietzsche and Heidegger diagnose modern life as plagued by a sickness – and invite
us to begin a cure. And the problem of our relationship to the world and to “nature” is
itself central to their thinking and to the worries they invite us to share.
What is especially valuable for us here is the way they beckon us to this problem:
precisely not as something susceptible to address in terms domestic to the dominant
modern construal of nature and what we “do” with it – e.g., resolve to know it more fully
in its “reality”, to manage it more responsibly, even to protect it ontically as
“wilderness”. The matter rather is made much harder for us. For both Nietzsche and
Heidegger, what is at issue is nothing less than the very fundaments of how we
understand and experience reality and our place in it (and by way of which nature
precisely becomes nature) – that is to say, the trajectory of our dominant metaphysics
and its consequences. These consequences could be said to afflict much that has
traditionally been assimilated into the domain of “culture” – in the sense of bearing upon
the manner and quality of our sense of selfhood and self-cultivation (which should not be
conflated with the sense of culture as distinct from nature, in its precise sense as an
ontological pillar of modernity1). What is in effect an impoverished ontology gives rise
to a poverty in lived relations; we encounter precisely the doubled and intrinsically
linked problem of the impoverishment of our (modern) relations to the world and worldly
entities on the one hand, and a corresponding impoverishment of the self on the other.
This critique is, as Nietzsche saw2, a potentially potent one to pursue in our age of
solipsistic subjectivism because it addresses itself directly to (and undermines) the pride
we moderns still cling to in one guise or another: that we alone represent the pinnacle of
culture and civilization, that our reworking of the world and of our relations in it
constitutes a universal history of life finally made better.
Now, the possible bridges I think we might explore between Indigenous and
Nietzschean thought arise precisely through the latter’s explorations of what a richer,
more thoughtful, less impoverished way of thinking-and-being-otherwise might be. Both
1

It is worth noting the etymology of “culture” in this regard – as Freya Mathews points out, the word
derives from “the Latin cultura, meaning a tending; cultura is in turn derived from colere, to till or
cherish.” (Reinhabiting Reality, 21.)
2
Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” 128-129.

181
Heidegger and Nietzsche, I will show, evince a turn in this capacity towards more
relational ways of thinking. Thus it is precisely that which sets them apart from their (and
our) own dominant tradition in this regard that makes these philosophers suitable as
interpretive bridges and as interlocutors with Indigenous thought. And although
Nietzsche and Heidegger begin from very different starting-points than those of the
Indigenous thinkers, for example, that I have come to know, they nevertheless seem able
to arrive at somewhat similar questions and inclinations in thought, though they do so by
means of different paths and arguments.
But then, there remain important differences between Nietzschean and Indigenous
thought, a number of which might be expressed in terms of the extent to which we can
recognize that they are permeated by relational thinking. In the case of Indigenous
thinking, relationality can be seen to be operative at the level of ontology and as prior to
any kind of “atomistic” or thingly fixity. This kind of relationality achieves expression
within the very terms of coherence of beings, in the scope and character of consequent
ethical relations, etc. – in a way that neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger aspire to or attain.
But this difference I think sets the stage for possibilities in reflexive and critical
rethinking of ourselves and the world in ways that would not otherwise occur to us – that
touch not only upon the question of how we understand our impoverishment or what is
“lost” in modern life, but also upon the ways we might imagine and explore richer
possibilities.
At issue in this chapter, then, is not simply the contrast between our dominant,
modern ways of construing and dominating “nature” on the one hand, and Indigenous
ways of thinking and relating to the land on the other. It is a question of also bringing the
work of defamiliarization to bear upon what we might call our contrapuntal or critical
lexicon, and the ways we conceive being-otherwise. In this way, I am attempting to pick
up many of what I consider to be valuable challenges from Nietzsche and Heidegger, but
moreover to do so with the insight that these thinkers wrote and offered critiques of the
modern tradition within and relative to what was, in important respects, a different time
and context from my own. Accordingly they were writing mindful of concerns and
contexts that, while connected, are also not precisely the same as my own; neither did
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they come to their questions through the spaces and conjunctures of settler colonialism in
the same way as I do (they were both eminently European thinkers). Nor were they able
to pursue their thinking in light of a serious engagement with Indigenous American
traditions of thought. (Their own attempts to open spaces for thinking also made use of a
defamiliarizing process – but here the conversation tended to be limited to engagements
with the ancient Greeks.) My concerns here, however, are framed by present-day worries,
and by a life lived within the complexes of Canadian settler colonialism; and the
openings I wish to explore are not the same as those experienced by Nietzsche or
Heidegger. Accordingly it can hardly be surprising that the latter did not come to
precisely the same conclusions I do – nor need we insist that they should have. But by the
same token, “doing theory” in a manner that is responsive to the present need not expect
all its relevant tools to come from Nietzsche or Heidegger taken alone and by themselves.
This chapter attempts to explore in this way some of the unique provocations of
thinking between traditions – and in this, attempting not only to step back from the terms
of our own metaphysics but rather to think in light of tensions, divergences, and alternate
pathways experienced between ontologies and the ways these unveil the world to us. And
if the problem of “nature” stands to be posed in terms of the consequences of our
metaphysics, we are afforded here an opportunity to ask whether and how, in the relief
cast by (my) cross-cultural thinking, even Nietzsche and Heidegger remain implicated in
(or less effectively able to problematize) manoeuvres and dicta that are precisely
characteristic of our modern (monological and ruinous) scene.
This chapter unfolds in three parts. The first section establishes what I take to be
bases for comparison or affinity between Nietzsche and Heidegger on the one hand, and
Indigenous thought on the other – thus laying the ground for the discussion that follows.
The second section turns to Heidegger, who brings the Nietzschean question of
impoverishment to bear specifically and perhaps most pertinently upon a diagnosis of our
relationship to “nature”. I then try to show how something like the worries Heidegger
raises for us – but also the sense of emplaced richness he invites us to experience – might
be engaged, but also revaluated and explored differently in light of the thinking opened
by Indigenous philosophical traditions. The third section turns to Nietzsche, whose
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meditations upon the sickness of modern life traced its symptoms so eloquently through
the convolutions of the modern self. In his explorations of what a “healthier” or richer
self might be, Nietzsche uncovers a way and orientation of thinking/being that bears
many suggestive affinities with Indigenous thinking.3 I then reconsider Nietzsche’s vision
in light of the way Indigenous thought might lead us to reflect on these matters.

4.1 Entry Points: On Truth, “This-Worldliness”, and the Self
On this point Nietzschean, Heideggerian, and Indigenous thinking tend to be in
broad agreement: that the question of the self must be approached as something
fundamentally embedded in the world, that it makes little sense to speak about the one in
isolation from the other. In Indigenous thinking it seems to be a question of already
finding ourselves, of only ever coming to be as selves, as situationally located within a
complex web of relationships that are prior, that give rise to fixities and supply the
conditions for further possible transformations of these fixities. With Nietzsche, we find
something perhaps similar in the notion that all there ever “is” is a sea of forces in a
relation of play and tension with one another, a “will to power” that is always becoming,
which we also are ourselves and from which “we” emerge epiphenominally.4 Heidegger,
responding in his own (phenomenological) way, will pose anew the question of the self
as Dasein or being-there, who always already encounters himself as “thrown” into the
world. This thrown-ness supplies the basic condition of access to being and beings,
relative to which it does not make sense for us to speak of an outside. In being-there, we
also always already find ourselves situated and in-relation, dwelling in places and
amongst others, gathered amongst things.5

3

By progressing from Heidegger to Nietzsche, we will also be able to progressively uncover many of the
implicit presuppositions operative within the former. But we will arrive at Nietzsche in such a way that we
already read him in light of Heidegger, and the worries he raises about the echoes of subjectivism in
Nietzsche’s story of will and value – worries that I think are worth keeping in mind if we are trying to read
Nietzsche in light of the problem of nature.
4
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, at 550.
5
E.g., equipmental relations with things, relations of care and attunememt, relations with other Daseins,
within relations constituted by the manner in which language reveals a world. See Heidegger, Being and
Time, 88, 94-97, 102-105, 112-113, 126-7.
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In this, it seems to me that both Indigenous and Nietzschean traditions of thinking
express a certain affinity in inclination and sensibility with regard to this “this-ness” (call
it being, existence, etc.6) that stands well at odds with the sensibility that has come to
shape our dominant tradition. Following Nietzsche, we might broadly call what is at stake
here a matter of “this-worldliness”. Of central importance here is the way this problem
plays itself out in the domain of our understandings about reality and truth on the one
hand, and (relatedly) about the relation between thought and the body and sense on the
other.
It will be recalled from Chapter Two how the Cartesian turn and its logic of the
real, for all that it may have signified the “death of God” in the rise of modern Man,
nevertheless remains beholden to the metaphysical architecture of Christian thought
itself. Crucially, this architecture (in its dominant form) is ontologically equi-vocal, and
uni-versal in its mathematical logic. That is, it presupposes on the one hand an
ontological separation between worldly, finite, materialized Creation and a transcendent,
infinite, spiritual Creator. On the other, and despite the gap between our finite
understanding and God’s, the logos that governs and constitutes the world remains
singular: there is one uni-verse, one “Book of the World”, that it belongs to us to aspire to
read. This confluence sets the terms for subsequent epistemological and ethical
problematics.
We can see some of the stakes here by asking: what is error and illusion for
Descartes, who sets us on the path of our epistemological subjectivism? It is something
that follows as a possibility from the way I, as an imperfect and finite being, am able to
partake in nothingness due the ontological distance that separates me from God (and
hence, is an iteration of my capacity to sin).7 In this metaphysical tradition, as we already
saw in Chapter Two, God is Spirit; and He is also perfect, infinite intellect with perfect
knowledge, whose power is expressed in infinite will that rationally creates and sustains
6

In much of what follows, I have conceded to use the word “existence” for ease of reading; though I would
not wish to retain its traditional sense (present in the medieval distinction between essentia and existentia)
of standing outside the thought of God. “Being” might do just as well or better, if we accept the possibility
of rethinking it through Heidegger’s more Nietzschean and evental inflection of the word, though the
overuse of the term often presents a barrier for readers that I have chosen to try to avoid here.
7
Descartes, “Discourse on Method,” 21; “Meditations on First Philosophy,” 79, 82.
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the universe. This configuration sets the stage for a particular relationship to sense: for
the mixture in us of body and mind (itself nothing other than an analogue of soul or
spirit) is also another way of describing our ontological imperfection vis à vis God.
Because it belongs to mind, “and not this composite”8, to discover the truth and to know,
it is necessary to disentangle our judgments about reality from the input of the senses.
This trouble arises within the context of an atomistic ontology, moreover, that sets up the
problem of knowledge in terms of the correspondence between the ideas/representations
of the subject (“in here”) and the universally valid reality of subsisting objects (“out
there”).
The significance of illusion in this arrangement is that it is what we experience
when we have allowed ourselves to be duped concerning what is “out there”: whether by
fanciful figments of our own (atomistically enclosed) faculties of imagination, or by our
senses – by relying on their input to tell us about reality itself, rather than mere
subjectively-experienced appearance. The way out of this problem is through what is
highest in us (since the orienting idea of God itself assures us that He has left us a
lifeline, a means to avoid deception): the rational mind. The whole problematic of
epistemological doubt and the possibility of correctness gains its meaning and value here
in a repetition of the Christian metaphysical aim to actualize our highest potential by
retracing and thinking the thoughts of God after Him, elevating ourselves towards a
“God’s eye” viewpoint through rational knowledge of His Creation. We can dispel
illusion by reflexively putting the body in its place and in effect recognizing the way it
inclines us towards nothingness and imperfection (an aim that, in turn, translates into the
privileging of primary qualities for articulating knowledge about reality).
What is interesting here is the way that both the Nietzschean tradition, as well as
the Indigenous traditions I have been referring to, seem to effect similar manoeuvres in
their visions of truth. Nietzsche will work to show how a particular moral feeling and
evaluation of existence (i.e., a No and a rejection) underlies equivocal ontology from
Plato to modernity. And accordingly, in his own movements towards a different
(affirmative) valuation, a Yes-saying to the world and to becoming, he will attempt
8
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precisely to think otherwise than with such oppositions. But how do we think truth
outside of the opposition of appearance/reality on the one hand, and outside of a
Christian, equivocal framework with its connected mind/body hierarchy?
In Nietzsche’s thought, the whole problematic of appearance/reality stands to be
supplanted on the one hand by an insistence on perspectival interpretation as the
unavoidable condition of life and of any experience of truth. (And indeed, the thrust of
his moral critique has precisely the effect of showing just how much interpretation and
valuation underlies what have become commonly accepted truths about the world.) We
might see in this a certain turn towards a more relational style of thinking: we have
suddenly little interest in things-in-themselves, or facts-in-themselves, anchored in
transcendent positioning of a singular, Godlike viewpoint – but rather everything of
concern occurs at the level of the relationships in which we find ourselves
perspectivally.9 There is no escape from interpretation or “apparentness” (which,
accordingly, can no longer have the sense of “appearance” properly speaking) – but there
is the possibility of having a bad conscience about it (a point Heidegger would later
reiterate in terms of the insight that the hermeneutic circle is not a vicious circle10).
On the other hand, there can be no question of feeling, sense, or the emotions
being “less real”; indeed the whole question of what thought is stands to be interpreted
anew. Nietzsche will say: thinking is nothing other than a relationship of phenomenal
“drives” to one another, a plurality of sensations or feelings which is always inseparable
from our embeddedness within the world. “Body am I entirely, and nothing else;” says
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra; “and soul is only a word for something about the body.”11 All
the folds of thought and the heights of the spirit, for Nietzsche, are indistinguishable from
a play of senses and sensuality, from the body and the relations that this body finds itself
in and enters into.12 But if the body is co-extensive with the self, the question would have
to be raised anew as to what the body is; and Nietzsche, in thinking the self qua body,
apprehends properly speaking not a singular “thing” (a logical “A”) but always a teeming
9

Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 301-306.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 65-66; Heidegger, Being and Time, 143.
11
Nietzsche, “Thus Spake Zarathustra: First Part,” 146.
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multiplicity in flux.13 (It is worth keeping in mind here what Deleuze saw in Nietzsche:
that he uncovers a domain of transversal and relational becomings, “a free and unbound
energy”, which Deleuze will come to theorize precisely in terms of a “body without
organs”.14)
It is worth noting here how Heidegger will go some way towards thinking an
alternate and non-subjectivistic conception of truth that responds to Nietzsche. In his
reclaiming of truth as aletheia, or the coming-to-disclosure of beings within the clearing
of being, Heidegger offers a “fundamental” sense of being-true that is nothing other than
the happening that we as Dasein or being-in-the-world essentially are.15 Within the terms
of aletheia, the kind of panic-reaction for the real that we see in Descartes ceases to make
sense; the question of truth is reframed in a manner that becomes inclusive of the prior
and relational positivity that being-in-the-world already is as such.16 But this means that
everything, such as it is encountered and engaged within the “clearing” of our beingthere, already is, crucially, in truth as such – a condition from which all other questions
13

Ibid, 271, 281.
Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. by Mark Lester (New York: Columbia, 1990), 107; Deleuze
and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, e.g., 40: “the Earth . . . is a body without organs. This body without
organs is permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or
nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles. . .” Of course, it should also be remembered here that
Deleuze will also differentiate his own thought from Nietzsche’s through his insistence upon the thought of
the surface: that what is interesting is not a Dionysus of the depths opening onto an undifferentiated abyss
into which the self dissolves (as we find in The Birth of Tragedy), but rather the nomadic play of becomings
across the surface of the world.
15
Logically speaking, Heidegger displaces the whole problem of the ground within the Cartesian logic
through the ontological difference. In the Western tradition, he suggests, we have tended to think the being
of beings as though it were a kind of being underlying and grounding phenomena – e.g., as substance, the
absolute positedness of things such that I might know them (Kant), etc. Heidegger works to instead show
that the being of beings is not itself a being, but is rather precisely the happening of that clearing (in) which
we find ourselves, on the basis of which we encounter things as already understood and interpreted. One
might accordingly suggest that, contra that old metaphysics that separates Being from the flow of time and
becoming, here being precisely “is” time. See Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982), 315.
16
We gain access to the character of this positivity of understanding through the everyday use of
equipment: for a tool, when it is working, is not an object standing before us awaiting analysis so much as
something that is already “understood” when it is simply being used, encountered as “to hand”. That is, it is
encountered as “to hand” relative to other things and the “in order to” towards which it is used, understood
within a broader lived context of being-attuned towards others, projecting possibilities, etc. “Worldhood”
for Heidegger signifies the relational totality of meaning within which we always-already are, and in which
we are already moving when we use and understand things in this way (i.e., even without theoretically
“thinking” about it we “know” what equipment is for because we already encounter it as understood in
some way.) Heidegger, Being and Time, 65-67, 77. C.f. also Heidegger’s remarks in Poetry, Language,
Thought, 123: “affirmation, however, does not mean to turn a No into a Yes; it means to acknowledge the
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about knowledge must be understood to be derivative. This coming-to-disclosure exists
necessarily in relation with Dasein, and indeed it would make no sense for us to imagine
a being-true outside of this relation – in other words, there are no adequate grounds for a
prior equivocal comparison that undermines the truth of our being-there from the outset.
The worldhood of the world is that it is that world.
It is worth briefly emphasizing the way this movement evinces a turn to a
relational habit of thinking, in contrast to the familiar Cartesian and Kantian habits of
understanding things as self-subsisting substances – which stand over-against the subject
in the form of objects of knowledge. Heidegger writes, in a way that by now will be
somewhat reminiscent of Indigenous thinking:
The thing does not relate to a cognitive faculty interior to the subject;
instead, the cognitive faculty itself and with it this subject are structured
intentionally in their ontological constitution. The cognitive faculty is not
the terminal member of the relation between an external thing and the
internal subject; rather, its essence is the relating itself, and indeed in such a
way that the intentional Dasein which thus relates itself as an existent is
always already dwelling among things. For the Dasein there is no outside,
for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an inside.17
One consequence of this is that there is also no sense in Heidegger that “illusion”
or hallucination can or should be reduced to a “nothingness” of the non-real: it is not a
question of an erroneous representation but of a genuine happening within the intentional
relationship, the equiprimordial togetherness, of our being-in-the-world. That happening
is misconceived, and not allowed to be itself, if we begin from the prior isolation of the
Cartesian subject and the question of its in/correct representations of what is “out there”.
Heidegger offers the intriguing example of coming across a tree and taking it to be a man;
what is important and interesting here is to not nullify the sense of the event, which is
precisely that “the man himself is given to me”.18 But we can note how this produces a
change in style of thinking and in orientation, and in the sense of what something like
piety in thinking means for Heidegger. For what is interesting is not restricting ourselves
to the special rules for saying delimited by the Cartesian epistemological logic, but the
17
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possibility of listening more daringly to the poetic folds of our dwelling, in a questioning
attunement that “lets beings be” in the abundance of their presencing.19 (And in this we
can recognize the echoes of the reorientation explored by Nietzsche: “How much truth
can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?”20)
Nietzsche’s turn towards the body might be said to have a rough correlate in
Heidegger’s thought in turning towards the constitutive relations we have with/in places
– i.e., the “there” in which we always find ourselves dwelling as being-there.21 It has been
the habit of the modern epistemological tradition to understand space as prior (i.e., a
universal mathematized frame of pure extension that has tended to be conceived as a kind
of empty container filled with rearrangeable physical bodies). To instead take place as
prior to mathematical “space” here is simply another expression of Heidegger’s strategy
of displacing the subjectivistic epistemological project through the problematic of beingin-the-world.
What sense does “place” have here, and in what way does it denote constitutive
relations? Edward S. Casey, thinking this problem after and also through Heidegger, puts
the matter aptly: on the one hand, it is a matter of seeing how places and bodies (and we
are in places precisely by way of our embodiment) belong to and “interanimate each
other”, as we inhabit and navigate places in an ongoing and open-ended way. This cobelonging and co-constitution of dwelling in place can be expressed as a gathering; as a
being-within a “configurative complex” that is also evental. It is a bringing-and-holdingtogether of a relational arena in which we understand, project, and live out possibilities,
in which we think and remember, in which we experience sense and mood. Dwelled-in
places, accordingly, are rich with meaning because they hold-together, with us in our
being-there, much that we atomistic moderns might want to gloss (and thereby
misconstrue) as “ours” and merely “subjective” – e.g., the voices and intensities of
memory and thought and emotion, interpenetrated as these are with innerworldly sense,
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and so on.22 (And we can see here, by turn, how the Nietzschean/Deleuzian question of
transversal becoming might be posed at this point in a way that allows “place” to gain a
character somewhat closer to the sense of Indigenous thinking, and attains to vistas
Heidegger himself seemed not quite to experience.)
We can recognize much that is perhaps similar here in the inclinations of
Indigenous thinking. We have seen examples of how Indigenous relational ontologies
give rise to an experience of truth that is not oriented towards a universalistic, God’s-eye
view of things, but rather remains always rooted within a condition of perspectival
relationality that begins from a position of situatedness within the world. (It should be
remembered however that the sense of “perspective” here is quite different from that
found in Nietzsche – arising as it does from a distinct ontology and thought-tradition.23)
Basil Johnston puts the matter quite explicitly relative to Ojibwe contexts:
“When an ‘Anishinaubae’ says that someone is telling the truth, he says ‘w'daebawae.’ But the expression is not just a mere confirmation of a speaker's veracity. It
is at the same time a philosophical proposition that, in saying, a speaker casts his
words and his voice only as far as his vocabulary and his perception will enable
him. In so doing the tribe was denying that there was absolute truth; that the best a
speaker could achieve and a listener expect was the highest [possible] degree of
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accuracy. Somehow that one expression ‘w'daeb-awae’ set the limits of a single
statement as well as setting limits on all speech.”24
Moreover, it is possible to see in Indigenous thought a broadly similar inclination
towards questions of truth vis à vis the question of illusion, which would seem to arise on
the basis of ontologies that also does not recapitulate the hierarchical equivocity of
Christian metaphysics. Elsje Lagrou offers a helpful gloss here of what she understands
to be the Cashinahua manner of understanding and approaching the world and
phenomena, which I suspect could be generalized more broadly within Indigenous
contexts:
Another consequence of perspectivism in art and perception generally is that
the traditional [Western] opposition between appearance and essence, or
between reality and illusion, no longer makes sense. Each perception has
some degree of existence specific to itself. . . the distinction between
different kinds of percepts is made within the frame of different states of
being. I use “states of being” to substitute the more commonly used “states
of consciousness” because in this way we avoid the pitfall of inadvertently
opposing mind and body.25
Not an equivocally-derived logic of inclusion/exclusion that sets terms for an
intellectualized correspondence with reality, but the assumption that all “experience” only
ever occupies different levels of being. All perceptual experience belongs in a valid sense
to this “this-ness”, and its coherences must be approached on that basis – and within a
world approached from the beginning on embedded, relational terms, relative to which
there is no Archimedian point. To continue our comparison, Indigenous views about
dream and vision would seem illustrative here. It is not a question of “hallucinating”
something “not really there” – a nothing/absence mistaken for a something/presence – or
of not being able to distinguish the conditions of dream/vision and waking/sober life. It is
rather a matter of acknowledging that under certain conditions the world is opened and
the self experienced in a different way – in and through different states of being – that
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also facilitates certain kinds of relationships, and always within a this-worldly context.26
(Though the sense of what counts as “this-worldly” accordingly becomes something
different, and more expansive.) Not a dissolution of all coherence, but a frame of
coherence able to ask what might be remarkable and valuable about such experiences as a
kind of truthful happening, and what might be learned from them. It is able to explore,
with good conscience, how certain kinds of investigations (and certain kinds of beings),
certain possibilities for listening and empathetic communication/transformation – the play
and sounding-forth of qualitative zones of sensation, etc. – are heightened, enabled, made
visible, and intensified, under such conditions.
In addition, I have already discussed at some length (in the last chapter) how
knowing in the sense of (e.g.,) the Quichua becoming-yacharishka, is bound up with a
notion of the body as delimiting perspective – but a body that is also susceptible to
transformation through relational connections. Certain affinities can perhaps readily be
found here between Indigenous thought and Nietzsche’s turn to the body, his experience
of thought as fundamentally embodied, and so on. But it is also the case that the
Heideggerian/phenomenological turn to place would seem helpful in opening up a way of
thinking and attunement that brings us closer to a point of conversation with Indigenous
relationships to the land, understandings of the landscape as storied, as an active
participant in daily life, and so on.27 For place connotes specificity of there-ness, an
immersion within a specific set of (bodily) relationships, in a way that resonates well with
the sense of situatedness characteristic of Indigenous thinking – a point I will return to
shortly.
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For the moment, let this suffice as a preliminary elaboration of what I take to be
some of the basic points of connection and affinity relevant to this discussion. What I
have termed here a “this-worldly” orientation of course gives rise in Nietzsche and
Heidegger to an apprehension and analysis of an impoverishment that constitutively
haunts modern life. Let us now turn more directly this aspect of their thought, and to
some of the ways we might begin to reflect upon this provocation in the vicinity of
Indigenous understandings. In this, let us turn first to Heidegger’s reading of modernity
and its metaphysics under the sign of “technology”.

4.2 Relationality, Listening, and the Poverty of the Fungible
What is impoverishing, for Heidegger, about existence experienced through the
terms of “technology” – that modern constellation of seeing by which nature comes to
stand as so many calculable resources before the human will?28 At issue, on the one hand,
is the way our manner of thinking the real “annihilates” things. This occurs because the
way we pose the problem of reality covers over the immersive conditions of our beingthere, the relational dimension of our dwelling in places.
Precisely in the way we thus “forget the question of being”, we secure for
ourselves the possibility for certainty concerning the (atomistic) identity of objects – in a
way that the whole problematic of calculability presupposes.29 The play of identity here
has the effect of construing beings as fungible within the context of an overarching and
universal mathematical framework – and thus, as exchangeable, identical, repeatable,
replaceable. In this, identity has the effect of flattening rank and difference, of
standardizing. At the same time, the disenchanting play of our metaphysical architecture
ensures that the richness we experience as belonging to our dwelling is bracketed away
into superfluous “cultural” or subjectivized side-structures, in effect covering over and
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degrading the relational grounds through which experiences of meaning and worth can
emerge.30
As beings recede into fungibility and value is subjectivized, the status of (likewise
atomistic) human beings as willful positions us as the ascendant masters of the earth.
And it is the interlocking logics of both sides of this constellation (i.e., as constituting the
nature both of subjects and objects), as well as the universalistic and exclusive character
of the framework as a whole, that comes to constitute the danger Heidegger sees. Not
only the play of fungibility, but the monological comportment of willing and ordering,
debars a more thoughtful engagement that lets resonate more fully the relational richness
of what dwelling in places and amongst beings is.31
Now, contra a horizon of innumerable, fungible objects within space, Heidegger
will speak of “things”, gathering themselves in places; the latter term denotes beings
insofar as we dwell amongst them – that is to say, it is a word for beings approached in a
renewed way from within the relational horizon of our being-there. And in opening up
the possibility of a more daring listening to “things” in their presencing, Heidegger will
speak of our dwelling as a poetizing – which describes nothing other than the open event
of truth qua aletheia, through which being comes to language.
Poetizing accordingly is a term for bringing-to-disclosure that connotes a greater
richness and more expansive sense of the positivity of our being-there – which
technological seeing never attains to. It would seem to comprise at once an understanding
and interpretation that is at once necessarily embodied and yet always connected to the
way we come to see something as something – in this sense a kind of immersive
hermeneutics that is always gathered in-relation-to the sayable.32 (It also seems, in the
space of Heidegger’s text, to be an experience of truth that opens the possibility of
remembering and re-enlivening alternate ways of thinking and encountering beings, as
30
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for example in the experience of Homeric religion. And running through Heidegger’s
engagement with the Greeks, in turn, is always a basic orientation to relationality: the
Greeks – including Aristotle – are remarkable in their being opened out onto the world,
even in their experience of reason, in a way that is closed off in the modern subject.33)
To open oneself more fully to this kind of abundance, moreover, requires that we learn a
different mode of comportment: it calls for a kind of unshieldedness to the event of being,
a mindful and questioning non-willing in contrast to the self-assertive willing of
technology.34
From the vantage point of late modernity, it strikes me that Heidegger’s thought
can be especially valuable as a way of opening space vis à vis our dominant way of
thinking, in which to explore something of the richness that a relational way of thinking
directs us to see and experience. His continual assertion that the character of our being –
our emplaced stay amongst things and the relationships that are possible there – suffers a
radical killing insofar as we reduce this to the terms of technology, and reduce all extant
beings to resources, remains I think a crucial point of objection and call to reflection
within our present conjuncture. And I take Heidegger’s implicit suggestion to be a
genuinely provocative one: that we might approach the question of modernity’s sickness,
and most particularly the devastations evident in our relationships to nature, by way of
the contrast opened by a more relational way of thinking.
But in this, we might perhaps do well to ask after some of the ways Indigenous
thought – in its profound relationality – might at once speak to some of the worries
Heidegger raises here while also pushing us in some sense “farther”, and bringing us to
reflect on these matters from a different vantage point. For if Heidegger seeks to step
away from the terms of the technological framework into a more poetic dwelling, he still
does not conceive of this matter explicitly in terms of a divergence between our
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dominant/equivocal/atomistic and relational, “this-worldly” ontologies. At some level,
this cannot be surprising given the way Heidegger conceived his own project in terms of
a “fundamental ontology” that was, as fundamental and primordial, precisely an attempt
to think the transcendental structures of human being-there while stepping-away from
metaphysics as such.
But in this, it seems to me that we can explore not only some of the limits of
Heidegger’s relational turn – and thus some of the ways in which he still seems to think
within the space opened by a largely traditional Western, atomistic ontology. At the
same time, we can perhaps begin a process of further rethinking concerning how we are
to understand something like an impoverishment haunting modern life, as well as what it
might mean to think and live otherwise.

4.2.1 Technology and Dwelling, Considered Between Divergent
Ontologies
How might we reflect differently on these matters in light of Indigenous thought?
Let us consider for example the issue of fungibility. At root here, we saw, is the logic of
identity: A is identical (i.e., the same and equal) not only to itself, but to any other
instance of A, since we are inclined to presume that what is true remains true always and
everywhere.35 To come to beings in this way, we have seen, involves an atomistic
ontology and bent of thinking. Heidegger counters this in his own way – not by
problematizing the question of how we conceive beings as such, so much as through the
question of being (thus by showing that insofar as something is, it is as gathered within a
world in relation to Dasein). Heidegger, I have suggested, opens onto a more relational
way of thinking by this route, which experiences that things as things are “modest in
number” and not fungible, directs us towards a renewed and poetic questioning of beings
in their presencing, and so on. He opens a possibility for seeing, in this direction, that
beings may show up altogether differently (worlded in a different way), and for
35
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countering certain of the universalistic logics by which our dominant tradition has tended
to be dismissive of such differences. And his implicit impulse would always seem to
incline him towards more relational possibilities in his reorientation towards the world (as
seen in his remembering the Greeks, and his recounting of things as always constituted
through a relationship and a coming-together of the fourfold of “earth and sky, divinities
and mortals”, etc.). Nevertheless, he does not seem to attain to the kind of positive
articulation of a relational ontology, such that beings themselves are able to assume a
whatness and coherence that is itself relational, in the same manner that seems
characteristic of Indigenous traditions.
This alternate kind of relational coherence is what seems to be at stake in the
Indigenous notion that things become what they are on the basis of a prior network of
relationships. We have seen already numerous examples of this playing out in different
contexts; but let us borrow one more from Rupert Ross: a shell holding smouldering
sweetgrass, passed around within a ceremonial context. Our own dominant philosophical
habit would be to focus upon that atomistic, self-subsisting thing, to determine its
properties, to investigate what it is in such a way that it might presumably tell us
something about similar things in other contexts. It is striking, however, that Ross’s
Indigenous interlocutor says something different: this shell, used now in this context and
assuming a name which reflects that context, will nevertheless be called something
different in another context. This “thing” we are apt to isolate as an atomistic A is in this
case notably not identical to itself; it has become something else. As Ross tells it, the
shell in question
could be a sacred vessel at one calling, a vessel bringing candy at another,
or a vessel receiving cigarette butts at another; it depended on its
relationship to the speaker and to the occasion. To call it, as European
languages did, by one name for all occasions was seen as a ‘poorer’ way to
speak of the world.36
Because such a “thing” as this shell is viewed relationally rather than
atomistically, it is relational context – subject to change in this case from one instance to
36
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another – that makes something what it is. This kind of relational ontology, we can see,
is connected to an ontological understanding of beings as capable of transformation. (And
we have explored this matter much more thoroughly already in connection with the
questions of relational personhood and perspective.) But then, in this it should be noted
that the question of what beings are is precisely not posed either in a substantive sense or
as relative to a universal perspective – it is understood contextually and relative to the
perspectival location of the speaker and with the understanding that this viewpoint can
itself be subject to transformation.
We see this again in the way that, as noted in the previous chapter, the term for
“human being” (in Quichua, runa) does not refer to a class of beings but to a position of
relative communicative transparency, shared feeling and understanding and empathy
relative to the speaker, that is held together by yakichina. But it is entirely possible for
one to cease maintaining relations with one’s community of relatives, to move away, to
become angry with them, to cease feeling yakichina for them. In such a case, one drifts
away from being a runa of the allyu (kinship network) to assume a viewpoint position of
non-transparency outside of it (i.e., one becomes an auca, which is to say a potential
enemy). Conversely, it is also possible for an outsider to become an insider, as for
example through marriage. Eljse Lagrou describes a very similar way of thinking
amongst the Cashinahua; she notes how the term nawa (equivalent here to the Quichua
auca) can mean “outsider” relative to oneself in a variety of senses – strangers and
enemies “like the white colonizers or mythical inkas (cannibal gods)”, but also simply
other neighbouring peoples, or even other moieties within one’s own community. The
meaning here is always strictly relational: nawa “will always mean someone other than
oneself” and hence occupies a contrastive position at an opposite pole from huni (the
Cashinahua term for “human beings”, similar to the Quichua runa). This also serves to
give another indication of the way relationality and the play of often reversible and
shifting positions comes to inform Amazonian “classificatory” thought generally.37
In certain respects, Heidegger may be seen to approach such a way of thinking.
Returning to the example of the shell, he might ask: how does the shell gather itself as
37
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what it is, within the hermeneutical and emplaced, relational context of our dwelling?
And he does seem to experience the way our thinking can undergo a change in trying to
apprehend as sympathetically as possible that it may have come to disclosure differently
(again, we can recall the impact of the Greeks here). And yet, it may be that throughout
this he is limited in his thinking by the noun-centered linguistic and philosophical habits
of European thought, as well as by the way his overall project is framed in terms of a
stepping-away from metaphysics rather than as thinking in the space between
metaphysical/ontological traditions.
For Heidegger can only ever name seemingly atomistic entities as examples of
things, whose underlying atomism itself is not explicitly put to question: jug and bench,
tree and pond, brook and hill.38 It will be noted, by contrast, that the broadly-shared trait
of Indigenous American languages (at least those engaged here) as being verb-centered
and heavily relational through their use of directional, positional, etc. suffixes, opens up
possibilities in naming and expressing that are markedly awkward in Western languages
– while also taking us quite beyond the almost exclusively Indo-European-based milieu
of Heidegger’s thinking.39
Heidegger’s project would also seem limited in this regard given the way the
temporal axis of historical being remains an underlying ontological structure that itself is
not problematized beyond its nonhierarchical division into epochal pulsations. His
thinking of history in this sense would seem (despite its leveling gesture) to continue the
habit, typical of late modern European philosophy, of conceiving the world in terms of
the unfolding of such an ultimately singular process – which is why the present is always
experienced inexorably and singularly as the present in such a way that one can only
await a future change or remember something different.
The difference is an important one that has implications for the way we think
about what is flattened over by a(n atomizing) logic of fungibility. Notable of course is
that this logic works precisely to cover over and remove things from the very context that
would make them what they are and sustain them – indeed as a condition of their
38
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mobilization as fungible objects. But pushing this matter further is the way that
Indigenous capacities to think in terms of relationships, in a non-entity-centric way, allow
for a sense of what is to be articulated in terms of these radiating and linking
relationships. Indigenous relational ontologies accordingly give rise to a sense of
something like ontic interdependence: everything that is, is profoundly connected to
everything else.
This kind of articulate interdependence gives rise to distinct normative
possibilities of caring for the land, relations of stewardship, concerns for something like
sustainability with regard to things, approached in terms of a law of respect for all and the
preservation of balance and harmonious relations.40 But in this sense, the violence of
technology’s “annihilations”, as the condition of mobilizing objects in the way it does,
also becomes something ontically “real” in a way that Heidegger’s own grappling with
the problem does not seem to be able to articulate. In the same way, it becomes possible
to experience possibilities contrary to the technological in the form of an articulate and
alternate disclosure of beings as what they are, in such a way as to enable precisely
something like disagreement or contest concerning the given and consequent normative
understandings.41
Such an alternate way of thinking the coherences of beings and happenings also, it
should be noted, undermines the problematic of the atomistically separate human will in
its own way. For a self that is understood as a relational focal-point of power, constituted
through relationships of becoming, contagion, and so on, the manner of our being-there
on the land and amongst others must also be understood and experienced as bound to
40
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these in profound relations of interdependency. The technological self-positioning of
ourselves as masters of the world accordingly makes little sense here, at the same time
that the problematic of “listening” acquires a different kind of meaning. I will return to
this point in a moment.
Following the question of relational ontology further, it strikes me that we hit on a
second major point to consider here: that is, the way personhood as such is thought
differently in these Indigenous traditions. Indeed, if we wish to ask how Indigenous
traditions might invite reflections relevant to the sense of technology’s impoverishments,
then one formulation from the Amazonian context strikes me as especially important
here. Namely: the lesson that if one blunders through the forest noisily and nonreceptively, incapable of listening and of being transformed there, if one cannot see
persons in one’s non-human environment, then there is a sense in which one is not
coming to things thoughtfully.42 For is this not at some level an apt description of what
we moderns tend to do – living our lives through such entrenched monological premises
that we remain assured in our workaday life that no dialogue is necessary or valuable
with the non-human, and indeed that it is absurd to even speak of dialogue here?
That the notion of personhood here is thought differently, and made inclusive of a
great range of beings (including “places”), constitutes one of the most crucial ways in
which, I think, Indigenous relational ontologies push us beyond the scope of
Heideggerian thought while nevertheless being able to speak to concerns this raises.
Heidegger, we saw, continually described “technology” as orbiting the story of the will
and drawing out the latter’s dangerous consequences. His engagement with this question
always bore the traces of Nietzsche who, before him, repeatedly undermined the
42
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ontological truth of the will by insisting there is finally no doer “behind” the doing, that
the supposition and unification of such a doer is bound up precisely with the
soteriological heritage of our Christianized metaphysics. But then, Indigenous thought
would seem to articulate precisely a kind of selfhood and agency that does not rest upon
this same set of suppositions, such a projection of a doer (structured by the atomistic
unity of the self, the free will as spontaneous organ of our authorship, whose activity
precedes action in the form of intention, and so on). Moreover, what is so astonishing to
see here is how our understanding of the whole world changes as a result, as does the
composition of human beings’ ethical horizons. Or rather, what is astonishing is that
nonhuman persons become thinkable as actors or actants vis à vis ethics (but also in the
constitution of thought and “world” as such).
In other words, if Indigenous senses of personhood are from the beginning
profoundly relational, and if it is this relationality that also allows for an understanding
e.g., of a stone as animate, as a person (as I have argued) – then part of what is so
provocative here is the way this comes to give rise to a profoundly different sense of our
ethical horizons. If it is a question of relating to “things” differently – this still, I think, is
one matter; if it is a question of relating to persons – well, this is altogether another, and
changes perceivably the way we are apt to approach and regard the problem.
To pursue the comparison with Heidegger, we may consider here the following
question: why is it only the human being who is Dasein, for Heidegger? Curiously, it
would seem in this that Heidegger in many respects repeats an altogether familiar
differentiation of beings as appears elsewhere in the Western tradition. The animal is
“poor in world” (and stones are “worldless”) as against the richness of the way man is
“world-forming”, because only we have language – i.e., only we are able to see
something as something.43
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But in this, we would seem to find ourselves (and quite curiously) moving again
and at bottom within a presumed atomistic ontology (i.e., we are the beings who “have”
language – such that our prior status and boundedness as beings would seem
unproblematically presumed). Or rather, is it perhaps that we encounter here the limit of
Heidegger’s own attempts to distance his thought from the way traditional metaphysics
has conceived man as the animale rationale (the being whose characteristic property is to
be capable of reason), without more directly exploring the possibility of thinking in the
vicinity of alternative ontologies as such? Could it be so self-evident to Heidegger that
“man” (what, finally, is this, as “a being”?) uniquely amongst beings “has” language,
were he not already moving from the beginning within the space of traditional Western
cultural and metaphysical construals of the given?
To begin to entertain possibilities of understanding ourselves and our ethical
position within the world differently, moreover, is I think one of the most radical and
important possibilities that a genuinely relational ontology would seem to present to us as
moderns. For what we experience as the problem of “nature” is profoundly bound up with
our sense of ourselves and of our unique ethical and agentive position within the world.
Beyond simply cultivating a distrust in our habitual sense of these matters, might not the
problem of thinking agency and ethics altogether differently not be a crucial task under
present circumstances?
It can be worth drawing out this question of language here. While in Indigenous
traditions it seems to be the case that, at least from a certain vantage point, only human
beings44 might be said to “speak” in a fully transparent (to us) sense, it is rather a matter
of there being different kinds of “speaking” – which includes, for example, the thunder
thundering. To describe thunder as speech, in other words, is not to indulge in metaphor,
likening it figuratively to something else (human speech) that it in truth is not.45 It is
rather that language as such is distributed across the differential registers of perspectival
being. In this sense the relational ontology of “perspectivism” and understanding of
beings as capable of transformation sets out an altogether different topography through
44
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which the existence of language stands to be thought. And this precisely does not reaffirm
our familiar self-conception as unique and privileged amongst beings46, but instead sets
the grounds for a whole alternate ethical complex, problematics of becoming and
containment, and so on.
Accordingly, if Heidegger invites us to a non-willing mode of listening or “letting
beings be” in contrast to the technological will, then it seems to me that Indigenous
notions of personhood set the stage for something that is also rather like such a meditative
listening, but one that stands in much greater contrast with monological willfulness by
virtue of its alternate articulation of our ontological and ethical horizons. For in a
relational world including non-human persons, a whole flood of additional questions and
possibilities arise that also go quite beyond the dichotomy of willing/non-willing and
venture into the realm of the properly dialogical (because interpersonal) with the nonhuman. For example: what is my relationship to X (a question that also thinks “me” in a
way that extends back to the ancestors and their relationships that I might be
inheriting/remembering)? How transparent is this relationship? How old is this person –
and (connectedly) how much wisdom do they have? How powerful are they? Can they
help me, and what might they teach me?47
The question of age amongst nonhuman persons is worth lingering over a bit
further here: across the traditions I am engaging here, there is a sense in which ancient
trees and mountains can be assumed to hold ancient wisdom, because their life cycles –
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the time in which to grow wise (each, we would expect, in their own way) and to have
relations – are longer than that of humans. More experience generates more wisdom. The
kind of ethical/interactive consequences we might draw here are ones that tend to elude
us given our usual thinking. As the logging industry makes clear, for example, forests are
to be understood as a “renewable” resource – which is to say that there is no appreciable
or essential difference between an old-growth forest and one planted to replace it. From
the industry’s point of view, all are rendered fungible and already pre-mobilized as
timber. We can see how the Indigenous perspective here would foster a very different
way of approaching, relating to, and appreciating/articulating not only what is striking
about mountains, old-growth forests, and so on – but also the kind of knowledge that
empathetic relations with these might give rise to. For Quichua and other Indigenous
traditions, it is moreover important and a source of richness that the land and the persons
in it knew your parents and other relatives, and that you remember and continually reenliven those inherited relationships; such an orientation must seem quite strange to
modern thinking.
The ethical problems of empathy, respect, and reciprocity – which seem to belong
most fully to the domain of relationships between persons – obtain a pre-eminence in
Indigenous relations to the non-human, the land, etc., in ways that are profoundly
circumscribed if not outright precluded in our habitual lifeways. Within the space of these
alternate ontologies, we also gain a more positive sense of how non-anthropocentric
relations with the non-human might be possible, and what it might mean not only to
profoundly (and non-subjectively) rethink the problem of “agency” but to understand
non-human others as also being agents. Interestingly, this also occurs in ways that
precisely cannot be dismissed as merely “anthropomorphizing” in the familiar (Western)
sense.
(It is also worth emphasizing here that Indigenous, relational ontologies’ nonanthropocentric character also implies the rethinking of the domain of the “anthropos”.
That is to say that places and people, human and nonhuman, become at some level utterly
inseparable. In dwelling in places we are also already dwelling with people. most
especially, with people who develop and deepen relations there. The joy we might
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encounter in our relations with the beauty of the nonhuman world is also experienced and
shared in our relations with people inasmuch as they are themselves dwell in place in a
thoughtful and sensitive way. For a Quichua person, a great part of the pathos of moving
through the land is being reminded of one’s human relatives there. Thus people are
embedded in the land as much as the land is embedded in people.)
The question of personhood raises the issue of something like the “freedom” of
these persons – although, once again, what is involved here is not understood in terms of
our familiar problematic of the free will.48 Bound up with this notion of freedom however
are a series of normative and ethical problematics that in their own way stand markedly
opposed to the framework and the aspirations of mastering the world by calculation,
subjecting nature to our monological ordering and planning, understanding beings as
fungible, and so on.49 It gives shape to specific ways and practices of “listening”, of
leaving space for others in a way that is also connected to the problem of language raised
earlier. For it is a broadly shared sensibility across the Indigenous peoples I have engaged
here that one should avoid impinging upon other persons and their freedom to act and
interact in the manner they do. This includes nonhuman persons, and moreover means
that it is necessary to let things speak for themselves and on their own terms as much as
possible.
In the injunction to not impinge upon the freedom of others, it seems to me that
we can also see something like a guarding or caring for “difference”. For a free person’s
actions are not calculable (i.e., governed by impersonal and necessary laws), and the
speaking of non-human beings is perhaps one way to think about much that recedes or is
occluded by the conditions of rendering-fungible, by relationships of willing, by our
48
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persistent (and connected) drive for (in principle, monological) disambiguation within
modern political and legal contexts, and so on. The problem of letting others speak would
seem to be a more dialogically-conceived way for exploring something like what
Heidegger approaches in terms of the poetic registers of embodied thought – but also for
inflecting this problem in a quite different way.
Some examples may be helpful here; and indeed one of the advantages of
reconsidering our own ontological commitments cross-culturally is that we are afforded
the opportunity of seeing how the consequences of alternative presumptions can play out
meaningfully and concretely in the context of (“our”, but also “their”) daily life, practice,
idiom, and so on. (And to experience that these kinds of lived differences is part of what
“ontological disagreement” and “relational thinking” means also, perhaps, encourages us
to take such philosophical matters in a sense that is made all the more “concrete”.)
I have already written at some length about practices of dreaming as modes of
listening. But it can be helpful to invoke more “prosaic” examples as well. One such
example of what this kind of listening and “leaving space” looks like, I think, is simply
the way Amazonian Quichua-speaking peoples are generally reluctant to abstract or take
things out of context – including the singing of songs or the telling of stories. (The sense
of lying, llullana, and exaggerating, lalana, in lowland Quichua is tied precisely to this
problem: to lie and exaggerate is what one does when one takes things carelessly out of
context.) And indeed, particular songs and stories will become especially “appropriate”
(or not) within such situations as coming across a particular plant in the forest, hearing a
certain bird, coming across a stream where peccaries used to be found, or some other
event. And so it is often easier to prompt and hear stories about forest-beings from an
elder when out in the forest than, for example, when sitting around at home: because in
this way non-human actors can participate. At some level, we might say that this has to
do with the way memory in oral Indigenous cultures is often “triggered” by specific and
direct encounters (seeing a particular tree, an animal, etc.). But I think we can understand
all this better in light of the question of personhood, and the nature of remembrance or
iyarina as a practice and form of engagement generally (of which the remembering of
origin stories is a component).
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As I have suggested, when encountering (for example) a tree, the practice of
remembering origin stories lets one remember and make-present in that tree the
withdrawn personhood that the story tells about, and lets one experience at the same time
what personhood means in terms of the tree. Such a making-present is not one-sided, but
is a relational and interactive happening; it is at once something one does and a kind of
invitation to dialogue that involves others, that precisely gives space for them to speak for
and show themselves, to be discovered as persons, for relations of empathy and contagion
to begin or continue developing. This may be more or less successful depending on how
things go. But to tell such a story in-context, i.e., in the presence of the tree, in this sense
is important because doing so allows iyarina and the story to work as a practice and
interaction. It is simultaneously a pathway to letting non-human personhood be seen, and
a means of allowing the story to be told with the participation of non-human others,
letting them speak in their own manner, for themselves on their own terms. (Songs
concerning nonhuman persons can be seen to belong properly within specific contexts
and situations for similar reasons, with the additional reason that songs are often sung to
specific nonhuman others as part of techniques for interacting successfully with them.)
It is interesting to note that this kind of leaving-space for others also applies quite
broadly in the context even of communication between human speakers. For example,
offering moral advice by speaking indirectly in stories or even (and more sparsely)
through place names invocative of stories, in the manner described by Keith Basso
amongst the Apache, seems at one level to be a way of preserving the dignity of human
interlocutors.50 By giving advice indirectly through stories, rather than spelling things
out, it is possible to at once offer direction while still preserving the freedom of others
and the space for them to come to the appropriate realizations by their own paths. But the
matter becomes even more complicated (and interesting, I think) when we consider the
way selfhood itself is understood as multiple and relational; for in this sense letting
stories go to work on others is also nothing other than leaving space through which that
person’s own dialogical and direct relationships with the land and the ancestors can be
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enlivened and allowed to transpire and give rise to insight.51 In this sense the “freedom”
being guarded from smothering here seems to be that of all persons involved, and not
merely human ones.
This is I think a broadly-found pattern amongst Indigenous traditions, of which
numerous examples could be adduced. The use of ideophones in Quichua, for example,
would seem to involve similar principles: these are not literal imitations of sounds (e.g.,
the laughter of the oropendula, the sound of grass, the sound of minnows in a school,
etc.) so much as invocations of them. This is precisely a way of inviting others to
remember not only their own experiences with the phenomena in question, but also
associated meanings and connotations, and so on. In this sense, one precisely leaves a
space in conversation in which these phenomena are able to speak for themselves. I have
also already discussed how Quichua pottery communicates in an analogous fashion.
It is also worth emphasizing here, I think, that this kind of “leaving space” might
well appear to us negatively as “sparse speech” or leaving silence, is in another sense a
full positivity of ongoing communication (and becomings, and so on) – although the
nature of that communication is such that it would seem to best or properly transpire
within such “silences”. This again stands markedly in contrast to the predominant
impulses of modernity, which seem continually bent on disambiguation and clarification
– as indeed the political problematic of Hobbesian sovereignty, and the political and legal
problematic of spelling out and defining what things are in a way that applies across
contexts and allows for predictability and rationalization, exemplifies.52
In the foregoing, then, I have tried to explore some of the ways in which
Indigenous thought might bring us to respond to Heidegger – and through him to our era
more broadly. In this, my predominant suggestion has been that while much in
Heidegger’s turn towards the problem of dwelling offers a valuable bridge for
conversation with Indigenous thought, the latter offers important challenges to particular
lingering metaphysical presuppositions within his thought. In the form of articulate,
alternate understandings and relations in the world consequent upon relational
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ontologies, and the kind of disagreement with modern thought this gives rise to,
Indigenous traditions would seem to invite us to further critical self-reflection, to
explorations of ourselves and the world along very different terms. And if our present
crises under the sign of the devastation of nature do indeed draw the consequences of our
metaphysical heritage, then perhaps such an invitation is of no small importance today.
But then, is there not a sense in which Heidegger also already thinks within and
responds to reverberations of Nietzsche’s critique and the latter’s ontology of the will to
power?53 And if we turn then to Nietzsche, do we not see an ontology, sense of self and
of beings (as multiplicities in flux), that differs significantly, with coherent articulateness,
and in important ways from our dominant traditions? And does this not also push forward
the question of relationality, in its own way? Let us turn now to consider these matters
directly. For Nietzsche, I think, does indeed offer valuable provocations to our dominant
tradition, that also might be seen to approach, from our vantage point, certain
understandings characteristic of Indigenous traditions. My suggestion will nevertheless
be that, in light of what is opened by Indigenous traditions, it can be valuable to
reconsider certain elements of Nietzsche’s thought and, accordingly, both his reading of
our impoverishment in modernity and his efforts to think otherwise.

4.3 On Knowing-Becoming, and the Impoverishment of the Self
In countering the equivocal metaphysical impulse from Plato through to
modernity, we have seen, Nietzsche explores a philosophy of perspectival, immanent
becoming and embodied thought that challenges us to a more “expansive” sense of the
world and of the self than is countenanced in our dominant philosophical and
epistemological tradition. From that vantage-point, moreover, Nietzsche is able to offer
an account of the impoverishment of modernity that turns upon its banality, and the
emptiness of its sense of “culture”. Perhaps the most striking (and haunting) image of this
is found in Nietzsche’s portrayal of the Last Men who have “invented happiness”.
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But if the Last Men express something essential about who we moderns have
become (and I think they do), then it seems to me that Indigenous thought also offers
grounds through which we might understand something like this banality, as well as a
contrasting vision of richness. One way we might explore this possibility is through the
suggestion that the dominant modus operandi of modern life (and for all its
epistemological pride) discourages and covers over anything like the cultivation of
knowledge as yachana and becoming-yacharishka. But to say this is precisely to link a
paucity of the self with an unthoughtful relationship with the land and nonhuman others:
for in becoming-yacharishka with the land, we have seen that one grows/becomes in a
sense not only a multiplicity of the self, but that at the same time one broadens the
affections, opens onto new registers of feeling and affect, establishes communicative
transparencies, and so on. In the vision of what a more cultivated selfhood and manner of
being would be in Indigenous thought, it seems to me that we at once come provocatively
close to Nietzsche in many respects, but that we also diverge significantly from him.
These divergences (and the grounds for them), I think, constitute important provocations
for us to think through today, especially if we are concerned to imagine how a more
affirmative philosophy rooted in “this-worldliness” might also possibly be responsive
(and reflexive) with regard to the problem of “nature” and the ongoing dynamics of
ecological devastation that now threaten us so inexorably.

4.3.1 Nietzsche’s Last Men
Nietzsche’s image of the Last Men, recounted in the early pages of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, expresses the cultural fallout of many of the most fundamental aspirations of
modern man and our stories of progress. These contemptible beings inhabit a world
made comfortable, domesticated, and manageable; a world entertaining and yet empty,
devoid of genuine worth and feeling. “’What is love? What is creation? What is
longing?’ . . . thus asks the last man, and he blinks.”54
What is at stake here for Nietzsche is the diminution of human beings in and
through the very ways we come to think and secure our freedom and our happiness, in
54
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accordance with our manner of thinking “civilization” and justice and so on. “The
leveling and diminution of European man is our greatest danger,” Nietzsche writes in the
Genealogy of Morals;
“because the sight of him makes us despond . . . We no longer see anything
these days that aspires to grow greater; instead, we have a suspicion that
things will continue to go downhill, becoming ever thinner, more placid,
smarter, cosier, more ordinary, more indifferent . . . This is Europe’s true
predicament: together with the fear of man we have also lost the love of
man, reverence for man, confidence in man . . .”55
This process occurs by virtue of the moral gesture or “valuation” that lies at its
root: fundamentally, a soteriological one that rejects the world in its ambivalence, its
danger, its fullness. Here we can recognize again what I described above as the equivocal
metaphysical gesture: for Nietzsche, the positing of a beyond that redeems our suffering,
which begins by saying No and holding the world accountable to a standard that must
find its orientation-point outside of it. But what is crucial here is the way this moral
gesture establishes and remains present within a whole metaphysical trajectory and
connected understanding of truth, and of ourselves and our position in the world.
But let us review Nietzsche’s gloss a little more closely. With Christianity, we
can see how this soteriological gesture becomes active in the world through the language
of universalistic law on the one hand, and a connected logic of identity on the other. It is
easiest to grasp what is at stake here interpersonally – in The Genealogy of Morals, we
are invited to see how moral universalism takes revenge on the strong and on difference
and rank: the leveling dictum “blessed are the meek” in this sense opposes every
aristocratic (and pagan) sensibility.56 But the law also and simultaneously requires the
supposition (and production) of a doer, an atomistic, self-enduring free agent who can
experience the guilt of her sins and be held accountable for them as their cause. (The free
will, we recall, is nothing but the organ of this efficient causality.) An atomistic selfsameness in this sense covers over difference and multiplicity “within”/as ourselves,
while universal law brings sameness to reign amongst and between human beings (at
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least, in the space of that law’s domesticity). Man, in becoming “man”, becomes
something tamer, less dangerous and more predictable, in a way that serves a broader
soteriological aim of making the world tamer, more comfortable, more agreeable, less
difficult.
It may seem something of a detour, but a comparison of early Christian and
Homeric senses of self can be helpfully illustrative of what is at stake here and of how we
might take Nietzsche seriously as a reading of the Western tradition. The Homeric self
was emphatically not self-sovereign. Happenings that were not unusual but nevertheless
stood out from the ordinary and were accorded importance (the sudden swell of courage,
the loss of one’s wits, a sudden flash of insight, etc.) were understood in terms of
relationships to forces beyond the self – i.e., as interventions by the gods or (expressed in
a more general way) “some daemon”. What seems expressed here is not least the insight
that the kinds of “psychological” happenings described here do not seem to originate
“from” us or to be at our disposal for control, but to come mysteriously of their own
accord and on their own time. Moreover, theophantic happenings in Homer possess
qualitative characters whose interplay constitutes precisely what the world is. This
interplay shows up in moments of affinity, as in the enduring love affair of Ares and
Aphrodite, but also in the way the gods are continually at odds with one another, pulling
human beings this way and that, such that we cannot avoid slighting one or the other at
various times. Early Greek justice was (accordingly) not concerned with intention but
with the act only; and so even in the case of being guilty of some crime, there could be no
gnaw of guilt in the same sense that we experience it as absolute authors of our doings –
for both good and ill belonged to the play of the divine within the world.57
But if the pagan Greek could inhabit such a world with reverence (Nietzsche’s
“golden laughter”) for the often treacherous, dangerous, and agonistic play of the gods
who embroil human beings within their eternal drama, Christianity required something
else altogether. Pagan attributions of feelings or actions to the influence or showing-up of
divinities must appear precisely as a shirking of responsibility; the will must be sovereign
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over the self as the condition of accepting the moral problematic of guilt and sin (and the
possibility of salvation) in the Christian sense. We can also recognize the transmutation
of the daemonic into the demonic in its ethically dualistic, Christian sense here. Even
where the force of the demonic is acknowledged, the struggle is always to overcome
one’s susceptibility to such influences through the trumping sovereign power of God’s
grace, in concert with the higher faculties of the finite human self aspiring to a
participatory repetition of that sovereignty.58
Returning to Nietzsche, we can see how, at the same time, he invites us to
recognize this same soteriological logic within the metaphysical story of the real and the
rendering-fungible and calculable of things. This can be seen not only in the specific
manner in which, e.g., concepts of law and of causality can be understood to employ
transferences from the moral/interpersonal realm to that of nature itself (the concept of
causality being derived, Nietzsche asserts, from an interpretation of willing).59 It is
always moreover a question of what we are doing when we seek such causes and such
laws as what is truly real. If Nietzsche sees in our moral and legal progress stories the
effort to rework the world and take revenge for our suffering, the same impulse underlies
our (Baconian and godlike) technoscientific mission: “the illusion that thought, guided by
the thread of causation, might plumb the farthest abysses of being and even correct it.”60
The result of our philosophical trajectory, which we experience in the modern
world, is nothing other than the leveling equalization of human beings and a
standardization of our relations to the world. (And we can see how Heidegger in turn
inherits this problem.) At the same time, a universalistic and imperializing commitment
to truth qua a subjectively-conceived (and equivocally structured) reality eats away at any
larger sense of meaning by showing this to be a matter of “value” – and hence to have no
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basis in “fact”. (Whence the whole trajectory of formally rationalizing values as matters
of “belief”, which accordingly withdraw from public conversation into the private sphere,
as against a public space defined by commitments to a formal value-neutrality in law and
to the purported value-neutrality of science.)
The Last Men arrive to inhabit the world this produces. On the one hand, they
experience the illusion that the world has been rendered finally transparent to knowledge,
dispelling the madness that had formerly engulfed human beings. On the other hand, they
experience a life in which “everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever
feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.”61 Life sinks complacently into a
superficially entertaining commodity fetishism, at the same time that all the hard
questions fade from view and appear irrelevant to the demands of the real world. The
sense of life becomes so impoverished and banal, so insulated from the questionable
richness of the world and all that invites us to the difficult heights of the soul, that we
settle into a spectatorial sterility incapable of any further or alternate “creation of values”.
Who still even asks why life is worth living, or what it means to have wisdom? The Last
Men cannot even despise themselves because it requires too much exertion to do so, and
indeed to see why they should be troubled – just as they no longer see how or why one
could or should strive for anything beyond the comfortable nullity they imagine as the
pinnacle of civilization.
For Nietzsche, the Last Men have forgotten the chaos within themselves – a
forgetting that is nothing other than the playing out of our dominant metaphysical
tradition. But it is precisely from the soil of chaos and tension that Nietzsche understands
love, joy, creation, and the experience of genuine worth to be possible.62 What is
important for our purposes is that the experience of this chaos is precisely connected to
the problem of “faithfulness to the earth”, to becoming, a rethinking and a more
expansive and courageous exploration of the self in its relations in the world. The whole
problem of Nietzsche’s resistance to what I have described as the Cartesian equivocal
gesture is situated within this context. It is this sense of chaos that Nietzsche recovers in
61
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his return to (and complication of) the body, in coming to see the self as a multiplicity of
forces in struggle with one another, embedded in the transformative ontogenetic sea of
becoming itself.63
But must not the self, experienced as a self, always be a kind of fixity or relative
hypostatization, even within the context of this turbulent sea of force relations? One way
Nietzsche expresses what a more affirmative form of fixity might be here is in terms of
an agonistic relationship between principles in tension – which carry the names of
Dionysus and Apollo. Apollo here signifies boundedness, stability, individuation, clarity;
and he stands in contrast to the “intoxicated”, transformative overflowing of Dionysus
(the “passionate-painful overflowing into darker, fuller, more floating states; an ecstatic
affirmation of the total character of life”).64 This passionate-painful overflowing is
connected to a sense of multiplicity, difference, the strife and struggle amongst pluralities
that give rise to thought and to the “I” as an epiphenomenon, of the self and thought as
always profoundly bodily and nothing else. These suppositions diametrically oppose the
thesis of the atomistic subject of the mind/body distinction and possessed of free will. In
this sense an Apollonian experience of fixity, which as Apollonian is already in relation
to Dionysus, must precisely be a different kind of self, in much the way that a selfsovereign atom can be differentiated from an always tragically ephemeral,
epiphenomenal concrescence.
What is the central problem that a more affirmatively-experienced self finds itself
engaged with? Not salvation, but the problem of health, of accumulating power, of
feeling the self increase in strength, and venting its strength – that is, of partaking to the
fullest in the joyous and terrible play of the world.65 Nietzsche speaks of “the highest and
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most illustrious human joys, in which existence celebrates its own transfiguration,”
experienced as “an overflowing wealth of the most multifarious forces” nevertheless
gathered together, in a sense “fixed” or concrescence as a kind of polity-in-tension within
“one man”. In this same passage, the tension between Dionysian overflowing and
Apollonian ordering appears in terms of the co-dwelling of this multitudinous wealth and
the lordly power of commanding within one person.66
Gains in such a wealth of power occur relationally, arising in and through the
bodily immersion of the self within the worldly play of force relations, and on the basis
of the self’s character as a processual (i.e., transformational) doing. This relational
principle is articulated on the one hand in terms of the idea that any displacement of
power at any point must necessarily affect any other within the whole system (i.e., in
terms of a version of interdependency). On the other it is expressed in the dictum that the
will to power can only manifest itself against resistances – whence the importance of
struggle and gaining in power through overcoming, which Nietzsche also describes with
metaphors of assimilation, absorption, nourishment, and so on.67 Such quantitative gains
in power, moreover, are experienced in myriad qualitative becomings (since to speak of
different quanta of force is only another language for expressing difference in quality, in
sense and feeling).68
A thoughtful and rich life within the play of the world is not comfortable, but is
rather something frightening, opening onto strange and terrifying registers that strain us
to (and always potentially beyond) the limit of ourselves. Much of the problem of art and
artistic creation gains its sense for Nietzsche in this context. Great art evinces a greatness
of spirit, an appetite for the terrifying and the questionable, which it is a sign of strength
to be able to endure.69 The power of a properly tragic aesthetic lies in its carrying-forward
into the (Apollonian) realm of form and boundedness, the resonances of such
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transformative registers, of Dionysian overflowing. It brings to presence a beauty that has
force in being tinged with the fearful, and whispering of death; but for this reason it is a
joy and delight in power and life, at once a tonic and a fixing of stabilities by which it
becomes possible to live.70

4.3.2 The Self that Becomes and Travels Far: Between Nietzschean
and Indigenous Thought
Certain affinities will perhaps be obvious at this juncture between Nietzsche’s
thought and Indigenous conceptions of the world and of knowing-becoming – as will
their mutual contrast with our dominant forms of selfhood in modernity. We can begin to
see how certain aspects of the paucity that confronts us in Nietzsche’s Last Men might
also be described in terms in terms of an impoverished relationship to the world, a dearth
of knowing-becoming. Given what has been said, we can begin to understand what
something like “listening to beings” might mean for Nietzsche, and also begin to sense
how close this comes at times to the character of becoming-yacharishka with places and
beings.
Let me suggest a few broad similarities here at the outset between Nietzschean
and Indigenous senses of the world. We have not only a shared inclination with regard to
matters of truth, embodiment, “this-worldliness”, the groundlessness of any absolute
distinction between inner and outer regarding the self (as I argued above), and so on, but
also a shared basic sense of the self as being in a relational process of becoming, a kind of
multiplicity-in-unity. We can see a roughly similar play here between something like
fixity and ephemerality, as well as a roughly shared understanding of the self as
constituted through a relational and this-worldly play through which the gaining of power
is both possible and crucial to life itself and to experiences of joy. We can see how the
search for power within a profoundly ambivalent world calls for something like an
aristocratic sensibility on both fronts, not least in the requirement for courage in relations
that can be marked by contest (recall the dangerous allure of the wanduj man, the danger
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of being contained rather than containing – and we see again how a notion of contest and
danger in relations with the nonhuman is grounded here in a different sense of
agency/freedom).
Both Nietzschean and (at least) Amazonian thinking in this regard recurrently
approach and concern themselves with something like limit-experience under conditions
of becoming – that is, with the question of “how far” one is able to go (“How much truth
do you dare?”; a shared attraction to the intensities of something like the “ecstatic”, etc.).
How much is one able to take on and yet return, maintaining oneself? On both fronts, it
would seem to be in the (frightening, transformative, uncomfortable) vicinity of the limit
that strength is gained, that enlivening is possible. (We can remember, again, the
character of face-to-face encounters with the supai, the character of ayahuasca sessions
as described above, the frightening character of the Nuu-chah-nulth oosumich, and so on.)
As we saw in the last section, one can also perhaps draw connections between the
Nietzschean/Heideggerian concern with difference and Indigenous sensibilities in thought
and interaction.
At the same time, there are important divergences here, a few of which I would
like to take note of here. Like Heidegger, Nietzsche is of course also a modern and
Western thinker, in ways that also become troubling when considered in light of what
being modern and Western tends to mean in terms of our contemporary relationship to
the world and to nature. Indigenous thinking in this sense can invite us to consider
whether inflecting certain matters differently might not permit us to think through
something like Nietzsche’s critique in a way that is more adequately reflexive and
responsive to present-day worries – most especially, the need to reconsider ourselves in
light of our relations to the land and waters, and to non-human beings. Together, I would
suggest, these differences constitute important provocations for allowing us to think
through and assess the impoverishment of the modern in a way that strives to be
responsive to the problem of our anthropocentric and monological domination of the
world.

220
A first and important point to make here is that Indigenous traditions can be seen
to be much more explicitly concerned with and rooted in relations with the land through
specific places, and with non-human beings gathered and experienced there as persons. In
this, they are relationally and directly situated from the beginning; and this situation puts
them in a position that on the one hand remembers relationships that precede the
dramatic, monological reworking of the land and our relations to it under the terms of
Western modernity.71 On the other, this situatedness also inflects the problem of
becoming in such a way that this also is consistent with practices and longstanding
relations of stewardship and “taking care” of the land.
One way to express this situation would seem to be through the question of what
it is to be a relative, which is precisely what a “human being” properly is (in the case of
the Quichua runa, for example). A runa, with whom other runa share constitutive
contagions and becomings (foods, dwelling-place, lifeways, etc.) and relations of
transparency, is profoundly rooted through these becomings in longstanding, inherited,
and continually re-enlivened relationships with the land and with specific dwelling places
and the beings that live there.72 It is worth emphasizing here that the relational runa (or
Tlingit, or Ojibwe) self is not relational within the domain of the present only, but in a
way that extends back to and recalls those ancestors who came before – it is constituted
“across” time in a way that emplaces thought and selfhood in a context of successive
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In this, it is worth noting that whereas various complex forms of plant cultivation, “management”, and
land use preceded the arrival of Europeans throughout the Americas, these nevertheless did not have the
same kind of anthropocentric, domineering character and generally deleterious consequences associated
with modern Euro-American forms thereof. The robustness of the land at the time of European arrival is
perhaps even testified to by the very ease with which it could be seen as untrammelled “wilderness” by
Europeans. For one set of examples of Indigenous cultivation and land “management” practices from the
North Pacific Coast, see Nancy J. Turner, et al., “Plant Management Systems of British Columbia’s First
Peoples,” in BC Studies 179 (Autumn 2013).
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Which is not to suggest that nothing “new” can be encountered or brought into the folds of Indigenous
traditionalistic thinking. An excellent example here might be the way missionary efforts at “conversion”
have played out in certain contexts. Neil Whitehead for example describes a whole form of shamanism in
Guyana (“alleluia shamanism”) that enfolds teachings and practices of Christian missionaries within a
shamanic ontology and manner of thinking. (Neil Whitehead, Dark Shamans: Kanaimà and the Poetics of
Violent Death, [Durham: Duke University Press, 2002], 5.) Indeed, the resilience of Indigenous ways of
thinking and being in the face of the changes and violences wrought by modernity throughout the Americas
is often nothing short of astonishing. But that this is so should also not be taken as a contradiction of the
point I am trying to make here about emplacedness and situatedness in Indigenous traditional thinking. To
conclude that this is so would seem to involve relying on the blackmail position that either Indigenous
peoples must be modern, deterritorialized, etc., or they must remain in a kind of purity of isolation.
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generations and relationships (with places, animals, etc.) that extend across them. To
move away, to live too long amongst others, to cease remembering and feeling the stab of
homesickness/yakichina, etc., is to become something different and not a runa73 (it is
also, relative to the point of view of runa, to be quilla and to forget one’s relatives, no
less than it is quilla to be seduced away into the forest by non-human supai).74 The whole
problematic of becoming here is accordingly understood in relation not just with an
abstract principle of fixity, but with the rooted problematic and emplacedness in situ of
being a relative amongst relatives.
In this sense it is also not (abstractly-conceived) becoming per se that seems to be
valuable here, as for example when removed from the containing and orienting fixity of
one’s preceding network of relatives. It is rather a question, I have argued, of a
disciplined and contained becoming, experienced in the tension between travelling far
and taking on much on the one hand, and being a relative on the other. A connected point
is to remember here that becoming-yacharishka always seems oriented or focused around
specific (non/human) persons, and around specific properties shared by people and
places.
That the persons of the forest also become yacharishka with you indicates not
only a mutuality of relationship that develops and extends itself over time but also that
one’s being a relative qua runa has its character in being tied to and rooted in the land
and its non-human beings as co-dwellers. And whereas becoming yacharishka with
powerful persons, engagements with supai, etc., can amount to becomings that enliven
the self and are sources of power, it is also therefore a matter of orienting and growing
the affections, cultivating empathy, feeling and inducing yakichina. In this sense a life of
wise or disciplined becoming is also nothing other than a life in which one comes to love
one’s dwelling-place and feel companionship there. (It is also the case that the entire life
of the emotions seems thought from the ground up on relational terms amongst peoples
like the lowland Quichua, in a way and with a sense of nuance that it is difficult to find
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In the strict sense. Tod Swanson has noted that the term can also be extended outwards to encompass
e.g., neighbouring peoples, and now also other Indigenous peoples throughout the Americas. Swanson,
“Singing to Estranged Lovers,” 62.
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C.f., Elsje Lagrou, Cashinahua Cosmovision, 35.
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parallels for in the Western canon.) Again, the effect of being situated as a relative tends
to be that this kind of caring is oriented in many respects towards what we might want to
gloss as the “natural landscape” and its wellbeing, although the matter is clearly not
understood in this way by Indigenous traditions themselves. It is becomings and
interactions rooted in this forest, these rivers, these mountains, that grow the self, that
open the self onto all the terrifying and wonderful registers of being, that enable one to
feel richly (and also dangerously) alive. But no less is that same land something to
respect and care for, and no less must the loss or devastation of that land bring
tremendous sadness.
But this already changes a great deal that sets our thinking apart from Nietzsche’s.
The way Nietzsche sets up and approaches the question of becoming, and thus
experiences the character of a tragic, richer, and Dionysian selfhood, would seem to be as
a universal principle, as such. Approached and grasped as a principle reigning over all
things, becoming of itself contains for Nietzsche something inherently “terrifying and
uncanny”, whose “strongest comparison is to the sensation whereby someone, in the
middle of the ocean or during an earthquake, observes all things in motion.”75
The challenge levied by Zarathustra is to say Yes to this vision of becoming, to the
great ontogenetic sea as such – which is to say, Yes to all possible change and
happenings, to all that is cast up in every moment, and even its eternal recurrence.76 If a
more tragic or Dionysian self, as described earlier, always constitutes a healthier vision
of selfhood by comparison with us Last Men, then it is in the thought of the Eternal
Return that Nietzsche finds a kind of test that shows us what a highest health, a greatest
and self-deifying Yes-saying, would be – and how difficult this is. (For if there no rage,
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Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers trans. by Greg Whitlock (Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 2006), 61. In this same early lecture, Nietzsche describes how this thought brings us to see
how all things stand to be “devoured” as by a “wild storm” – and this would seem to have force even for
Nietzsche in undermining what presumably must be a pre-given sense of stability. We might wonder
whether, at this early stage in Nietzsche’s thought, we detect one place where the traces of an atomistic
ontology are felt. Still, it is the case that Nietzsche’s later writings will strive to avoid this sense of
becoming: “[the world] is not something that becomes, not something that passes away. Or rather: it
becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased from passing away – it
maintains itself in both.” (Will to Power, 548.)
76
I.e., the thought of the Eternal Return, which confronts us with the notion that everything that can happen
has happened, and will again do so eternally – and this is the orienting vision that Nietzsche challenges us,
ultimately, to affirm. (Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” 270.) C.f., The Will to Power, 544-550.
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for Nietzsche, against what happens to us, against time in becoming, then there can be no
“I should/should not”, nor is there the same kind of necessarily-reactive genesis of a
hypostasized I who remembers and promises.)
But this is a point of crucial importance, it seems to me, if we wish to consider the
potential of Nietzschean provocations for allowing us to respond to the devastations we
now confront in the “problem of nature” – as one pre-eminent sign of the devastations of
modernity as such. Oriented in this way to becoming as a vision of the total worldprocess as such, is there perhaps a peculiar sense in which Nietzsche allows us to be too
comfortable in our uprootedness, or with the ecological and cultural ruin now spreading
in the face of capitalism and industry? For it would seem that his challenge here is finally
to be up to all such changes and even this ruin, to say Yes to it (even again and again!).
Read in the vicinity of Indigenous thought, we might ask whether Nietzsche’s
approach to the problem of becoming does not bear too many easy affinities with the kind
of scenario we find ourselves in as moderns – in our passion for mobility and
mobilization, for the new, for deterritorialization, and in our ready conviction that life
such as we can live it is already uprooted, such that we must learn to embrace precisely
this rootlessness?77 The crucial point of tension would seem to be this, thought relative to
Quichua terms at least: if for Nietzsche, strength lies in saying Yes absolutely, in Quichua
thought strength (being sinzhi) is always opposed to being quilla78 (which in some sense
says Yes too much and too easily). And so even if there is something in Nietzsche (and I
think there is) that is contemptuous of our oblivious and atomistic solipsism, our
complacent unthinking and non-listening character, I would venture to suggest that
Indigenous thought challenges us more profoundly to connect our impoverishment of
selfhood with the matter of our situated relations to the land and place and the general
problem of our non-sustainable and domineering relations with these.
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A conviction that has after all been a mainstay of the modern ontological constellation since the rejection
of neo-Aristotelianism: final causes are not operative in the world, we are in this sense cut off from nature,
ergo we must set our own definitions and ends, emerge into our freedom as human subjects, etc.
78
An opposition that often invokes sexual connotations – if quilla is also a word for being promiscuous,
easily seduced, etc., there is also a connected sense in which that the expenditure of sexual energy depletes
one of power that could otherwise be marshalled to other purposes. See Swanson, “Singing to Estranged
Lovers,” 49-50, 54-55.
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From the vantage point of Indigenous philosophies’ rootedness in place and
amongst non-human relations, it might perhaps be suggested that our own way of life is
not only poor in emplaced knowledge (as knowing-becoming), but that we are also
(somewhat paradoxically) impoverished in a certain sense as being quilla. That is, our
condition of uprootedness vis à vis “nature” would seem to preclude us being good
relatives in our dwelling-places – in a way that is at once celebrated in many of the
aspirations of modern life, and that Nietzsche would seem at some level not to adequately
counter.79 In a connected way, Indigenous thought would seem to provide grounds for
articulating why and how becoming per se is not necessarily interesting or wise as an
absolute point of ethical orientation (i.e., in any and all contexts) – a point that various
contemporary Western inclinations to identify becoming or difference with a force of
necessary resistance to modernity (e.g., in the Marxian rhetoric of the multitude) seem
reluctant to grasp.80
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Zygmunt Bauman’s descriptions of our present stage of “liquid modernity” may be worth invoking here
– a stage in which “mobility, or rather the ability to keep on the move, is the very stuff of which a new
hierarchy of power is built.” But it is also interesting to note here how Bauman understands this form of
society to impact thought (easily digestible ideas not needed reflection are privileged, novelty displaces
substance, etc.) and understandings about life (which becomes an individualized obsession with selfinvention, in search of ever greater horizons, irresponsible to local roots and indeed reluctant to ever set
roots down). (Zygmunt Bauman, Society Under Siege (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 162-3, 165, 171.)
Something like this character of the way being quilla, in the sense proposed here, would seem to coexist
with our unthinking, atomistic dearth of knowing-becoming in place has also, I think, been approximated
under different terms in Marxian analyses that have traced the relationship between the peculiar mobilizing
destruction of traditional countryside life wrought by capitalism and the lonely, isolating atomism
characteristic of modern mass society. See, for example, Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle trans.
by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1994), 26, 120-122. Such a condition as described in
these terms must of course be distinguished from the kind of mobility characteristic of non-modern
nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples (or so I argue in light of my above engagements with Algonquian
thinking).
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As seen for example in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s classic text, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2000). This is detrimental I think in a way that especially manifests itself in the domain of
the politics of nature. As an extreme example, it would seem that it is difficult for a political ontology
rooted in a principle of becoming (and approached from out of a modern position) to articulate why, for
example, capitalism is harmful other than in unduly hampering becomings – even though it must also be
acknowledged that to a certain extent capitalism opens the door to a greater fluidity in and through its
deterritorializations. In which case, we find ourselves again in a position not unlike that of Marx: capitalism
is itself a liberatory force, but must be surpassed. But in this, the whole problematic of rethinking our
relations to nature – as well as the whole political terrain of multiple ontologies – remains stubbornly
difficult to adequately raise. And if we are serious about extricating ourselves from soteriological thought,
why must we assume that there cannot be bad becomings, bad multitudes? C.f., Hardt and Negri’s location
of resistence to the power of Empire always in a principle of creativity, flux, new mutations, etc. against all
forms of discipline, seeing “nothing permanent” and reducing all that exists to rubble so as to open new
paths through it, in Empire, 215-218.
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But then, there would seem to be other (though not unrelated) ways in which
Nietzsche reaffirms understandings that would seem all-too modern and of no small
significance for our capacity to reflect upon the problem of “nature”. A second major
point of divergence, for instance, lies in the way power is conceived between Indigenous
and Nietzschean thought. For Nietzsche, strength or power manifests itself in the
phenomenon of commanding – i.e., power over others: at the level of relations between
selves, but also within the self, whose multiplicity is envisioned as a political body
ordered by the rule of one part over others.81 (Similarly, philosophy, art, and the positing
of values for Nietzsche constitutes an act of strength that is described as tyrannical as
over against an intrinsically indifferent nature – a setup that seems eminently
subjectivistic and all-too familiarly modern in its ontology, in ways that will by now be
obvious.82) In other words, even if the self is made multiple and chaotic for Nietzsche, his
way of interpreting becoming qua Heraclitean strife nevertheless preserves a good deal
that would seem traceable to or at least consistent with the problematic of modern
sovereignty and rule itself (and in this, intriguingly, to nothing other than the Christian
theological tradition).83 While Nietzsche might disagree on a great deal with a thinker
like Thomas Hobbes, they would seem to share this assumption at least: that power, as
power-over, shows up in relations of dominance rather than, for example, of vulnerability
or dependency.84 This notion of power as domination centered in the will, as I have
shown, has been of no small consequence in modern relations with nature.
In the Indigenous traditions I have surveyed, power is precisely not thought in
terms of “power over”. Rather, it would seem visible in the way that what is is
maintained in a balance or dynamic tension of forces, which have the character of being
relations of complex and mutually sustaining interdependency – in which nothing,
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E.g., “’I am free, “he” must obey’ – this consciousness adheres to every will.” (Beyond Good and Evil,
48.)
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See, as an example of this move in Nietzsche, his refutation of Stoicism in Beyond Good and Evil, 39.
83
It is interesting to compare Hannah Arendt’s observation here (who attempts to conceive both power and
freedom in more relational and less hierarchical terms, with reference to the classical Greek polis – which
she emphasizes was precisely not characterized by relations of rule): “In polytheist systems, for instance,
even a god, no matter how powerful, cannot be sovereign; only under assumption of one god (‘One is one
and all alone and evermore shall be so’) can sovereignty and freedom be the same.” In The Human
Condition, 234-5.
84
Hobbes, Leviathan, 62, 65, 141.
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moreover, is superfluous. This Indigenous understanding of the world, as comprised and
sustained by power relations and in which striving to gain in power is understood to be
important for living, is nevertheless consistent with an ability to derive from the world a
law of respect for all things. Rupert Ross has intriguingly suggested that this is precisely
a consequence of the Indigenous habit of thinking relationally, i.e., understanding
between-ness to give rise to (at least temporary) fixities/”things” rather than assuming a
world of atomistic things from the outset. If one looks at the forest and sees a sum of
atomistic beings, it may well make sense to look within them for an innate principle of
behaviour (self-preservation, self-expression, self-assertion over others, looking out only
for itself) that necessarily sets animate beings against one another. Looking between,
however, it is possible to observe that same forest and see rather relationships of
interdependence and interwovenness, in which any one point is connected to any other.85
And following Ross, we might wonder whether this is one sign of Indigenous thought
being more profoundly relational than Nietzsche’s.
The Indigenous traditions engaged here understand power to circulate through
relationships and be shared.86 Remarkably, the basic mode of comportment or condition
associated with the growing of strength is precisely something like vulnerability – it is a
question of seeking help from more powerful others, inducing them to care and to
cooperate, of entering into/cultivating more transparent relations with them. For
example, Ojibwe vision-fasters will seek to invoke the pity of the ätisokának.87 The
Quichua concept/problematic of yakichina, of causing others to “compassionate”, to care
and feel sadness for you, seems very similar. It is also worth quoting Umeek on this
point, who describes the matter (in this instance) in connection with human community,
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Ross, “Exploring Criminal Justice and the Aboriginal Healing Paradigm,” 3-6.
In the Ojibwe context, this is the case not only in that the ätisokának share power with human beings, but
also in the way powerful persons seem able to share power with others. For example, “powerful men, in the
Ojibwa sense, are also those who can make inanimate objects behave as if they were animate.” (Hallowell,
Contributions to Ojibwe Studies, 553.) It is also interesting to consider here that, if the problematic of
commanding or ruling is linked to a monotheistic tradition in which one party stands above all others,
hunter-gatherer Indigenous societies themselves tended not to experience any such centralization, even in
the relatively rigid, hierarchical and aristocratic codifications of the North Pacific Coast. In this sense an
affinity may also be drawn with the polytheistic Greek context. Supra, fn. 82.
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though I would suggest that this community should be understood to extend well beyond
the human:
A specific Nuu-chah-nulth teaching associated with the idea of community
is that if one doesn’t ask for help when help is needed, then one is not
friendly, one is not kind. One is not aphey. . . One of the strongest
criticisms of another person’s character is to say, ‘that person is not aphey.’
Consequently, a person in need is taught and encouraged to depend upon
neighbours, and this interdependence is considered one of the strengths of a
traditional Nuu-chah-nulth community.88

The contrast could not be clearer with the modern ideal of the self-sovereign individual,
pulling himself up by his bootstraps and owing nothing to anyone. But it also stands in
stark contrast to Nietzsche’s sense of what power means and how he understands it to be
manifest – as for example amongst the ferocious “birds of prey” of the Genealogy of
Morals, with the strong dominating the weak. Umeek’s passage also illustrates the way
strength here is understood with reference to a community of relatives in a way that is not
at all the kind of super-individual or atom that the modern state is, and indeed seems quite
different throughout from Western/modern conceptions.
Power, in the Indigenous traditions I have discussed here, seems identifiable or
felt not in one force or person being dominant over others, so much as in the way that one
is able to belong to a community of relatives through which strength is gathered, through
which it is possible to grow the self into a multiple of shared (and yet contained) modes
of being.89 (That this community of relations extends to land, place, nonhuman others,
etc., will by now hardly need reiteration.) That containment (in the manner of the Ojibwe
spoon) – rather than commanding – seems a more suitable image here is significant: it is
not a question of a struggle between would-be rulers asserting/expending themselves, but
rather of relational and shifting positions (of effecting and being-effected, etc.) that
88

Umeek, Tsawalk, 12.
Although, to be sure, certain individuals may be known as especially powerful. But it is important, I
think, not to read into this the kind of egoistic and individual quest for power as this would be understood
in modern/Western contexts. For no matter how powerful such a person might become, this can never (so
far as I understand it) be ontologically divorced from the community of relations to which they belong; and
a whole complex series of limiting and other problematics must accordingly be understood to be at play
here.
89
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implies interrelationship and asymmetry of power without importing metaphors (or
structures/institutions) of rule.
This containment can moreover occur within the space of a relationship in which
the containing person remains less powerful than e.g., the plant or animal supai from
whom they have contained something, with whom they become yacharishka. Indeed, this
would seem to be the pervasive nature of experiences with ätisokának, supai, animal
masters, of surviving the intensities and becomings of wanduj and ayahuasca and so on
without losing oneself – whence in part the continual problematic of treating these others
with respect, of maintaining relationships, etc. The difference involved here can also be
expressed, I think, in terms of the difference between Nietzsche’s problematic of artistic
creation – even if his “creation” does not originate in a free self-grounding will, in
contrast to the usual modern conception – and the kinds of relationships characteristic, for
example, of Quichua artistic practice described in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, that containment rather than commanding seems the better metaphor
for understanding power in turn changes the character of the kind of contest we find
ourselves navigating in the world. For in the notion of commanding it seems that we will
always find an underlying assertion of will, of self-assertiveness and self-expenditure in
which we locate the agent of an instance of domination. An atom (even as one part of a
multiplicity) actualizes (or attempts to actualize) what seems inevitably to be a kind of
external, efficient causal impact on something else: in being commanded we are being
marshalled to ends other than our own, and we recognize in the will of another the power
that moves us there.90 But containment can be brought about by different kinds of
dynamics and structures. We see this in the case of yakichina acting as a kind of glue or
bond of attraction that maintains the fixity of the shared body of the allyu. For as a runa
travels, engages in a range of becoming-relationships, etc., we can recall that the
experience of yakichina plays a role in instances of remembering oneself, not going too
far, not being quilla: one feels homesickness, remembers one’s family as one’s family
and feels empathy and care for them.
90

The connection between the problematic of the will, as comes to be clarified in connection with the
Christian doctrine of Creation, and the notion of external causality that becomes dominant in modern
thought and natural science, is also helpfully drawn out in Bradley Bryan, “Reason’s Homelessness”.
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But this remembering should itself, I think, be understood to be an instance of the
phenomenon or happening of containment. Yakichina’s showing up – as an emotional
pull, a remembering, and so on, in this context would be precisely part of what allows
containment to happen, and hence an instance of a “contest” being won (in the sense that
one is not seduced away, does not become somebody else, is not pulled into death, etc.).
The shared body of the allyu, and the strength this network imparts, prevails – and a
mature, disciplined becoming is maintained. Whereas yakichina is a relational verb that
expresses the way I might cause another to feel empathy, pity, or concern for me, it is
important to see that it is not a question of finding a will here. For yakichina is cultivated
through interactional relations between persons; it transpires between such as in the
experience of being drawn and finding someone else attractive, cute, cuddly, and pitiable;
in maintaining and cultivating shared planes of transparency, and so on. And if this
involves processes of gathering powers of attraction and marshalling “technologies of
sentiment”, then the beauty and attractiveness one gathers up in this way itself is
something attained relationally, and is not summoned without the cooperation and help of
others (and where that cooperation and help is itself understood to transpire in the manner
of a relational happening). Not a will or multiplicity of wills, in this sense, but relations
all the way down; not rule, but a maintained network of relatives; not commanding, but a
play between fixity and becoming constituted not least in the play between attractions and
becomings relative to which problems of focus, rootedness, and memory attain a
particular kind of meaning.
In these ways, then, Indigenous thought would seem to be able not only to speak
to certain of the worries raised by Nietzsche concerning modern man. Engaging
Indigenous thought, furthermore, can be helpful in bringing us to integrate these worries
into a radical – and in certain respects more effective – problematization of our
relationships to “nature”. And if the image of the Last Men gives us an important and
harrowing vision of ourselves and of the fallout of our dominant philosophical tradition –
and I think that it does – then confronting the problem of nature in modernity would seem
to demand that we be reflexive about the precise manner in which we understand their
(and thus, our) impoverishment.
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No less would it seem incumbent upon us to reflect upon the possibilities we
delineate in the way we construe a contrasting vision of richness. Especially striking here
is the way Indigenous thought seems so adept at what is so elusive for Western moderns:
bringing together an immense richness that we seem best able to describe in terms of
“Dionysian” registers, cultivating accordingly a tremendous breadth and courageousness
of self, an openness and sensitivity to becomings; while simultaneously cultivating a
profound caring and empathy, forms of balance and fixity that confound soteriological
premises, entrenching a loving “rootedness”91 and stewardship of place, living much
more sustainably with “nature” – and this altogether without nature in our sense of the
term.

4.4

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to open up and explore one possible conversation

between Western theory and Indigenous thought. I selected Nietzsche and Heidegger for
this conversation not only because I think they offer valuable bridges for engaging
Indigenous thinking, but because I am also convinced that they offer some of the most
enduringly important available critiques of our present “cultural” moment (especially in
our relationship to nature) from within the Western tradition. And yet, it may also
perhaps be a matter of faithfulness to the spirit of their own thought to experience as
sharply as possible the way that our habits of thinking, our language and its metaphors,
our inherited ontological dicta, and so on, delimit and give shape to what we experience
as possibilities for being and thinking in the world. If the wasteland we experience as
unfolding in late modernity (not only within ourselves, but across the earth itself, in the
form of what from one vantage point are ecological crises) traces the fallout of our own
habitual philosophical heritage, then a reflexive engagement with Indigenous American
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In a way that, interestingly, seems present in albeit different ways across very different Indigenous
traditions – for example, “rootedness in place” for a Tlingit person would seem to connote a more sedentary
heaviness that contrasts with the inclinations of an Ojibwe or Cree semi-nomad. But then, if by rootedness
we mean a self-constitution that is profoundly rooted in communicative and transformative becomingrelations with the land and with co-dwelling non/human others in it, then Ojibwe and Cree traditions very
much exhibit a rootedness in place that far exceeds our own. As I have already noted, we can also expect
that the qualitative kinds of dialogical relations that are possible in places will also differ with the landscape
itself.
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traditions (such as have, indeed, dwelt upon this land since time immemorial) will
perhaps be recognized as holding no small value. If our approach is to be a Nietzschean
one – i.e., one diagnostic of a sickness latent in our culture and looking towards a greater
health – then we should not, I think, exclude a diagnosis of our evidently ruinous
relationship to “nature” from our motivations and concerns. And Indigenous traditions
are, I think, some of the best available teachers concerning the possibility of having more
dialogical relationships with the land, of growing the self through those relationships and
paying heed to the ways in which this can happen. In this, they also precisely avoid
anything like our accustomed Romanticism, and the ways this might lead us to try to
overcome a rift with “nature” by seeking a “one-ness” with it, the ways we would
understand what this would mean, and so on. I have accordingly attempted to explore
some of the ways it might be possible at once to think with and against Nietzsche and
Heidegger – to work through elements of their thought that are perhaps especially
provocative (glossed here as their turn towards relationality), and yet to see some of these
carried further into much more into altogether different horizons.
Of course, to reflect on Indigenous traditions of thought in this way is to construe,
inflect, and respond to them in ways that are inevitably and significantly shaped by a very
different tradition and trajectory. That a non-Indigenous response and engagement with
Indigenous traditions (such as this one) is and must be its own distinct phenomenon,
forming its own pathways, need not of itself be viewed as a weakness or a bad thing, I
think, provided that it recognize itself for what it is. At some level, such a recognition
would seem to be a necessary beginning-point for any authentic engagement in this
regard.92
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If non-Indigenous engagements such as these should be recognized as inevitably shaped by and emergent
from its own specific context, this point should not be taken as an excuse to ignore the unmistakable
dangers of confusing our own interpretations with the ways of thinking we are trying to understand.
Otherwise we engage in no conversation at all – and it does seem to me that the protocols of honest and
respectful dialogue demand of us that we not cease trying to get it right, and trying to learn – a process that
is always difficult and, in the case of cross-cultural work, demands that we try to be faithful to the
experiences of blocked understanding, opaqueness, and the ever-present risk of misinterpretation, with
which fieldwork is apt to acquaint us. In this sense, the present chapter must only ever be understood as one
tentative exploration of possibilities, a beginning and invitation to further conversation, and an attempt
above all to encourage reflexivity from a non-Indigenous position.
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Arranging this engagement through Nietzsche and Heidegger can in turn have its
own distinct advantages for us. Among them is this: that they help us recognize, by
analogy, something of what the challenge in engaging and learning from Indigenous
thought, of even being up to an honest conversation with it, must be for us moderns. Not
least amongst these difficulties would seem to be the problem of overcoming our own
endemic banality, our own impoverished sense of experience, of the world and of
ourselves. The thought of Nietzsche in particular may be taken as instructive here, as to
what grappling with such banalized horizons must be: the challenge, in ways perhaps not
so different from those he saw levied on us by the echoes of ancient Greece, is likely to
be both harrowing and difficult. At stake is not only the possibility of altering the terrain
of understandings through which the self may be experience and cultivated, but moreover
of letting the face of the world show itself in altered (and, at a certain level, much more
expansive and terrifying) guise.
At the same time, by engaging Nietzschean thought through Indigenous relational
thought, it becomes possible to recuperate elements of Nietzschean critique reworked
along more relational lines (and lines more profoundly dialogical, especially with the
nonhuman). The challenge to explore more “aristocratic”, affirmative, or daring modes of
being and thinking can be dissociated from the lingering traces of a commanding ethos,
and from the valorization of a “tyrannical” posture (including over meaningless nature) as
the necessary outflow of “aristocratic” self-affirmation. Rather, we can come to see how
something like a more affirmative existence in the Nietzschean sense might be taken to
be perfectly consistent with a profound vulnerability and respectful listening to the
nonhuman. An affirmation of this-worldliness becomes reconcilable with an emplaced
situatedness quite different from the modern love of rootlessness and transience. By
rethinking power and thus substituting containment for commanding, we can come to see
how a call to strength and to the joys of becoming stronger can be perfectly consistent
with an ethos oriented around cultivating rooted relations and being a good relative. We
can also experience something like a call to a reverential dwelling in place that pushes
well beyond the relatively traditional Western ontology of Heidegger. A slavishness and
smallness or impoverishment of self, as well as that which is “annihilated” by
technological seeing, can also be reinterpreted along lines that do not lock us back in our
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more accustomed ontology and all the associated concepts the modern “problem of
nature” might lead us to try to avoid.
But then, it should also be noted that many of the provocations of Indigenous
thought, and the possibility of experiencing these, would seem inevitably to lie quiet – or
perhaps only ever be prepared-for – within the space of a written theoretical discussion
such as this one. “An Indigenous way is not an abstract system,” Tod Swanson writes;
and there is something essential, I think, worth heeding here.93 Such Indigenous ways as I
have been fortunate to engage firsthand have been profoundly interwoven with (and
responsive to) the fabric of specific places and specific networks of relatives and
inheritances, situated relations of empathetic becoming, with the speech and movement of
the non-human and with the seasonal rhythms of life and sustenance upon land and
waters. The sense of becomings and knowledges spoken of in Indigenous thought is
always bound up, at least in the contexts I have observed, with direct practices and
emplaced “askeses” – with the work of walking thoughtfully in the forest, in this land,
with the work of dreaming, sustenance practices and the consumption of foods, the
meditative taking of medicines all indissociably linked to dwelling-place. These
specificities are sensuous and directly dialogical, as experienced for example in the
passage of qualitative samai (breath) from plant persons into the thoughtful taker of
medicinal steam-baths or through smoke as part of the process of becoming yacharishka
with them: these are becomings that are inextricable from the somatic and relational play
of smells, tastes, and sounds, as well as other senses.
The question of how we who come to such things from the outside might
authentically experience and explore, at this level, something of what lives in these
traditions is itself a complicated one that cannot be entered into here. But my suspicion is
such explorations must be honest about the space and position from which we begin. The
question of what it might mean to co-dwell thoughtfully and in a decolonialized way
upon Indigenous lands would seem to be a crucial place to start.
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As Swanson himself argues, we can moreover recognize that something in the
nature of Indigenous ways and these practices retains an essential relation to those whose
Indigenous traditions they are and precludes direct adoption in the way an individual
theorist might simply espouse a new set of ideas. For the very reasons that a runa (for
example) is not the same thing as a human being in the sense of the universalistic,
Western category, we who are not runa must acknowledge that though we can in some
sense appreciate the possibility and richness of experiencing place in a runa way, the
specificities of that way are also not ours. Indigenous traditions are not merely abstract
ideas but emplaced knowledges and practices, rooted and situated within specific
networks of relations that extend back innumerable generations. And we who are
colonial settlers in Indigenous lands have no adequate rejoinder to a challenge once
levied by a Tlingit man: “which grandfather gave you that place that you can claim it?”94
But it seems to me that one way we might at least begin to proceed here is to see
how taking Indigenous thought about “nature” seriously also seems to require that we
reflect upon our own manner of relation with those peoples whose traditions we are
attempting to engage. Those of us who are settlers here would do well, I think, not to
abstract such a philosophical conversation as this one from the political conditions that
bring us into encounter with Indigenous traditions in the first place, and which moreover
implicate us in longstanding and continued colonial dynamics aimed at the
disqualification and dispossession of Indigenous peoples, the eradication of Indigenous
lifeways and the assimilation of its peoples. To begin to authentically take Indigenous
thought seriously, in other words, demands in its own terms that we confront the
challenge of healing and establishing better relationships with those peoples in question.
Might a starting point not be to learn, in other words, to be better relations to Indigenous
peoples ourselves? It is I think only through such a course that we can properly set out on
the problem of what thoughtfully and authentically paying heed to Indigenous thought,
and letting it go to work on us, might mean.
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But with this, we find ourselves turning back to the question of politics with
which I began this dissertation. That we find ourselves here is perhaps only a further
indication of the value of engaging Indigenous thought and the kinds of coherences and
hence disagreements it presents us with. For if we wish to ask what a meaningful
counterpoint to modernity’s dominant logics is, then perhaps no better indication can be
found than in precisely those traditions that still comprise some of the most verdant
political and cultural challenges to the unrestrained industrialization and exploitation of
“nature” under modern conditions. And if the bridges proposed in this chapter hold, we
can also take a further lesson here: that the question as to whether a more “daring” and
“listening” relationship to the world, whether a less impoverished and more relational
way of living is possible and viable today, is one that precisely remains alive within the
terms of our colonial politics and relationships. Such questions are accordingly not only
ones that we ask alone and of ourselves; they are questions that force us to grapple with
the political terrain in which we are continually and structurally embedded.
From wherever we find ourselves in this scenario, however, it seems to me that
we can always begin to play the relational game against the atomistic one, in ways that
kick the solidities of our dominant atomistic stories out from under themselves, and that
open thought and experience to alternate possibilities. This game can begin at the level of
the self: as with the atomism of the state, the atomism of the subject requires that we
draw a line somewhere that bounds us: here is where I begin in my independence, here is
the locus in which I locate my freedom, the (human) origins of beauty and art and will
and whatever else. Accordingly, we can ask: how do my understandings of what is real
and of what matters in life reflect a way of thinking that turns against and passes over the
relational?
A relational turn will always open this self out again, will disrupt the neat
partition between inside and outside, self and relatives, self and dwelling-place.
Accordingly the self becomes expansive. And this expansion lets us ask in turn: what
relations predominate in gathering me as I am, which are strongest and continually
reinforced by the work of memory, narrative, and so on? How am I embedded and
implicated in bad, impoverished, or resentful relationships, and the bad relationships of
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my relatives? And – conversely – how might I cultivate better relations, letting certain
connections wither and developing/strengthening others, gathering certain qualities to
displace others, and so on? Such a way of thinking is not too distant, I think, from the
way one might think about healing in a relational way. In such recuperated terms,
perhaps, we might begin to take up Nietzsche’s invitation to cultural self-diagnosis and
cure – as unavoidably at once an ethical and political problem. It is a problem that is lived
out in, and concerns, at once our relations to the human and nonhuman, and to the land on
which we dwell.
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Conclusion(?)
5

Growing Alternate Relations in Dark Times
How we think about ourselves and/in the world shapes in no small measure how

we are able to live, and to experience and cultivate our existence amongst others. If we
are able to think only in our accustomed terms – our atomistic ontology, our selfseparation as willful, free individuals over and against a mute natural backdrop of passive
matter and lower life-forms – it becomes all-too easy to remain confirmed in our selfimage of privilege within Creation, to experience our relations to “nature” and the
nonhuman monologically, to view anything else as obviously nonsensical. The aesthetic
and affective element here can be connected to a capacity for empathy: where our
accustomed terms reign alone, we come to feel the serious demands of “real life”
marginalize and disavow any more attentive “listening” to the nonhuman, or any more
meaningful ethics of respect. We experience instead an underdevelopment of anything
like what Amazonian Quichua peoples might call becoming-yacharishka – and with this,
I think, also a dearth of yakichina.
I have tried to show how a defamiliarizing process of engaging, of learning to
“think through” more relational ontologies and ways of thinking, might be capable of
meaningfully shifting the terrain of acknowledgeable possibilities, opening up unforeseen
alternatives and insights. Under relational terms, the inhabited world discloses itself
differently: more dialogically, dynamically and perspectivally, more vibrantly
interconnected, speaking and resonating in ways that continually teach, that grow and
even strain the self to liminal intensities of transformation even while comprising the
nurturing folds of who and what we ourselves are at any time. Contrapuntal thinkers
within the Western tradition, such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, have in their own way
shown us something of what a more relational way of thinking can lead to, and the
critically rich possibilities this can open. But in the preceding pages, I have tried to
indicate how much further Indigenous thought can take us in this direction, and how
valuable a cross-cultural conversation can be on this point.
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From the relational perspectives explored here, there is much in our dominant
lifeways that looks decidedly bad, crass, and even oblivious and foolish – even while our
usual thinking (and the complex of social relations that expresses this) seems almost
engineered not to see it. Nietzsche’s construal of the danger in our tradition – in terms of
the fallout of a particular moral trajectory – is I think an incisive articulation of much that
is at stake here, as is his sense of what a meaningful counter-evaluation might be: a
contrasting play1 for “this-worldliness”, a more relational ontology, and so on.
Reconsidered cross-culturally, however, it also becomes possible to rethink and deepen
our sense of what relational thinking can mean, while bringing this to bear more
fundamentally upon the problem of nature itself and our habituated assumptions in this
regard.
That the problem of nature as we experience it proves at once so pressing and
seemingly intractable for modern thinkers (including even Nietzsche and Heidegger),
should make evident our need for different conceptual tools; and I have tried to indicate
something of the learning Western thinkers might do in conversation with Indigenous
thought in this regard. If Nietzsche exhorts us to a more affirmative, courageous, and less
contemptible mode of living, I have tried to show that, thought in more rigorously
relational terms, this exhortation can also be consistent with an ethic of empathetic
listening and respect, and of a more caring rootedness (which can even be nomadic) and
stewardship, relative to the land and the nonhuman. And Nietzsche’s general invitation is
also consistent, in this light, with a call for greater respect for Indigenous traditions and
peoples themselves. We can see, accordingly, how this problem of nature and of
grappling with our own endemic slavishness is never far from that of grappling with our
colonialism, with the way this continues to live within us in our sense of who we are and
how it makes sense to live. And neither is it far from the question of how we might better
understand some of the reasons that colonialism and colonial efforts at assimilation
continue to be resisted by Indigenous peoples.

1

Which may be taken, perhaps, in the sense of the Heraclitean palintonos armonia – and as telling us
something about how the situated metaphor of philosophy as medicine might be thought here. C.f., my
discussion in the last chapter.
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The reflections made here, the askeses and pathways I have tried to explore
philosophically, are of course inevitably made in situ, embroiled within broader
dynamics, structures of entrenched power in the Western sense, that we can neither stand
altogether outside of nor individually control. And it is clear, as we return back to
ourselves from the path of our thinking, that those who – like me – live as settlers and
moderns today (in one way or another) especially find ourselves intimately and
structurally bound up the worrying trajectories detailed in this essay. Effectively
grappling with these trajectories and dynamics requires engagements that go beyond what
can be discussed here, even if it may be hoped that the theoretical efforts of this
dissertation may contribute, in a preparatory way, to them. On this front, it may be hoped,
not least, that the present work may contribute to a more adequate understanding of the
political situation in which we currently live – as involving the struggle and disagreement
of multiple ontologies. It will hopefully be better and more substantively understood what
this means, and what this might mean in terms of potential openings, dialogues, and
solidarities to be explored politically.
The value thought can have here is perhaps (and paradoxically) signalled by the
very degree to which our dominant political and quotidian culture seems to do its utmost
to foreclose on such openings. For if our dominant culture encourages a certain
underdevelopment of aesthetic and dialogic sensitivities relative to the nonhuman,
numerous contemporary theorists have also described in other ways a narrowing and
ossification of modern horizons, even relative to what a fuller life might mean under a
more classic humanism. Here we might reference all the important work of the Frankfurt
School, of Hannah Arendt, and so on: their accounts of our increasing de-politicization
and alienating atomization, of the supplanting of critical thought with stereotyped
edutainment and fascism, of the reduction of daily life and valued activities to the
routinized economistic roles of job-holders and consumers, and of an accompanying
atrophying of thought within the narrow confines of our technological rationality.2 Under
an increasingly transactional model of existence, it appears that thought (and also self2

C.f., perhaps most notably, Arendt, The Human Condition; Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man; Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments trans. by Edmund
Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), especially 94-136. Weber in his own way could be
included here, among many others.
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work) comes to be valued only insofar as it furthers the rationality of that model. And if
we recognize in ourselves here the slavish banality of Nietzsche’s last ones, we can also
recognize how readily this is guarded by the resentment and revenge-taking highlighted
in The Genealogy of Morals, ready to rage at all that stands in our way to unilateral, if
ultimately empty and recklessly devastating, mastery of the earth. In just this way, the
“conservative” ethos now coming to prominence in the public life of Western societies
seems only and most especially to appeal to everything that is worst in us.
There can perhaps be no greater defence of a reinvigorated valorization of thought
and critical thinking – and the meaningful difference these can make – than watching our
own nihilism play itself out to its repugnant conclusions in this way. For such cannot be
permitted to hold the day, to determine the terms for what life and thought can be: for the
life they offer is not worthy of what life is. If not a few Western theorists have seen this,
it is also the case that many of their critiques (and many that continue to form the
available and accustomed critical arsenal) tend to be waged in a way that does not yet
permit us to grapple adequately with the problem of nature, and to see how this problem
is integrally of concern here. This occurs, not least, where we resort to a story of
anthropocentric, willful freedom as the ontological grounds necessary for breaking open
contemporary life for disputation and rethinking at all. I hope that the present study may
be taken as a modest contribution towards exploring less anthropocentric and
monological ways of grappling with this problem and thinking about alternatives.
However, we do find ourselves struggling here within an overarching, globalizing
context, as it were a great machinery long ago set in motion, from which it is difficult to
know if “we”, or indeed if anyone, will emerge. Rubbed raw against his iron cage of
disenchantment a hundred years ago, and attempting to evaluate what life could then hold
for us under the dominant and seemingly immovable terms of our modernizing
rationality, Max Weber once prophesied that “not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but
rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness.”3 Weber understood by his words an
impoverishment of our worldly existence, the loss of a certain freedom and beauty and
plenitude possible for human life, though he did not yet fathom the full consequences of
3
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this process for the fate of all life on our planet, as such. But coming after Weber, if we
project forth our futures as merely the further playing-out of our dominant logics, of the
relations we seem bound and determined collectively to enact, it seems no exaggeration
that this winter promises to be long and dark indeed. Can we even, in full honesty to
ourselves, imagine that a spring will come before the end? Is there not a sense, as one
thinker has put it, that it is easier for us today to imagine the end of all life on earth than
even a much smaller, meaningful change in our rampant technological capitalism and
associated lifeways?4
As ever, however, a clear sight of the future is not open to us – and as a Quichua
thinker might remind us, we perhaps do better to refrain from pronouncing on such
matters with certainty. If there is hope, or even at least a more open-ended field of
possibility, we can perhaps glimpse this in the simple truth that Weber’s horizons do not
hold the field exclusively or universally, or unchallenged – that there remains more going
on, that the finality and inevitability of the “reason” he knew remains contestable and
never rests on merely neutral grounds, and certainly not on “reason alone”.
As a beginning and at a minimum, one possibility that still lies open to us is to
refuse the blackmails that even Weber thus played into – and which we ourselves
continually experience in everyday hailings of interpellation, and the demand that these
be seen to straightforwardly capture things as what they (and we) are, to settle matters.
Where we allow our ethical horizons and our terms for interpreting the world to be sewn
up neatly in the claim that we all are and must be moderns now, we also too readily
convince ourselves that we have no option but to go all-in on all the wagers of modernity
wherever the question comes up – as it does in all manner of everyday contexts. Matters
become accordingly at once simpler, more easily legible, and less open – as a wealth of
contestations, alternate possibilities, and more complex considerations are continually
passed over and effaced. But there is room here yet for disagreement, and aliveness to a
persistent agonism within our present; for practices of defamiliarization; for cultivating
and nurturing alternate relationships; for refusing the simple resolution, the closure from
disruption, of onto-political and ethical terrains – which means nothing less than the
4
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terrain of reality itself and of our concrete relations. There is moreover room for the work
(at once personal and collective/interactive) of decolonization and for fostering better
relationships with Indigenous peoples, for doing better rather than worse under the
circumstances, and for attempting to learn something from Indigenous normative and
philosophical traditions, and to respond and carry forward what we learn in our own way
as authentically and courageously as we can. There is room to help preserve and
strengthen alternative positivities and coherences that exist and to let ourselves be shaped
by them: alternate disciplines, alternate games of truth. It is Hobbes who tells us that
where there is not the order of modernity, there is chaos and uninhabitable nothingness.
The better counter is not simply to opt for the chaos that is the mere negation Hobbes’
order, but to see and to show from the beginning that this construal of the alternatives,
and of the terrain we must navigate, is false.
This is so even if we concede that simply disengaging the state altogether, and all
the structures through which we remain embroiled in it and the rest of our dominant
heritage, may seem at once idiosyncratic and self-delusional, and to abandon ground that
remains valuable in concrete struggles. (Indeed my writing of this dissertation, in
conversation with a public university, presupposes at some level a different strategy.) But
to resist the closure, the containments, and the disavowals our dominant logics would
have us accept, to foreground and remain faithful to a context of onto-political
disagreement and the alternate possibilities this leaves us with – that in itself, thought
through and carried forward in concrete instances in daily and collective life, may already
open up great deal, and to entail no shortage of political work in colonial contexts. And
if, as Nietzsche has it, the wasteland grows – then woe indeed to them that harbour
wastelands within, who are able to be nothing else, because they also experience and are
up to nothing else.
Even so, the Weberian in us will ask: will Western society at large, and the
globalized world along with it, continue undeterred (and despite all efforts at resistance)
down its present and colonially violent path to ecological ruin, ever convinced that there
are no meaningful alternatives, that any actually different lifeways are only the
anachronistic echoes of “humanity’s” primitive past? Or will different futures be
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possible, shaped by different practices and more sustainable relations? Jacques
Rancière’s writing on politics suggests that politically effective interventions on the
sayable and thinkable, litigations against the exclusion of worlds, may bring about an
experience of rupture – and with this, a reconfiguration of the terms of the dominant
order.5 Will such reconfigurations indeed be possible, in an adequately meaningful way,
for our society?
Such questions reach beyond our sight. Practically, to give up on such a
possibility altogether would seem to lead us only to a quietism or resignation that is I
think intolerable, coming from us. Even so, present experience would seem to promise no
small sadness for any who are bonded in empathy with the land and non-human others,
who have intimated the most sublime heights and terrors of the soul in the beautiful and
beckoning intensities of the forest, who have grown and stretched even themselves
sufficiently to feel something of their own death in the death and silencing of the land.
(And we can also recognize how difficult it is to share this sadness with those not already
attuned to it; for feeling yakichina entails work that it is fully possible to ignore. We
accordingly find ourselves fumbling for words in the face of callous insensitivity, of
impoverishment that thinks itself as wealth. And to this it is difficult to have any adequate
rejoinder, other than to simply admit that this too is part of our situation and the sadness
of it.)
We might draw a cautionary lesson here from the longstanding love-affair that
modern Western imaginary and its blackmails have had with a certain kind of temporal
reasoning. In this reasoning, the future is projected to follow inevitably from out of
modern logics, which in turn justifies in a renewed way contentious assumptions about
the present – namely, that it is modern, or that now is a time only for becoming modern,
that those who live today can have no time for anything else. Under that temporal
framing, we have tended for a long time to see Indigenous peoples and traditions as
unavoidably destined for extinction. Now, in a reversal of “civilizing” universal history
into universal decline, it seems that most life on our planet must also go. We should not
assume that there are not real dangers and pressures in this regard; but once again we
5
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should resist taking such matters too readily as foregone conclusions. They have been
wrong, too quick, and most certainly harmful in the past. And we might well harbour
worries about the kinds of projects and “solutions” such a logic might lead us to in years
to come, as our ecological situation worsens.
One lesson that relational thinking might broadly invite us to here – as a thinking
of emplaced situatedness, of attentive listening wary of abstraction – is to not blind
ourselves to what remains (Heidegger might say, what is nearest) before us – to those
relationships we yet do have and can have as real positivities. Hearing a different kind of
story, or a way of thinking that allows the world to cohere in alternate ways, can be
powerful and go to work on us in such relationships, and can and do bear fruits, when
approached the right way and with sufficient effort. There remain possibilities for a more
expansive vision of existence to which we might strive to do justice, and from which it is
possible to gain nourishment and strength. And neither need we reduce what can be
involved here to actuality of presence: what we might call the work of “memory” and
memorializing, but which is really only another form of relation, constitutes a crucial
force in this connection. Might the cultivation of such relations be a beginning, a source
of disruption that pries open alternate futures? We might hope so and work toward such a
possibility. But whatever scenario awaits us in the years to come, keeping alive such
alternate modes of relating and cultivating ourselves would seem at a minimum to be a
vital possibility for even our own enrichment and enlivening. It would seem vital for our
own sense of beauty and interconnectedness, for remembering why one must fight at all,
for keeping all this alive for others, for keeping open doors that the worst aspects of the
modern tradition would see closed forever.
Tod Swanson recounts in one article how a highland Quichua woman he has
interviewed understands changes she has experienced in recent years to the Andean
landscape she knows and cultivates. The increasing poverty of the soil there is interpreted
through Catholicized imagery as the “aging and tiring of God” – though in speaking of
God here she identifies Him, in a more traditional highland Quichua fashion, with the
earth and the weather, and signifies her reverence for these. For her, the inattentiveness of
people to the dynamics of the land and its changing rhythms, their (quilla-like) envy for
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the lives and situations of others (we might say the mobilizing ethic of modernity),
contributes to this accelerated aging of God. This Quichua woman’s response, as
Swanson tells it, has been to strive to better attune her own life to the rhythms of the land
she knows, to its storylines, “so as to slow down God’s aging.”6 Maintaining and
deepening relationships with the land, in this sense, appears as a kind of counterforce, an
effort of mindfulness that preserves a richness of positivity as a potential disruption of
fate, as a way to enliven and actualize alternate futures, if always within a kind of tragic
context of looming death.
So as to slow down God’s aging – to slow the tiring of the earth, and the decay of
relationships – which means also the decay of ourselves. Such a phrase makes little sense
within our dominant frameworks; but holding off such initial closures, there is perhaps
much that can yet be nurtured with the aid of such an ethic. Perhaps even those of us who
are non-Indigenous might take a lesson here – an invitation to explore, strengthen, and
keep alive more intimate and dialogic relations with the land; to be “faithful to the earth”,
we might say, so as to also let the earth in turn be as generous as possible; to care for the
richness of our dwelling-places and help this remain audible and esteemed a little longer.
To explore meaningful alternatives for understanding and living a good life, to carry
these forward lest the night fall even before its time. It might perhaps be hoped that such
an ethic could make no mean contribution to the unfolding fate of our times, and to our
own worthiness in meeting it.

6
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